

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3367

shall be my intention to try with determination.

My personal regards to you.
Cordially and sincerely,

JOHN Q. McADAMS.

VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PRICE). Under previous order of the House the gentleman from New York [Mr. RYAN] is recognized for 30 minutes. (Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted today that Members of the House of Representatives have taken time in which to discuss the serious situation which exists in Vietnam. I believe that we have heard this afternoon from the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] and the other Members who have addressed the House, a very sincere discussion of some of the very complicated and complex problems which confront us in the entire area.

Mr. Speaker, last June 10 when the Foreign Aid Act of 1964 was under consideration on the floor of the House, I discussed some of the very serious problems confronting the United States in Vietnam. I said then:

The military situation in the area is steadily deteriorating and the United States is becoming more and more involved in a mean and ugly war.

I suggested then that there should be debate in the House of Representatives concerning our policy in this war-torn area. Unfortunately, since then the military situation has gone from bad to worse and our involvement has become even deeper. But debate has begun in the House of Representatives and in the other body. It is very important that elected Representatives of the people present their views on an issue which is fraught with so much complexity and so much danger and has so many ramifications for the American people.

Although recent events, including the bombing of North Vietnam, have heightened the crisis, the fundamental situation has not really changed since I talked on June 10. It is still true that the shifting governments in Saigon have not been able to gain the support of the South Vietnamese people. Indeed, it is difficult to see how anyone in South Vietnam could be fiercely loyal to the Central Government when that Government hardly exists. There have been eight coups in 16 months. The most recent occurred only a few days ago.

Mr. Speaker, this political instability, this pattern of coup after coup, coup within coup, and coup and countercoup—can only breed cynicism and indifference on the part of the great majority of the people of South Vietnam. The political situation in South Vietnam casts doubt upon slogans about protecting the "freedom" of the people. The fact is that there is no elected government.

Not only is there no constitutional government in South Vietnam, but the discontent of the Buddhists, students, and others is apparent. No wonder a responsible commentator, Walter Lippman, almost a year ago estimated:

The Saigon government has the allegiance of probably no more than 30 percent of the people and controls (even in daylight) not much more than a quarter of the territory.

The lack of support of the people is of great military significance, for this is not a conventional war. It is a guerrilla war. The enemy infiltrates into South Vietnam by walking through the jungle. He mingles with, and is usually indistinguishable from, the local population which supports him. Since the Vietcong live among the South Vietnamese, it is highly unlikely that attacks such as the one at Pleiku, which require advance planning and coordination, can be successful unless the South Vietnamese can be counted on not to inform the Americans. Mr. Speaker, we must face the facts in South Vietnam.

In spite of the evidence, it often is argued that this guerrilla war can be won in South Vietnam. The experiences in Greece, Malaya and the Philippines are cited. Without going into great detail, there are essential differences between those situations and the one we face in South Vietnam.

In Greece the Communist guerrillas were not defeated until Yugoslavia closed its border, depriving them of their sanctuary. Moreover, the Greeks were motivated to win.

In Malaya the guerrillas belonged to the Chinese minority, and there was no active sanctuary next door. Despite advantages the British had in Malaya, which do not exist in South Vietnam, it took 13 years and cost \$3 billion to defeat 8,000 guerrillas with 300,000 men.

In the Huk uprising in the Philippines the guerrillas were cut off from outside help, and a sound agricultural reform program deprived the Communists of much of their appeal. Yet it took 7 years for approximately 60,000 men to defeat 8,000 to 10,000 guerrillas.

If one seeks a parallel to Vietnam, let us look to the French involvement in Algeria where 760,000 men were tied down for 8 years at a cost of \$12 billion, fighting a guerrilla force which shrank from 60,000 to 7,000 at the time of the cease-fire. By the time the French were "winning the war" it appeared that it would require the maintenance of 200,000 to 300,000 troops in Algeria to prevent the recurrence of guerrilla activity. The Algerian experience suggests that, if the minds and hearts of the people are lost, it is almost impossible to win a guerrilla war by military means.

Mr. Speaker, what alternatives are feasible in this situation? It has been seriously proposed in some quarters that the war be greatly expanded by massive bombing of North Vietnam and a massive troop commitment to South Vietnam. The New York Times editorial of last Sunday, February 21, pointed out:

Not one of our major allies in the West could be expected to endorse, much less actively assist, an American involvement so massive it would amount to a military occupation of leaderless South Vietnam.

Furthermore, the New York Times said that the costs of such an adventure would end America's efforts to demonstrate the superiority of its social system by abolishing poverty and building a Great Society.

Increasing escalation of the war in South Vietnam will bring the Chinese closer and closer to open intervention and increase the possibility of a Korean style war. Moreover, this would provide the paste and glue for the Chinese and the Russians to paper over their differences—differences which we should seek to exploit. As Walter Lippmann said in his column of February 18:

For this country to involve itself in such a war in Asia would be an act of supreme folly. While the warhawks would rejoice when it began, the people would weep before it ended.

While it would be highly dangerous to escalate the war, while there is no pat answer to the problem, I do not stand here to advocate a complete withdrawal. A complete withdrawal from the area would probably lead to Communist control of the whole peninsula. The pressures on Cambodia, the pressures on Thailand, would be enormous. In addition, we have a commitment, and if we were to abrogate that commitment, our action would lessen the reliability of our commitments elsewhere in the world. Therefore, in considering our future course, we must make it clear that we do not intend to bargain away the independence of South Vietnam.

However, within that framework it seems to me there are reasonable, sensible, and honorable alternatives which should be explored and which we must explore, for time is running out. If we keep in mind President Kennedy's immortal words, "Let us never negotiate out of fear but let us never fear to negotiate," we can seek a negotiated settlement which guarantees the independence of South Vietnam.

I suggested last June that we steer such a course. The United States today is still in a good position to negotiate an honorable settlement. Despite the deteriorating position in the south, North Vietnam has its difficulties and faces serious problems. The North Vietnamese have spent 10 long and arduous years in building up their industrial policy, which they know could be destroyed overnight by the U.S. Air Force. Our recent bombing raids should have left little doubt of the increasing possibility that the United States will use its air power to the fullest and maximum extent.

Moreover, as the situation grows more intense, as the war steps up, there is the greater possibility that Communist China will "volunteer" to aid North Vietnam by sending troops into that country. The North Vietnamese have had experience with Chinese occupation before. The Chinese occupied North Vietnam for centuries, and it is doubtful that the North Vietnamese would want to repeat that experience. It also appears that the Russians would not want to see the Chinese take over North Vietnam because that would lead to further expansion into southeastern Asia.

Economically and geographically North and South Vietnam complement each other. The north needs the rice from the south. Before the war there were large imports of rice from the

south. Certainly the south could use the industrial goods of the north.

Mr. Speaker, the elements for negotiation in this situation do exist. Once there is a willingness to negotiate, a proper forum within which to negotiate can be found whether it is through the machinery which was set up in 1954 at the Geneva Conference or through the United Nations or some other forum or international conference.

It is impossible at this moment, I realize, to set forth any surefire formula for negotiations. However, various possibilities can be suggested. Again let me stress that any plan must insure the independence of South Vietnam.

In the first place, there must be an immediate cease-fire. Then there can be serious discussion of the terms of a potential political settlement. Any agreement for a settlement would have to be guaranteed by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

A minimal agreement might guarantee that both North and South Vietnam would agree not to join any military alliances or attempt to overthrow each other either directly or by subversion. Each would be allowed to develop its own form of government. The South would agree to normalize trade relations with the North, but it would not be necessary to offer diplomatic recognition. The relationship between East and West Germany might be used as an example in that respect. As I suggested last June, joint economic projects between the North and South might lead to eventual reunification and free elections.

Another possible area of solution might be to provide for both North and South Vietnam to enter the United Nations on the stipulation that all aggressive action, including subversion, cease between them and, furthermore, that trade be resumed. The United Nations might very well be called upon to send a peacekeeping force into the area to supervise such an agreement.

Then there is another possibility, one which in the long scope of history and on the basis of a long-range look into the future should be given very serious consideration. That is the creation on a regional level of an agreement which would include North and South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Such an agreement would prohibit the signatory countries from joining any military alliances or attempting to overthrow the governments which are parties to the agreement.

A common market might be devised for North and South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Consideration might be given to the establishment of a customs union and a payments union to finance special projects and long-term economic development. A regional planning bank could plan projects for the entire area or for the individual countries.

Mr. Speaker, whatever political settlement is envisioned would have, I say again, to be guaranteed by the great powers. Either the International Control Commission under the Geneva agreement or the United Nations would be expected to play a peacekeeping role in the area.

As I said at the beginning, there are no final answers to the difficult problem of South Vietnam. However, neither is there any satisfactory military solution. Therefore, a diplomatic resolution of the problem must be found.

I return to the thought of a recent editorial which appeared in the New York Times on February 9, 1965, which is expressed in this way:

The only way out is diplomatic, international, political, economic—not military. A solution will not be found by exchanging harder and harder blows. Perhaps a new start can be made from an untried base—that Americans, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Russians are all sensible human beings who are ready for peace in southeast Asia, or at least willing to consider it.

Mr. Speaker, it is time to make a new start in Vietnam.

MR. JUSTICE FELIX FRANKFURTER

(Mr. CONTE (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, it is an irony of life that amid our rejoicing and celebrations we must give pause to mourn. Two days ago, on the birthday of the first American President, we lost a man who had become within his lifetime first among American judges, Felix Frankfurter never sat as the Chief Justice of this land, but he was its chief jurist.

Long before his death, novice and trained lawyers studied and were guided by the brilliance of the law he set down in his opinions and as, indeed, they shall long be guided after his death. For no man more epitomized the clarity, the intricacy, the sternness and the mercy of the law than did Mr. Justice Frankfurter.

And if for future generations we must mark this man, if mark him we can, then let us say: "To no one did he sell, to none did he deny or delay, right or justice."

Mr. Speaker, at this point, I wish to insert into the Record the New York Times editorial of February 24, 1965:

FELIX FRANKFURTER

Felix Frankfurter was the heir and exemplar of several traditions that have mingled successfully in the rich tapestry of American life.

Had he lived in the 18th century enlightenment, he would have been at home in Dr. Johnson's London or in the Paris that so warmly welcomed Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin. He had a Jewish love of learning for its own sake as befitted the descendant of six generations of rabbis and Talmudic scholars. He was an effervescent, insatiable conversationalist—a suitable taste and talent for a man born, as he was, in 19th-century Vienna.

Frankfurter had the authentic radical's need to protest against injustice and, in so doing, to risk unpopularity with the rich and respectable. He exposed the wrongful conviction of labor leader Tom Mooney during the patriotic excitement of World War I. He crusaded in behalf of a new trial for Sacco and Vanzetti, in 1927, shocking many defenders of the status quo in Harvard Yard and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He was active in innumerable dissenting movements.

But Frankfurter had also the authentic conservative's devotion to the past, respect for power and taste for balance and order and moderation. He entered public life under the auspices of Henry L. Stimson, one of America's great conservative statesmen. As Chairman of the War Labor Policies Board in World War I, adviser to Presidents and finally Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Frankfurter served his Government with conspicuous devotion. Nor was it any accident that he contributed the phrase "with all deliberate speed"—with its nicely balanced double imperative—to the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision.

During more than 20 years at the Harvard Law School, he was a superb teacher of law. Combining erudition with enthusiasm, he awakened, stimulated, goaded, enlightened and finally educated hundreds of young men—not only as skilled professionals but as civilized men and as future public servants with lively consciences.

Among his admirers there was a school of thought that for Frankfurter elevation to the Supreme Court, although it seemed to crown his career, was in fact an anticlimax and a wrong turning. This greatest of teachers, some believed, lacked the ultimate self-confidence to wield judicial power, intimately acquired though he was with the workings of political power.

Certainly his death will only temporarily still the long-continuing controversy between the judicial activists and the advocates of judicial self-restraint whose cause he championed. There is no need here to arbitrate this rich and fruitful intellectual dispute. One has only to observe that he was admirably brilliant, honest and unsparring in his contribution to the public dialog.

As a philosopher and scholar of the law, a judicial craftsman, a master of prose style and a formative influence on a generation of American lawyers and public officials, Felix Frankfurter was a major shaper of the history of his age.

FORT SNELLING

(Mr. MacGREGOR (at the request of Mrs. REID of Illinois) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MacGREGOR. Mr. Speaker, a citizens' group in Minnesota, named the Fort Snelling State Park Association and headed by Samuel H. Morgan, of St. Paul, has been doing a magnificent job in working to preserve the historic and natural values of the Fort Snelling area, the birthplace of modern Minnesota. Plans are underway now, with notable accomplishments already recorded, for a State park in the fast-growing Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area within easy access of nearly two-thirds of the population of the State. It has been designated as a national historic landmark.

Over \$200,000 has been raised from private sources to implement the work of this association. Because this park is so important to the entire State of Minnesota I am inserting in the Record today a portion of the chapter entitled "The Americans Build Fort Snelling," from the book "Minnesota—A History of the State," by Dr. Theodore C. Blegen, the dean emeritus of the University of Minnesota graduate school. Dr. Blegen's excellent one-volume history of our State was published in 1963 by the University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minn.

The excerpt is as follows:

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3365

had to get military advice to the proper authorities, and to determine who was in power very often caused a cessation of combat operations with the enemy. In effect, the war would stop while the heads of government and the key leaders in the Army were changed, and this meant a complete retraining program by the American mission of all military unit heads as well as political subdivision chiefs.

Probably one of the hallmarks of our mission in Vietnam has been the extreme patience of our American advisers, from our Ambassador and military commanders, down to the valiant Americans who spill their blood along with their Vietnamese comrades. The situation to say the least is vexatious but we must always keep our eyes on our strategic role—that of thwarting these Communist advances. We will be successful. The Vietnamese will win their struggle. However, the road to victory never has been easy. The future may call for more intensive strikes at the base and source of Communist power and aggression in North Vietnam. The borders of South Vietnam may have to be sealed to prevent the flow of reinforcements and war material to the subversive Communist army. The 1,800 miles of coastline must be patrolled and the potential for resupply of North Vietnamese operations on the sea be destroyed.

The American people stand firm behind their President and behind the principles of freedom everywhere.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MURPHY of New York. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I would like at this point in the Record to include an observation to the effect that the gentleman from New York [Mr. MURPHY] is speaking from a very knowledgeable position, being a graduate of the Military Academy and having been one of the great heroes of the Korean war. He full well knows what the battle with the Communists means. He is fully prepared to evaluate properly exactly what we are doing in southeast Asia.

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman for his very knowledgeable opinions in this debate here today.

Mr. MURPHY of New York. I thank the gentleman from New Jersey.

BANKING POLICY AND NEW BANKS

(Mr. HANNA asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. HANNA. Mr. Speaker, it is fairly obvious that the Comptroller of the Currency's office in general, and the recent more liberal policy for new bank entry in particular, has become a popular agency not only for criticism but also a rebuke. No agency has operated infallibly and, therefore, all are open to criticism. Also, it is fair to observe that these departments of Government are no more likely to be completely clear of partisanship under a Democratic administration than they were under a Republican ad-

ministration and I do not think that anyone is surprised that this is so.

The Office of Comptroller has taken on the vigor and assertedness not always present in its operations and there are many who would have preferred the previous status. Mr. Saxon announced candidly his intention of broad competition in the banking field, and injected new ideas and new personalities into the field. This he has done in the normal course available under the law by chartering new banks. This policy, coming as it did after a long history of very limited new bank entry, gave the appearance of a revolutionary change and, in fact, on filling the area of banking expansion to meet the level of banking service and need as determined by his office. Mr. Saxon's first year's service struck with particular impact. In our judgment, and I think those of sober objective observers, the soundness of the Saxon policy can only be ultimately determined by the results of that policy when time has given a sufficient period to correctly assess the affects of that policy.

Banking is, under our laws, a quasi-public activity, with special privileges and special responsibilities. To the degree that new bank entries are extremely limited it can become a private monopoly under public protection. It occurs to this Representative that our country, in its past, has preferred policies of maximum competition in a free market and such a policy is ill served by a banking policy which would develop fewer and fewer banks as our population and economic strength expanded.

Mr. Speaker, if an investigation, upon appropriate grounds, is indicated as being desirable, I would suggest that such investigation direct itself to an objective scrutiny of the policy of the Controller, seeking to determine whether the results of free competition, better and newer services, and wider business opportunity have in fact been achieved. The operations of all Government agencies are no doubt open to some sniping on the details of particular cases, but if there is, beyond that, a charge raising the question of criminal action or malfeasance in office, these should be particularly made and particularly pursued, with emphasis of responsibility on the part of those making the charges.

There remains one further observation Mr. Speaker. Some of the confusion and much of the criticism should be directed against the confusion in the laws Congress has drawn relative to banking regulations. Some recent events have demonstrated clearly that responsibility has been too broadly proliferated in three agencies: the Federal Reserve, the Controller, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Some better mechanism for cooperation between the State and Federal agencies should be devised and finally, such new regulatory laws as may in the future be devised, should provide administrative action that assists compliance with the laws more than to punish for failure to comply. The agency should be as much a partner as it is a policeman.

It is our opinion that when time has given a proper measure for performance, Mr. Saxon's contribution will, on balance, have been a constructive one.

INVESTIGATION NEEDED WITH RESPECT TO SOME PHASES OF THE BANKING BUSINESS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Gross] is recognized for 15 minutes.

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, an investigation of some phases of the banking business in this country is overdue.

Evidence has come to the surface indicating there is something wrong in the way national banks are being chartered, denied charters, and in the general administration of banking laws.

The Bobby Baker investigation, as halfhearted and spineless as it has been, has provided evidence indicating political influence is involved at least to some extent in the chartering of national banks by Comptroller of the Currency James Saxon.

Certainly, the strong political complexion of some of the stockholders of the District of Columbia National Bank raises some serious questions that call for a much deeper investigation than there has been to this date.

Such an investigation, to have any real meaning, must disclose the names of all political figures—including Members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives—who are dealt in on the original stock and thereby stand in a position to make a financial killing.

The payment of a \$5,000 fee to Wayne Bromley, a former assistant to Bobby Baker, and the cashing of the check in that amount by Baker, certainly raises some questions in connection with the Redwood National Bank at San Rafael, Calif. Baker and Bromley have taken the fifth amendment on all questions relating to the possible use of political influence in that and other matters, but this provides no excuse for Congress to fail to do a full investigation.

I repeat that these cases and others raise danger signals that the chartering of national banks is serving a type of political patronage. There is also evidence that the activity of political figures has been an important factor in the decision to reject an application for a national bank charter.

The full evidence is not available but what is available indicates that former Secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth, of Fort Worth, Tex., was involved in political string pulling to block the issuance of a national bank charter in Winters, Tex. Only a thorough investigation by the Senate or House, or both, will determine the extent of the hanky pank involved in this case.

If Korth was not involved in the use of political influence at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, then he and

3366

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

February 24

some of his banking associates misrepresented their political fixing ability in order to get additional new deposits for Korth's Continental National Bank in Fort Worth.

Correspondence that Korth made available in connection with the TFX warplane investigation discloses strong evidence of political manipulations in connection with at least one national bank charter. Here is a brief chronology of what happened in this case:

First. An application was filed for a new national bank charter in Winter, Tex. It was opposed by several bankers, including Fred Holland, president of the Merchants and Planters National Bank of Sherman, Tex., and John Q. McAdams, president of the Winters State Bank of Winters, Tex.

Second. Holland wrote to Korth on November 7, 1962, asking the then Secretary of the Navy for help in blocking the national charter for Winters, and promising to "make it worthwhile" to the Continental National Bank at Fort Worth. Holland commented that there were other banks in the Winters, Tex., area that would be equally grateful if Korth and his associates at Continental in Fort Worth would block the Winters charter.

It should be noted at this point that Winters, Tex., is a considerable distance from either Fort Worth or Sherman, Tex.—far too distant to be competitive in normal banking business.

Third. On November 9, 1962, Korth replied to Holland stating he would "do everything I can" to assist in blocking the Winters application.

Fourth. Holland replied on January 22, 1963, enclosing a copy of a letter to Comptroller of the Currency Saxon and making reference to the fact that G. E. "Gus" Holmstrom, senior executive vice president of Korth's bank, knew all about it and added:

We will greatly appreciate you helping us with this matter and shall certainly look forward to the opportunity of returning the favor.

Bear in mind that Korth, then Secretary of the Navy, was the former president of Continental National Bank and still owned about \$160,000 worth of stock in Continental.

Fifth. On April 23, 1963, Holmstrom wrote to McAdams, of the Winters State Bank, assuring him that he and Korth would do all they could to block the issuance of a national bank charter at Winters.

Sixth. On the same day, April 23, 1963, Holmstrom, the senior vice president of Fort Worth's Continental National, wrote to Korth, then Navy Secretary, and I quote the following from that letter:

Just a short note to let you know that John Q. McAdams has increased his account with us substantially, and I am convinced now that if the application for a national bank charter at Winters could be declined, we would probably get all of his business. Thought you might be interested in having this information.

Seventh. On June 21, 1963, Comptroller of the Currency Saxon rejected

the application for the new national bank charter at Winters.

Elghth. A few days later, on June 29, 1963, McAdams wrote to Navy Secretary Korth:

Want to thank you as sincerely as I know for the assistance you gave in defeating an application for a national bank in our town. If the opportunity is ever presented for me to show my appreciation for this favor it shall be my intention to try with determination.

This is not the whole story but it is enough to demonstrate that a penetrating investigation is called for in this case and other cases involving the business of banking. And let it be a fair and decent investigation, not a repetition of the Bobby Baker affair which has long been smothered under an avalanche of white-wash.

Following are the texts of the letters released by Korth after he found an investigating committee hot on his trail in the TFX fighter plane contract case:

THE MERCHANTS & PLANTERS
NATIONAL BANK,

Sherman, Tex., November 7, 1962.

HON. FRED KORTH,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR FRED: I first want to apologize for taking your valuable time to discuss a matter of relative unimportance, in view of the fact that you have so many very important things to do.

Gus told me a couple of days ago that he had talked with you about the application here for a national bank charter. I believe he also told you, at the same time, that the sponsoring group was Charles Spears and his associates, who presently have the Grayson County State Bank and the Texoma Savings & Loan Association.

Presently there are 2 banks in Sherman and 10 banks in Grayson County, which we sincerely believe take care of the banking needs of our community. The proposed location of this new bank is less than five city blocks from the Grayson County State Bank, and is to be located in a shopping center which we understand will be started in the near future.

We know the prevailing attitude with respect to new charters, as well as branch banks in general, and feel that we must have assistance from friends like you if we are to effectively oppose this application.

I have assured Gus that if we are successful in our efforts that we shall certainly make it worth while to his bank, and would like nothing better than to solicit similar assistance from the banks in Denison, Whitesboro, Whitewright, and the others in our area.

When you have time I would appreciate having your thoughts on this subject.

Respectfully yours,

FRED HOLLAND,
President.

NOVEMBER 9, 1962.

MR. FRED HOLLAND,
President, The Merchants & Planters National
Bank, Sherman, Tex.

DEAR FRED: I have your letter of November 7 and certainly share your concern with reference to the proposed new national bank charter. I shall do everything I can consistently to assist you in blocking what I consider an improper application.

I will discuss this matter with the proper people.

With best regards,
Sincerely,

FRED KORTH.

THE MERCHANTS & PLANTERS
NATIONAL BANK,
Sherman, Tex., January 22, 1963.

HON. FRED KORTH,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR FRED: I am enclosing copy of a letter to Mr. Saxon relative to our opposition to the granting of the new bank charter here. You will notice that we have based our opposition on the lack of community need and stayed completely away from the fact that it will be actually a part of the Grayson County State Bank and Texoma Savings & Loan Association, which you will remember are both controlled by Charles Spears.

Gus Holmstrom knows the situation here well and I am sure he would tell you that if there was a need for another bank at this time we would be the first to recognize it.

We will greatly appreciate your helping us with this matter and shall certainly look forward to the opportunity of returning the favor.

Cordially yours,

FRED HOLLAND,
President.

APRIL 23, 1963.

HON. FRED KORTH,
Pentagon Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR FRED: John Q. McAdams keeps calling me concerning a new bank charter application in Winters. I have told him that we would do whatever we could, and I also admonished him to be very careful as to what statements he made, as we were not in a position to commit ourselves in any way, due to our correspondent at Abilene.

However, it seems rather foolish for the national department to grant a charter in a town with only 3,000 people, and only \$4 million on deposit.

The bank now located there is adequate for this size town, especially when there are many banks in the county in every direction from Winters.

With kindest regards.

Yours very truly,

G. E. HOLMSTROM,
Senior Executive Vice President.

CONTINENTAL NATIONAL BANK OF
FORT WORTH,
Fort Worth, Tex.

HON. FRED KORTH,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR FRED: Just a short note to let you know John Q. McAdams has increased his account with us substantially, and I am convinced now that if the application for the national charter at Winters could be declined, we would probably get all of his business. Thought you might be interested in having this information.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

G. E. HOLMSTROM.

THE WINTERS STATE BANK,
WINTERS, TEX., June 29, 1963.

HON. FRED KORTH,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR FRED: Want to thank you as sincerely as I know for the assistance you gave in defeating an application for a national bank in our town. When word came a day or two ago of this negative answer the whole town and those composing the area, except for a few individuals, were as happy as people can get. You know, Fred, if the Lord himself had a bank he could not have 100-percent support.

If the opportunity is ever presented for me to show my appreciation for this favor, it

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3363

Indonesia would be lost forever to the free world.

Should this happen the great subcontinent of India, already under Chinese pressure along its Himalayan frontier, would be a prime target for further expansion of communism. Here we have involved not only the Indians but also the Pakistani. The Philippines, Taiwan and Japan are likewise flanked and could not survive infiltration, subversion or assault. The Chinese colossus would then be at the front door of Australia and New Zealand, both with only token defense forces.

Where can the stand be made? Unfavorable as Vietnam might be, where will conditions be better? With each victory, with each swallow our enemy will grow stronger and the free world weaker. This lesson is not lost on Australia and New Zealand, both of which are beginning to look to their defenses.

Our policy, through both Republican and Democratic administrations, has been to contain communism—and it has generally been successful. Since the dust settled on World War II with Eastern Europe behind the Iron Curtain, only North Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba have fallen to the Communists. Even in Korea, unsatisfactory as the conclusion there might seem to many people, communism did not advance beyond the 17th parallel. It was contained.

We have heard it said that communism contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction. There are signs that these seeds are maturing and that the Communist empire is beginning to break up. Freedom cannot be forever suppressed. A successful policy of containment—of denying the expansion of communism—will expedite this process. Expansion to include the mushrooming population and the great resources of southeast Asia can only strengthen our enemy and weaken the free world's ability to finally take a stand—as take a stand we must.

It is far easier to say what must be done than it is to say how it should be done. On this score we must rely on those better informed than we, but we cannot help but speculate on what might work.

I am pleased to note the observations of the gentleman from New Jersey that the South Vietnamese in the field are prepared to continue the battle. I agree that a prime objective must be a stable government in Saigon capable of attracting the loyalty of the South Vietnamese. I deplore the lack of leadership and the internecine strife that has characterized South Vietnam for too long. Yet, I think it is not too much to expect that South Vietnam will produce—perhaps with our help—the leadership it so desperately requires just as England produced its Churchill at the ebb of the tide, as France accepted De Gaulle in the midst of chaos, indeed as Malaysia produced its Tunku. This must be the objective of our diplomacy.

Militarily, all is not as black as is painted but success in the field is vital to the establishment of a stable government. I would support—as all of us would—a multi-nation effort in lieu of bearing the

entire responsibility ourselves. But there is no possibility at this point of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The current U.N. financial crises makes this apparent. Britain has its hands full with its commitment in Malaysia. France urges virtual withdrawal. Only token internationalization is possible but this I would support.

I would then pursue with even greater diligence and a greater commitment of Western troops—yes, American troops, if necessary—the fortified village concept which ultimately led to success in Malaya. I say Western troops because the job in Malaya was easier in that the enemy—the Chinese Communists—were ethnically different from the Malaysians. The Vietcong refuse to wear black hats and the “protected villages” which the South Vietnamese “liberate” fall when left to the protection of the home guard which frequently contains one or more of the Vietcong. I am aware of the greatly increased effort this would require of the United States and South Vietnam.

A greater effort must then be made to interdict the border and stop the flow of men and arms to the south. This is a tremendous job. I like to think of our air strikes to the north as being not only “retaliatory”—in which objective I have little confidence—but also as being aimed at marshalling points and transportation lines and therefore an effort to interdict the border by the best and easiest means at hand. I am apprehensive of escalation but doubt that such will occur at the present level of “retaliation.”

And then, long since, I would have brought the Soviet Union into conversations about this area. A major war between China and the United States, from which Russia could abstain, would of course be in the Russian interest. Short of that, however, Russian interests in southeast Asia far more closely parallel American interests than they do those of the Chinese.

We had a bitter lesson in opportunistic negotiation before World War II, as area after area was sacrificed to fascism by the inactivity and, perhaps, the fear of the Western powers. The list is long—Ethiopia, Albania, Austria, the Saar, the Sudetenland. We need not, I hope, learn that lesson again. The task is not easy. It calls for the highest level of diplomacy, the most persistent, skillful, and patient military policy. The President's job—which is the job of all of us—is most difficult. The President has my confident and assured support.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members who wish to do so may be permitted 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks at this point in the Record.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. PRICE) Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I also ask unanimous consent that the special

order of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PUCINSKI], may be printed in the Record immediately following that of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER].

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

SOUTH VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. MURPHY] is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. MURPHY of New York. Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure for me to join my colleague the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] in expressing my personal, and I know the overwhelming sentiments of my district, concerning the militant role that we must play in southeast Asia.

I think we must bear in mind that military force is an extension of a nation's foreign policy and that force is used when diplomacy fails. The question in this case, however, is, Who used force first and what is the proper solution in dealing with a foe that has resorted to the tactics the Communist bloc has initiated in the southeast Asian region?

The Honorable William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, spoke before the Washington Chamber of Commerce, Washington, Mo., on Saturday, January 23, 1965, and traced the history of the present situation starting with the year 1898. I include some of his remarks:

AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Address by Hon. William P. Bundy)

I

The first question requires a look at history.

Even when the Far East was much more distant than it is today, we Americans had deep concern for developments there. Americans pioneered in trade and missionary effort with China and in opening up Japan to Western influence. In 1898 we became in a sense a colonial power in the Philippines, but began almost at once to prepare the way for independence and self-government there—an independence promised by act of Congress in 1936 and achieved on schedule in 1946. By the 1930's, we had wide interests of many types in the Far East, though only few direct contacts in southeast Asia apart from the individual Americans who had served over decades as political advisers to the independent Kingdom of Thailand.

Events then took a more ominous turn. We became aware that the ambitions of Japanese military leaders to dominate all of Asia were a threat not only to the specific interests of ourselves and other Western nations, but to the peace of the whole area and indeed of the world. China, in which we had taken a lead in dismantling the 19th century system of foreign special privileges, was progressively threatened and large parts overrun. We ourselves were finally attacked at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines. We responded to aggression by conducting with our allies a major Pacific war that cost the United States alone 272,700 casualties and over a hundred billion dollars.

In the end Japanese militarism was defeated, and the way apparently cleared for an Asia of free and independent national states that would be progressively freed of colonialism, that need threaten neither each

other nor neighboring states, and that could tackle in their own way the eternal problems of building political and economic structures that would satisfy the aspiration of their peoples.

That kind of Far East was a pretty good definition of our national interests then. It is equally valid today. We cared about the Far East, and we care today, because we know that what happens there—among peoples numbering 33 percent of the world's population, with great talent, past historic greatness, and capacity—is bound to make a crucial difference whether there will be the kind of world in which the common ideals of freedom can spread, nations live and work together without strife, and—most basic of all—we ourselves, in the long run, survive as the kind of nation we are determined to be. Our basic stake in the Far East is our stake in a peaceful and secure world as distinct from a violent and chaotic one. But there were three great flaws in the 1945 picture after the defeat of Japan.

1. In China, a civil war had been raging since the 1920's between the Government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Chinese Communist movement. After a brief and edgy truce during the war against Japan, that civil war was resumed in circumstances where the Government had been gravely weakened. We assisted that government in every way possible. Mistakes may have been made, but in the last analysis mainland China could not have been saved from communism without the commitment of major U.S. ground and air forces to a second war on the Asian mainland. Faced with a concurrent threat from Soviet Russia against Europe and the Near East, we did not make—and perhaps could not then have made—that commitment. And there came to power on the mainland, in the fall of 1949, a Communist regime filled with hatred of the West, with the vision of a potential dominant role for China, but imbued above all with a primitive Communist ideology in its most virulent and expansionist form.

2. In Korea, a divided country stood uneasily, half free and half Communist. With our military might sharply reduced after the war, as part of what may have been an inevitable slackening of effort, we withdrew our forces and reduced our economic aid before there was in existence a strong South Korean defensive capacity. With Soviet backing North Korea attacked across the 38th parallel in June 1950. With the Soviets then absent from the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. was able to condemn the aggression and to mount a U.N. effort to assist South Korea. The United States played by far the greatest outside role in a conflict that brought 157,530 U.S. casualties, cost us at least \$18 billion in direct expenses, and in the end—after Communist China had also intervened—restored an independent South Korea, although it left a unified and free Korea to be worked out in the future.

In retrospect, our action in Korea reflected three elements:

A recognition that aggression of any sort must be met early and head on, or it will have to be met later and in tougher circumstances. We had relearned the lessons of the 1930's—Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia.

A recognition that a defense line in Asia, stated in terms of an island perimeter, did not adequately define our vital interests—that those vital interests could be affected by action on the mainland of Asia.

An understanding that, for the future, a power vacuum was an invitation to aggression, that there must be local political, economic, and military strength in being to make aggression unprofitable, but also that there must be a demonstrated willingness of major external power both to assist and to intervene if required.

3. In southeast Asia, finally, there was a third major flaw—the difficulty of liquidating colonial regimes and replacing them by new and stable independent governments. The Philippines became independent and with our help overcame the ravages of war and the Communist Huk rebellion. The British, who had likewise prepared India and Burma and made them independent, were in the process of doing the same in Malaya even as they joined with the Malaysians in beating back a 12-year Communist subversive effort. Indonesia was less well prepared; it gained its independence, too, with our support, but with scars that have continued to affect the otherwise natural and healthy development of Indonesian nationalism.

French Indochina was the toughest case. The French had thought in terms of a slow evolution to an eventual status within some French union of states—a concept too leisurely to fit the postwar mood of Asia. And militant Vietnamese nationalism had fallen to the leadership of dedicated Communists.

We all know the result. Even with substantial help from us, France was unable to defeat the Communist-led nationalist movement. Despite last-minute promises of independence, the struggle inevitably appeared as an attempt to preserve a colonial position. By 1954, it could only have been won, again, by a major U.S. military commitment, and perhaps not even then. The result was the settlement at Geneva. The accords reached there were almost certainly the best achievable, but they left a situation with many seeds of future trouble. Briefly:

1. North Vietnam was militantly Communist, and had developed during the war against the French an army well equipped and highly skilled in both conventional and subversive warfare. From the start, North Vietnam planned and expected to take over the south and in due course Laos and Cambodia, thinking that this would probably happen by sheer decay under pressure, but prepared to resort to other means if needed.

2. South Vietnam had no effective or popular leadership to start with, was demoralized and unprepared for self-government, and had only the remnants of the Vietnamese military forces who had fought with the French. Under the accords, external military help was limited to a few hundred advisers. Apart from its natural self-sufficiency in food, South Vietnam had few assets that appeared to match those of the north in the struggle that was sure to come.

3. Cambodia was more hopeful in some respects, more remote from North Vietnam, with a leader in Prince Sihanouk, a strong historical tradition, and the freedom to accept external assistance as she saw fit. From the start Sihanouk insisted, with our full and continuing support, on a status of neutrality.

4. Laos, however, was less unified and was left under the accords with a built-in and legalized Communist presence, a disrupted and weak economy, and no military forces of significance.

Such was the situation President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles faced in 1954. Two things were clear—that in the absence of external help communism was virtually certain to take over the successor states of Indochina and to move to the borders of Thailand and perhaps beyond, and that with France no longer ready to act, at least in South Vietnam, no power other than the United States could move in to help fill the vacuum.

Their decision, expressed in a series of actions starting in late 1954, was to move in to help these countries. Besides South Vietnam and more modest efforts in Laos and Cambodia, substantial assistance was begun to Thailand.

The appropriations for these actions were voted by successive Congresses, and in 1954 the Senate likewise ratified the Southeast Asia Treaty, to which Thailand and the Philippines adhered along with the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan. Although not signers of the treaty, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia could call on the SEATO members for help against aggression.

So a commitment was made, with the support of both political parties, that has guided our policy in southeast Asia for a decade now. It was not a commitment that envisaged a U.S. position of power in southeast Asia or U.S. military bases there. We threatened no one. Nor was it a commitment that substituted U.S. responsibility for the basic responsibility of the nations themselves for their own defense, political stability, and economic progress. It was a commitment to do what we could to help these nations attain and maintain the independence and security to which they were entitled—both for their own sake and because we recognized that, like South Korea, southeast Asia was a key area of the mainland of Asia. If it fell to Communist control, this would enormously add to the momentum and power of the expansionist Communist regimes in Communist China and North Vietnam, and thus to the threat to the whole free world position in the Pacific.

Let us look at Vietnam from the beautiful city of Saigon. I visited Saigon in December of 1963 with five of my colleagues, and spoke at length with Gen. Paul D. Harkins, commander of our Military Assistance Advisory Group, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, and many of our American military and businessmen in the area. The most striking thing about Vietnam is the fact that it is the richest agricultural area in the world. The experts have said that sufficient food can be produced in this area to feed almost all of Asia. This territory in the southern portion of Vietnam also permits guerrilla forces to live off the land without a constant resupply to sustain their activities in the field. The area is abundant in geese, ducks, and of course the staple commodity—rice.

During the early phase of the Vietnamese operation against the Vietcong, our military adviser initiated a policy wherein all of the villages of the country were organized and defended in a unique manner. Instead of letting the farmers fall prey to small marauding bands of Vietcong, each town was fortified. The valuables were placed in a warehouse or hut in the center of town, and at the first sign of an attack, the villagers would retreat to this redoubt, and a radio call for help was sent to the nearest army force whose immediate response was guaranteed through the use of helicopters and other high-speed aircraft, in conjunction with paratroop operations. When the war was virtually won in the north the Vietcong were starved out, but in the south they could rely upon the overabundance in the Mekong Delta to support their operation, hence their success in the Saigon area.

The war has been further complicated by the very complex situation within the country. You can imagine the problems our advisers had with the turnover of governments. The American advisers

1965.

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3361

What the gentleman says and in support of what the President of the United States says.

Mr. Speaker, I am more than pleased to see that this discussion today has been treated on a nonpartisan basis—that the great leaders in the Republican Party are speaking as Americans and speaking in behalf of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, I think the gentleman from New Jersey has done the country a great service today.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentleman for his kind observations.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Speaker, I consider it a high honor and a great privilege to associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER]. The gentleman has made a very valuable contribution to our foreign policy and well being policy here today and I commend him very highly for taking this time to discuss this vital subject.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentleman from Illinois very much for his kind remarks.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Florida, a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I join in the general commendation of the gentleman in the well of the House who is discussing this subject and giving the House an opportunity to give its support to the policy of the President of the United States in this very difficult situation.

The rest of the world must and should know that the United States is not frustrated—we do know what our duty is and we are doing our duty. Despite the fact that there may be some question of what needs to be done, we know in our hearts we are doing the only thing that can be done at the present time, looking to the future and working for a different way to resolve the problem. I think most of us agree that we must hold the line and beat back the efforts being made by the aggressors, or we will not have the future opportunity to work toward another solution.

The Vietnam and Cuban problem, emphasizes the continuing difficulty that the United States and the free world have in dealing with a new concept of international politics which has been evidenced by the Communist world. We no longer have fixed lines in the old military sense. That went out many years ago. We no longer have a direct or overt crossing of a boundary line by a recognizable armed force. We no longer have a clear-cut definition of what is armed, overt, or just plain aggression. This requires us on the free world side to maintain more than military flexibility. A standard, flexible, or new military response appears to be insufficient to a problem like the one we are facing in Vietnam, despite the fact that we are committed to a military response and may have to respond in an even greater degree.

But we have not solved the basic problem of how to deal effectively in non-military terms with what is commonly called subversion either military, economic, or political. We are willing and should be willing to commit the necessary manpower, materiel, and resources to meet any military threat, but we must also look one step ahead and be working to obtain those solutions which will permit us to deal effectively with subversion without being forced into a partial or full military response.

Vietnam is not the last place that we are going to meet subversion.

The United States cannot afford to be nibbled to death and we are not going to be nibbled to death.

We have made that clear. No enemy should have any doubt about that. The history of the American people is clear, that we will stand up, fight and die if necessary to protect what we believe in.

But we face a new kind of warfare and we must be prepared to deal in every way with that new kind of warfare.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FASCELL. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. MICHEL. The point the gentleman from Florida makes is a good one. I have heard mentioned earlier in this discussion Korea and several other cases in point.

Would the gentleman not agree that Korea was an act of overt aggression? Rather than lumping the two together, here we see a classic example of indirect aggression at play. It is something new. Here we make, really, the first full test of whether or not we will meet this as we met the overt aggression.

Mr. FASCELL. The gentleman from Illinois is correct. Of course, we must meet it. We will meet it. The fact is that our enemy is working in all other countries of the world in this same fashion, but without the obvious military overtones to their acts.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentleman, who is a most knowledgeable member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. GRABOWSKI. Mr. Speaker, I have made it clear over the past few weeks that I am opposed to any withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam at the present time.

There is no other honorable action that we can take at the present time. We must stand up to the Communist threat here as we did in Cuba. We must let the Communists know we mean business as we did in Berlin. We must draw the line on Communist aggression as we did in Korea.

This Nation intends to live up to its commitments and we intend to live up to our commitment in Vietnam.

I have stated before and I say again that I support President Johnson's actions in Vietnam and will support future additional steps that are necessary to insure the continued freedom of this area.

The American people—judging by my mail—are beginning to realize that not only is South Vietnam at stake, but freedom—freedom for every peace-loving nation in the world. If we back down here,

the Communists will have gained an important victory in a strategic area of the world and will have made the United States look like the paper tiger that Red China claims she is. If that should ever happen, how could we expect our allies to believe us when we say that we stand shoulder to shoulder with them.

I am tired of listening to proposals of retreat and appeasement to the Communists. I believe that these proposals do a great deal of harm to American world leadership.

Since the emergence of the United States as the natural and willing leader of the free world we have led and will continue to lead the fight against Communist aggression.

If the time should come that we are no longer willing to oppose communism, then let us make that clear. But we are not going to abandon the battle now.

And if we should quit in Vietnam, the rest of the world will take this as a signal that we are quitting the fight and giving the Reds a victory by default. And they will think that this is the beginning of a policy of giving in to the Communists throughout the world.

Mr. Speaker, during the past few years things have not been easy. They have been far from easy. But we have always shown the world that we will fight the Communist aggressors and will stick to our commitments.

We should not and will not quit the battle now—or until the face and soul of communism is wiped from the face of the earth.

Mr. FARNUM. Mr. Speaker, in my opinion this honorable body has been greatly enlightened by the report of my distinguished colleague from the State of New Jersey, the Honorable CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER, on the conditions prevailing in Vietnam.

Without necessarily agreeing in their entirety with my colleague's conclusions, it appears to me that in his factual report he has rendered a significant service in calling the attention of this body and of our Nation to the necessity for a view of the entire situation when statements are made about our policies in that area of conflict with communism.

There is certainly no suggestion on my part that free and unlimited debate be limited in the slightest. That is unthinkable in a democracy.

But it would serve the national interest, I believe, if all who have occasion to speak of affairs beyond our borders, and particularly at this point in history of affairs in the Far East, keep in mind some of the points made by the honorable Member.

Certainly all of us agree with him that we must continually serve notice on the world that our Nation is united in meeting the challenge of communism in Vietnam.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Speaker, we who join in today's discussion are conscious of the need for the House of Representatives to speak responsibly and with understanding on the situation in Vietnam. I am pleased that we are doing so.

Both Houses of Congress have a role to play, as elected representatives of the people, in reviewing, criticizing, and

explaining our foreign policy. But we should do so with the constant realization that the President has the constitutional duty to make foreign policy. While not infallible, he has far more military and diplomatic intelligence available to him than any of us. He has acted with wisdom and restraint in South Vietnam. I trust him, and I support him.

In the last few weeks, we have seen the appearance of an abundance of "oversimplifiers"—those who see the answer in "escalation," and those who see the answer in "negotiation." In my judgment, neither view is appropriate at this time.

Bombing of North Vietnamese targets is not an answer in itself, although we must be prepared to pursue it if circumstances warrant. I say this fully cognizant of the risk of escalation inherent in our policy of measured response.

Negotiation for a neutral and unified Vietnam, as suggested by some, is a futile idea under present circumstances. For one thing, it implies that the Communists will not only abandon their drive to communize all of southeast Asia, but will also agree to neutralize North Vietnam. This is illusory. Indeed, North Vietnam and China have made it abundantly clear in radio broadcasts that they will not negotiate until the United States withdraws from South Vietnam. This is not negotiation; this is a call for unconditional surrender.

There are two ultimate ways to end any war: you either beat the enemy in a full scale confrontation, or you negotiate a settlement. That is obvious. If we do not have an all-out war, then we will ultimately have some settlement by negotiation. But the blunt truth is that in Vietnam today, there is little, if anything, that is negotiable.

We are in a situation where events compel us to continue a policy in between escalation on the one hand, and withdrawal on the other. It is a difficult position, inconsistent with characteristic American preference for quick and clean solutions. Regardless of the difficulties, however, we must persevere.

Under the best of circumstances, the creation of a secure Vietnamese state will be a long, slow process. Inevitably, the main burden of meeting and beating the Vietcong must fall on the people of South Vietnam. They have accepted this burden in large measure, particularly in military operations. We should observe, for example, that their fighting forces go into battle day after day, notwithstanding coup and countercoup in Saigon. Their will to fight is still strong.

Now, nobody is happy with the political instability in Saigon. The American Ambassador awakes every morning not knowing if he will have a coup as an appetizer with his breakfast. We do not pretend that things are going well. But the case is not hopeless.

Insurgency tactics are not unbeatable. While, admittedly, there are some significant differences, we have seen similar tactics beaten in Greece, in the Philippines and in Malaya. In a jungle country, where many villagers have no sense

of nation, a relatively small number can disrupt the normal processes of living.

Of course, our response must be more than military. Of course, progressive economic, and social programs are needed. But in recognizing this, we must not ignore the role that terrorism plays. The majority of people are uncommitted. Moreover, they are naturally afraid to get stuck backing a loser. Eliminate terrorism, give the people a decent chance to make a choice, and you will probably get a favorable choice.

We should remind the critics that when Vietnam was divided in 1955, many observers gave the south a life expectancy of 6 months. Its economy and administration was a shambles, and transportation had broken down.

But the south survived. It wiped out city gangs and absorbed over a million northerners who had fled across the border to escape the Communist system. In the first 4 years, school population increased fourfold; per capita food production rose in the south, fell in the north. The contrast was not permitted to stand. In 1959, the Vietcong began a calculated effort of terrorism and infiltration. If this can be cut down, progress can be renewed.

What of the recent coordinated attacks on U.S. personnel? For one thing, they should dispel the view still held by some that the struggle in South Vietnam is merely a local civil war. It is not. It is largely planned, equipped, and directed from Hanoi.

Let the critics address themselves to these questions:

First. What impact would U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam have on Thailand and Malaysia, and the rest of southeast Asia?

Second. What would our withdrawal mean to Japan and India, two democracies without nuclear arms who might some day need our nuclear guarantee in the face of a hostile, nuclear-armed China? What would it mean to their confidence in us?

Third. What would our withdrawal mean to the people of South Vietnam, who have resisted communism for a decade?

Fourth. Would our collapse in this insurgency encourage more insurgency in Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

One does not have to fully accept the automatic operation of the so-called "domino theory" to recognize the strategic and psychological importance of South Vietnam.

Our policy is to stay until South Vietnam's ability to maintain its own security is firmly established. Our aim is to help stabilize the government, pacify the countryside and present an attractive alternative to communism.

Whatever we do in the short run, affects our interests in the long run. As the principal guardian of the free world, we must honor our commitments now, or risk complicating our expected responsibilities 10 and 20 years from now.

Those calling for immediate negotiations are harming the situation rather than helping it. They are not thinking things through. Moreover, they are narrowing the President's options and flexi-

bility without coming forth with any real, affirmative, viable alternatives.

Let the Vietcong abandon their aggression and no negotiations, no new Geneva Conference will be needed. Peace would return to Vietnam.

The President has rejected surrender, and he has rejected brash action. I commend him for his restraint, his patience, and his wisdom in dealing with this thicket, where no easy answers are to be found, and our alternatives are limited and harsh. Let us meet our responsibilities with toughness, patience, and understanding.

Mr. DUNCAN of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, I am delighted that the debate on American policy in Vietnam has finally spread to the House. We are indebted to the gentleman from New Jersey for his initiative in this matter. I think further that the colloquy in which he has engaged with the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] has contributed to a better understanding of this problem.

There has been discussed on this floor the question of the desirability of a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam. One of the difficulties we have in expressing ourselves in the English language—as Winston Churchill once pointed out—is that we must not only listen to what is said but also try to understand what the speaker means to say. Someone else has recently pointed out that every armed conflict sooner or later must end up at the conference table. So I think we must define what we mean by "a negotiated settlement."

A negotiated settlement of the problems in South Vietnam which accomplished the objectives for which we have made a military commitment in that unhappy country would surely be welcomed by all of us. Negotiation with less than that objective cannot, it seems to me, be accepted or even undertaken. Those who fear negotiation at this juncture cannot forget that the present conflict rose from negotiations which followed Dien Bien Phu. Those who fear negotiation cannot forget the story of the rising young Communist officer who, when asked on an examination what he would do in an engagement with the enemy as his ammunition ran low, replied, "I would commence negotiations for a settlement until more ammunition was brought up."

I cannot help but feel that a defeat in South Vietnam, whether at the negotiating table or in the field, would lead to an envelopment by Red China and nations satellite to Red China of portions of Asia and the South Pacific the equal of or greater than that to which Japan aspired a quarter of a century ago. And we will all remember the 4 years of bloodshed we accepted to frustrate Japan's ambitions in World War II.

I fear not just for the fall of Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. I do not see how the new nation of Malaysia could survive in the nutcracker of Red China on the north and Indonesia on the south. Indonesia is the fifth most populous nation in the world, rich in natural resources and scattered across the trade routes of the East Indies. It already harkens to the pipes of Peiping. I fear

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3359

dition, to be left alone. He, therefore, posed the question, "Why not get all the foreigners out of Laos and let these people work out their own future as an independent and neutral nation without outside interference?"

And, as Secretary Rusk so rightly recalled:

Chairman Khrushchev agreed to that in Vienna in 1961, and that became the object of the Geneva Conference on Laos and was the result agreed to in the accords of 1962. But before the ink was dry, Hanoi, with the backing of Peking, treated with contempt the pledges it had just given. All Viet Minh, that is North Vietnamese military personnel, were not withdrawn from Laos—

And, having been in Laos in November 1964, I can testify that half of the country is occupied by the Vietminh and Pathet Lao forces—

thousands remained. And North Vietnam continued to infiltrate guerrilla cadres and certain supplies through Laos into South Vietnam. The International Control Commission was paralyzed in its efforts to observe noncompliance. And Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of the government of National Union, who supported those accords of 1962, was denied authority over territory or forces controlled by the Pathet Lao and the Vietminh.

It is true that today neutralists and conservatives are now working together and that there is no Soviet supply line supporting the Pathet Lao. But a peace which would be so simple to achieve is blocked by the continuing refusal of Hanoi and Peking to comply with the accords of 1962.

And so, when people ask you, "What about the neutralization of South Vietnam?" keep your eye on Laos because there was a sincere and genuine effort to give the Laotians a chance to be independent and neutral in the most fundamental sense of those terms. And there was an agreement which has been frustrated by those who seem not to be content so long as there is any chance to expand their world revolution.

Mr. Speaker, there are no quick or easy or ready solutions to the very difficult situation confronting us in South Vietnam and southeast Asia.

It is too late to debate the question of whether or not the United States should have responded in 1954 to a cry for help from a new country seeking to preserve its newly found and shaky independence. The fact is that we joined in an agreement to defend southeast Asia from aggression—a policy which has been supported by President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and President Johnson. We have stayed to help an embattled people free themselves from outside interference and domination so that they might develop their own society, choose their own leaders, and determine their own course of development. We have stayed because we believed our national security as well as the great principles for which we stand are at stake.

There are those who argue that we should pull out now; that we should withdraw on the best terms possible, but in any case withdraw.

But, Mr. Speaker, we are in no position to pull out of Vietnam or southeast Asia until and unless an effective means is found to guarantee the independence of these people. If we were to withdraw from South Vietnam today, or tomorrow, or even the next day without such a guar-

antee, the inevitable result would be the fall of that country to a Communist attack which, while waged in the south, is financed and supplied and supported from the countries to the north—from North Vietnam and Communist China itself.

The loss of South Vietnam to the Communists would clearly menace neighboring Thailand and Cambodia. It would bring increased pressure to bear on already beleaguered Malaysia. It would open a side door into India. It would threaten the Philippines and even Australia. It would make impossible any alternatives for Indonesia. In brief, Western interests and indeed freedom itself throughout southeast Asia and the Pacific would be imperiled.

James Reston, writing in the New York Times 10 days ago, stated:

Very few people here question the necessity for a limited expansion of the war by U.S. bombers into Communist territory. The American and the South Vietnamese position was crumbling fast, and the political and strategic consequences of defeat would have been serious for the free world all over Asia.

But, Mr. Speaker, a series of retaliatory bombings do not constitute a foreign policy and I am fully confident that this fact is recognized by the President of the United States.

He has stated that, "We seek no wider war," that "our goal is peace in southeast Asia."

This peace cannot be achieved by arms alone; neither can it be achieved by unilateral withdrawal or surrender.

Mr. Speaker, it is imperative, I feel, that we heed the wise words of Secretary Rusk concerning Laos; that we keep our eyes on the relevant facts of current history.

It is also imperative, I feel, that we remember the President is charged under our Constitution with the conduct of our foreign policy; that we support him in his efforts to preserve both peace and freedom in southeast Asia in this very sensitive and delicate period of world history.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentleman for his observations, and also compliment him for the suggestions he made on his tour in southeast Asia.

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

(Mr. PICKLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to make this one point. We all want peace in Asia and throughout the world. We should bear in mind that we do not gain ground by giving up. You do not improve your position by retreat and you do not strengthen your leadership by a statement of weakness. You cannot negotiate with the deaf.

Mr. Speaker, as the headlines continue to blare at us every day, many questions are being raised about our involvement in southeast Asia, "How did we ever get in Vietnam? What are we doing so deeply committed in far-off parts of Asia? Whose idea was all this, anyway?"

Most of the people asking these questions seem to believe that our interest in Asia, and especially southeast Asia, is something brand new, something strange, and even something a bit irregular. But nothing could be further from the truth. Our interest in southeast Asia goes back some 130 years, when the first diplomatic contacts between the United States and the Kingdom of Siam, now Thailand, took place. Since that time, we have helped in the opening of Japan to the West; we were the ruling power in the Philippines for nearly 50 years; and we risked and waged two wars because we were concerned over the basic proposition that it was in the interest of the free world—and particularly of the United States—that Asian nations be allowed to develop themselves free from outside aggression.

Whether we like it or not—especially some of our short-remembered and rain-bow-seeking friends—we are looked to throughout the world as the one Government which will help small independent nations remain free. It is a heavy responsibility; but it is a proud banner we carry. At their invitation, we have offered help to the nation of Vietnam. That little country—beset with the greatest conflicts of racial riddles, religion and distrust—is fighting for its life—fighting against communism.

These are tortuous and exasperating times for all of us. Voices of doubt and appeasement and negotiation plead that we should take the easy—and temporary—course of immediate withdrawal. But this is unthinkable; we cannot give an inch to aggression, or the aggressors—like the proverbial camel—will soon be inside our own tent. We must steel our determination and stiffen our backs with the firm faith that right makes might.

In the beginning, we were either right or wrong to help the free people of Vietnam; and we are either right or wrong now to preserve and maintain our commitment. There is no middle ground. Our course is the right one; the determination to see it through tough times is the difficult task. The wise and the worried know this. The weak and doubtful want to ignore it. But history cannot let us escape it.

In our time, our society faces one great issue—we must meet and answer the threat of communism. It is a confrontation that cannot be escaped. In Korea, we either met it or lost north Asia; in Vietnam, we either meet it or lose all of southeast Asia. You do not gain ground by giving it up. You do not improve your position by retreating; you do not strengthen your leadership by a statement of weakness. And you cannot negotiate with the devil.

What would it profit us to abandon Vietnam only to have a worse threat in India or Pakistan or Turkey or France or Mexico—on and on—until the cries of retreat grow into a thunderous tidal wave of isolationism—and we are left alone. It is better to have the confrontation now—to firm up our resolute position—than to close our eyes to the tyranny.

President Johnson has answered these threats with positive and forthright ac-

tion. You can be sure that this same kind of reply will be forthcoming whenever and wherever freedom is endangered. The American people support the President in these hours. And history will praise him for the strong leadership he is giving us today.

We are not embarked on some new and remote adventure in Vietnam; we are embarked on just one part of the defense of freedom that has occupied us since we became a nation almost 190 years ago. The scale of our participation may be new, but the fact of our participation is old, continuous, and honorable.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentleman from Texas for his statement.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to highly commend the gentleman from New Jersey for taking this special order to speak out on this very important question. I unhesitatingly associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman who, as a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, is in a position to have a superior knowledge of the background of the South Vietnam situation and the present state of affairs.

I personally feel that there have been altogether too many speeches both inside and outside of the Congress by gentlemen who are not as highly informed on the situation as the gentleman from New Jersey. We of the Armed Services Committee—and the Presiding Officer now in the chair is a ranking member of that committee—also had the occasion, the opportunity and the duty of dealing with the South Vietnam situation at length. Although I am not authorized to speak on behalf of the committee I believe I would be correct in saying that all members of the committee, both on the Republican side and on the Democratic side, give the President of the United States their wholehearted support in his announced policy on South Vietnam.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentleman for his kind words.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. PEPPER. I wish to commend the able gentleman from New Jersey and those who have worked with him in this important matter on the splendid sentiments which he and they today have expressed giving notice to the President and to the potential aggressors of the world that America will not falter in standing against those who commit aggression in any part of the world.

I think all of us realize that it is of the utmost importance at this critical time that nothing which shall be said in the Congress or in the country by any responsible voice shall give any encouragement to those who are watching with the most critical eye to see whether the faith and the courage of the people of America will falter in this high resolve

of defending freedom; whether we will regard the end as hopeless; or whether we will count the cost too great and the cause not worthy of the aid that we give.

Mr. Speaker, many of us for a long time have had great hope in the United Nations organization as the peacekeeping force of the world. Unfortunately, it has not been able to achieve that status; unhappily, recent events in the Assembly have discouraged the hope that the United Nations was making real progress toward stemming aggression and keeping the peace of the world.

So today, Mr. Speaker, if the United States with the strength and the will that it possesses does not defend the cause of freedom in the world, where will freedom find a champion? If we falter here, withdraw elsewhere where we stand as the bulwark of freedom, the aggressors can sweep across a large part of the world without any effective opposition. Until more collective machinery can be provided effectively to defend freedom, the dedicated might of America is the only force which can shield the weak and the free against the aggressive strong in many vital parts of the world.

Mr. Speaker, the motives of the people of America in respect to Vietnam and wherever else we assert our power have no selfish ends. We seek no ill gain; we support no colonialism; we are a part of no conspiracy to preserve the status quo because it is the status quo. We are in league with none who would suppress the legitimate ambitions of those slow to arrive at the center part of the world stage. We are part of no combine to hold back any who have the right to progress, whoever it be and wherever they are. We do not propose to dictate anywhere to establish for selfish purposes any area of influence or to dominate any field or play the game of power politics according to the old way of nations. We do not arrogate to ourselves the only righteousness or infallibility of judgment and, of course, we are always willing to reason with those who want to reason about right and how to do it or to negotiate over what is negotiable and here in Vietnam as well as elsewhere we will negotiate about the best way of preserving the freedom of an independent people and protecting them against aggression with any of good will. But, we shall not negotiate relative to our determination to discharge our solemn duty under the United Nations Charter to defend freedom against aggression and we shall not negotiate as to whether we withdraw from duty whatever the difficulty, however great the danger.

So, Mr. Speaker, I think it is highly important that we let the word go forth from the will and the heart of America that there is no weakening of our will, there is no division in our sentiment, there is no faltering in our faith to stand behind the cause of freedom and against aggression wherever that threat occurs. Let the word go forth that in pursuance of this high resolve we will stand with others if we can or, God helping us, we will stand alone if we must.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the dis-

tinguished gentleman, who has served with such distinction in the other body and in this House of Representatives.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. DORN. I join in supporting the President and the distinguished gentleman in the well, and congratulate the gentleman on having taken this time, because this issue is the greatest single issue before the American people today. It is one of national survival.

To me it is utterly fantastic and incredible that any responsible person in the United States in view of the past 20 or 30 years of history of the modern world would propose that we pull out of South Vietnam or negotiate at a time when Kossygin in Hanoi a few days ago demanded that we get out of South Vietnam. He demanded that we leave there, and branded the United States as imperialist; this at a time when Mao Tse Tung has also demanded that we abandon the cause of freedom in South Vietnam.

To me it is inconceivable that anyone in this country should acquiesce in that blackmail and turn these people over to the ruthless international banditry known as communism.

I want to commend the gentleman, and point out that during the last few days reports continue to come through that hordes of Red Chinese soldiers are massing on the borders of India. As Lenin is reported to have said more than 45 years ago, the road to Paris is the road through Peiping. They have Peiping. If we give them South Vietnam, we would be giving them all southeast Asia. India and 67 percent of the world's untapped oil in the Near East would be next. Then north Africa, which is just a part of the great Afro-Eurasian land mass, will fall. Western Europe would be outflanked and would collapse as predicted by the Communists. The road to America will be completely open because, as the gentleman knows, it is only 1,500 miles from Africa to South America.

The defense and security of this Nation and of the entire western world and our western civilization is hanging in jeopardy today in South Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I want to again commend the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] and I rise to stand by the President of the United States in his earnest desire that there be no withdrawal and, certainly I think at this time, no negotiation, with the Communist gangsters.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentleman for his contribution and for his kind words.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from New Mexico.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Speaker, I have long admired the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] for his wide knowledge in the field of foreign affairs. Today the gentleman has brought something to the attention of this House and to the attention of the Nation, and I am very proud to stand here in this House of Representatives at his side in support of

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3357

I am confident that North Vietnam will find there is nothing inflexible about the policy of the United States. We want peace and security in South Vietnam.

(Mr. PATTEN (at the request of Mr. DANIELS) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PATTEN. Mr. Speaker, domestic critics of our Government's policy of extending military and economic support to South Vietnam are speaking and writing a great deal these days about the high and increasing number of American military casualties there, as well as the huge cost of maintaining our support effort to that southeast Asian nation. Some of these critics—and they are not military experts—are calling either for major increases in U.S. military involvement in the war in South Vietnam, or a total pullout of U.S. forces and support. The argument seems to run like this: If we cannot win the war in South Vietnam, or if the South Vietnamese cannot do it even with massive U.S. assistance, let us cut our losses and get out.

Another argument which the critics of U.S. policy in South Vietnam are using these days is that the South Vietnamese armed forces cannot or will not fight effectively against the Communist Vietcong. Some people claim that the Vietnamese soldier is lacking in aggressiveness. Others claim that he and his officers are unwilling to accept advice from their American military advisers.

Both these arguments, Mr. Speaker, are grossly unfair to the Vietnamese and American soldiers who are daily risking their lives—and in many instances dying—in the fields, swamps, and jungles of South Vietnam.

The record of both South Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam today is one in which all Americans and other free world peoples can take pride.

Reports of individual heroism and self-sacrifice appear frequently in our newspapers and news magazines. Does anyone doubt the truth of these reports by experienced American news correspondents?

I remember reading of one recent case in which a village hamlet in South Vietnam was attacked and its outnumbered garrison overrun by the Communist Vietcong attackers. The hamlet defenders were not regular South Vietnamese armed forces, but a small detachment of the provincial Popular Forces—something like the State Guard in this country—assisted by two or three U.S. military advisers. I believe a lieutenant and two sergeants.

The Government forces radioed for help, which arrived too late to prevent heavy Government casualties, but the rescuing force succeeded in driving away the Vietcong. Among the survivors was a wounded Popular Forces soldier who had fired his machinegun until he ran out of ammunition. Then, although wounded, he had buried his weapon in the mud to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Vietcong.

During the week of February 7–13, the South Vietnamese armed forces suffered

a greater number of casualties than in any similar period during the war. During the same period, the Vietcong likewise suffered more casualties than during any other week.

During that week, 290 members of the South Vietnamese armed forces were killed, 655 were wounded in action and 610 are missing in action. At the same time, the Communist Vietcong lost 795 dead and 105 captured. This may be considered a low estimate for Communist casualties, since the Vietcong carry away their dead and wounded with them whenever possible, and total figures cannot therefore be tabulated for the Vietcong.

All Americans can take very great pride in the personal courage and devotion which have been exhibited by our American military advisers. One Congressional Medal of Honor and numerous Silver Star, Bronze Star, and Air Medals—all awarded for bravery in combat—have been bestowed on our ground and air advisers. U.S. naval forces are also doing a fine job of supporting the South Vietnamese junk fleet, which patrols the coastline and guards against the introduction of Communist men and munitions by sea.

Mr. Speaker, our U.S. military advisers now serving in South Vietnam are aware of the criticisms which I mentioned at the beginning of my speech. Their wives and families clip these articles out of newspapers and magazines and mail them to South Vietnam.

Our military advisers in Vietnam are helping their Vietnamese counterparts fight a dirty, vicious, and extremely difficult guerrilla war. Of course they are not enjoying it, but they have both demonstrated great stamina and tenacity. The Vietnamese are not quitting, and they are profoundly grateful for our help. Our own soldiers are convinced of the necessity for their presence there, and that with our assistance the Vietnamese can win their fight against the Communists, if we on the home front continue to give them our full support.

Secretary of Defense McNamara told the Armed Services Committee last week that the situation in Vietnam is grave but by no means hopeless. This country has been in tough spots before, and has not survived all these years by throwing in its cards and walking away from the table when the going got rough.

Let us support our armed forces in South Vietnam. They are doing a crucial job out there for all of us. They deserve our full backing, no less than the South Vietnamese armed forces and people, as the record shows, deserve our full backing against a common enemy.

(Mr. HOWARD (at the request of Mr. DANIELS) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Speaker, my esteemed colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER], has delivered a clear and penetrating outline of the problems in Vietnam.

Certainly it is obvious to one and all that the war in Vietnam is filled with

complexities. We cannot, however, let this war serve as an exercise in futility.

No one wants war. I, too, am appalled that our American soldiers are dying on battlefields in Vietnam. Most of the persons with whom I have talked wish there were no fighting in Vietnam. So do I. However, these same people also express a desire that the United States not bow to this aggression by the Chinese Communists. These people know that surrender here would merely serve as a signal for the Chinese Communists to open up new aggressions elsewhere.

I favor a negotiated peace but not at the price of defeat. I agree with President Johnson that we should withdraw only when foreign powers supporting this war also withdraw and begin living up to the commitments agreed to in 1954 with the French and the Laotian agreement in 1962.

What assurances do we have the Communists would respect agreements made at a forced negotiated peace such as some persons are now demanding? Why, when the Communists are currently violating agreements made in 1954 and 1962, should we believe they will not violate any agreement with us as soon as we withdraw from South Vietnam?

The war in South Vietnam has been subject to a great deal of misunderstanding here in the United States and abroad.

It is sometimes represented as a local war, in which Vietnamese are fighting against Vietnamese.

It is also represented as an Asian war, in which the Communists charge that Americans and other westerners are illegally interfering.

It is often represented as a popular uprising against an unpopular and unrepresentative Government in Saigon. Now, in the jargon of communism, "wars of national liberation" are essentially local efforts to overthrow oppressive and imperialistic governments and to replace them with so-called democratic governments which will truly represent the interests of the people. The Communist countries furnish political, military, economic and psychological support to their foreign "brothers" in such common, fraternal struggles against imperialism. This is how the Communists represent the situation in South Vietnam and elsewhere.

The true facts, however, are quite different.

These wars of national liberation are actually guerrilla wars which are organized, directed, and supplied by foreign Communist powers utilizing the tools of murder, wholesale destruction of property, and terrorism to intimidate the local population and to subvert and destroy the legally constituted government. This terrorism is compounded by open irregular warfare in which guerrilla units, sometimes operating in battalion strength, ambush Government military units, mount sneak attacks on airfields, damage railroad lines, assassinate local officials, and do everything possible to destroy the Government and economy of the country under attack.

Behind the Communist Vietcong guerrillas in South Vietnam are the North

Vietnamese Communists in Hanoi. Behind the North Vietnamese Communists are the Chinese Communists in Peiping, ruling over the world's largest nation of more than 650 million people.

Down through the mountain passes from Communist China into North Vietnam roll the railroad cars with their freight of Communist Chinese and Soviet arms and military equipment. Down the Ho Chi Minh trail through southeastern Laos roll the trucks carrying the same deadly freight. Over the mountain trails from Laos into South Vietnam, on the backs of thousands of porters, go the same arms and equipment into the hands of the Communist guerrillas who will use them to kill Vietnamese soldiers and their American military advisers, as well as many innocent women and children who happen to get in the way. A smaller, but still significant amount of military equipment is smuggled into South Vietnam by sea, usually in harmless-looking fishing boats.

By this time, isn't the nature and source of this insurgency clear enough?

In addition to the incontrovertible evidence consisting of captured Communist documents, testimony obtained from Vietcong prisoners, and the seizure of thousands of weapons manufactured in the Communist bloc, the most recent and dramatic proof of foreign Communist intrusion in South Vietnam came last week, and on a massive scale.

A Communist Vietcong ship was spotted hidden in a cove on the South Vietnamese coast, in Phu Yen Province. After aerial investigation, air strikes were called for and the ship was sunk. South Vietnamese military units moving into the area encountered unusually fierce Vietcong resistance. When the area was finally cleared after several days' fighting, Government forces found themselves in possession of a Vietcong weapons cache covering about 100 by 300 yards—an estimated 80 tons of Communist-manufactured weapons. Among this arsenal were 2,000 rifles and 150 crew-served weapons—machineguns, mortars and antiaircraft guns—enough war material to equip many Vietcong battalions. More arms, ammunition and explosives now being off-loaded from the sunken ship will bring the total even higher.

The capture of these Communist weapons and the sinking of the Communist ship which was in the act of bringing arms from North Vietnam should prove to even the most doubting that the Communist claim that the war in South Vietnam is simply a "civil war" is utterly false.

The Communist North Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, and the Chinese Communists have regularly and insistently demanded that the United States get out of South Vietnam. They demand that we remove our 23,500 military advisory personnel, end our military assistance to the South Vietnamese Government, and depart from the area. The problems of Vietnam, the Communists say, would then be settled by the Vietnamese people themselves without outside interference.

There would be no need for large numbers of U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam if that country had not been attacked by its Communist neighbor to the north. As Secretary of State Rusk stated not long ago: "We have no desire for any bases or permanent military presence in that area." We are there today because the South Vietnamese Government has asked for our support. That support should and must be continued as long as it is necessary.

We should not lose sight of the fact that almost 30 other free world nations, including many other Asian nations, are providing or have agreed to provide military and economic support to South Vietnam. This support takes many forms. Some nations are providing mobile hospitals and ambulances, other technicians and commodities for water supply and communications improvement, still others are sending teachers and offering scholarships. Even though a war is in progress, economic activity and social services must continue.

It is a test of the will of the entire free world in the face of Communist aggression. In this struggle, I am confident that the United States will not be found wanting in will or action, and that we shall continue to set an example for other free world nations who, though smaller, are just as dedicated as we are to the preservation of freedom.

(Mr. McGRATH (at the request of Mr. DANIELS) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Speaker, recent events in South Vietnam appear to be causing a noticeable strain on the patience of Americans with both the conduct of the fighting there and the continually unsettled state of the South Vietnamese Government.

In some quarters, this strain has given rise to fears on the part of some and hope on the part of others that the patience of the Government of the United States might soon evaporate. Further, stepped-up Communist military activity has caused insistence by some Americans that the United States negotiate itself out of South Vietnam.

I cannot agree with those of short patience who would hurry the United States to the negotiations table. I cannot agree that this is the time to "play it safe," and back out of our pledge to the South Vietnamese people by face-saving agreements which, in the light of past experiences with the Communists, we could not expect to be honored.

I do agree, however, with President Johnson's actions aimed at convincing the Communists in North Vietnam and their advisers and conspirators elsewhere that the United States is determined to abide by its pledge to the South Vietnamese and continue to fight Communist aggression and subversion in southeast Asia.

The situation in South Vietnam has now become a test of wills between the Communists and the United States and other defenders of freedom. To win this test, we must be patient and must not permit our determination to waiver.

It might be well to remember that the Communists have been fighting continually in southeast Asia since the Japanese began their invasion of the Asian mainland in the late 1930's. In many respects, the burdens on the Communists have been heavier and the rewards fewer for them than have been the burdens and rewards of the United States.

Therefore, it behooves all Americans to fall into step behind President Johnson and to maintain our resolve to keep South Vietnam and other southeast Asian nations from falling prey to communism. Only with all of us pulling together can we at home support the sacrifices our military men are making in blood and, thereby, convince the Communists that our resolve is implacable, our resources unstintingly given and our faith in the righteousness of our cause is unending.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to compliment the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] for his very forthright and excellent statement.

It was my great privilege only this last fall to be in southeast Asia at the same time the gentleman from New Jersey was in that area for the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

In the interest of time I am not going into any great detail other than to say that in 1964, prior to the great national political campaign, the issue of Vietnam, of course, was very important and very much a part of that national debate. It was my good fortune to be present at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on September 22, 1964, when the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, dealt with this general question in a major address.

Mr. Speaker, I believe it is relevant at this point in the discussion this afternoon to quote one section of his very thoughtful speech on the subject of southeast Asia.

He said to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco:

Let me turn for a few minutes to our most serious immediate problems in southeast Asia. That area entered a new chapter in its strife-torn history with the partition of Vietnam in 1954 and the consolidation of the Communist regime in Hanoi. It requires no domino theory to explain the subsequent pressures on Laos and South Vietnam. One need only recall the Communist appetite for world revolution, an appetite which grows upon feeding.

When President Kennedy took office in January 1961, he found in Laos, for example, an active battleground between government forces supported by the United States and a combination of neutralists, Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces supported by a Soviet airlift. He became convinced after studying the evidence that the Laotians themselves, if left to themselves, had no inclination to kill each other or to cause trouble for their neighbors—

And may I say as an aside, having been in Laos while in southeast Asia on two separate occasions over a period of 3 years, I can attest to that fact—their tradition was one of peace; their am-

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3355

of inevitable divine right, and it is no such thing.

When we criticize the South Vietnamese, let us remember that for four long years the South Vietnamese people have suffered 5,000 fatalities a year in the fight against communism—fatalities at a higher rate in proportion to their population than the United States has ever incurred in any war it has ever fought. Can we say that such a people don't have the will to fight? Can we say that we should abandon such a people? When we criticize the instability of their government, and Lord knows we wish that a George Washington or a Ulysses S. Grant or a Robert E. Lee were to rise among them who could unite his people and coordinate their efforts, let us nevertheless remember that this is a nation just 11 years old, which has spent 5 of those years in stability and increasing prosperity, and 6 of those years under an outright subversion and attack.

I do not say that we should not ever negotiate. I certainly do not say that we have any desire to lose more lives in South Vietnam, or spent more money there, or broaden the war there. But I do say that it is in our own self-interest to demonstrate there, as we have been called upon to demonstrate time and again throughout our history, that aggression, whether overt or subversive, against the freedom and against the dignity of human beings, will not go unchallenged.

Two weeks ago the halls of this Chamber rang with voices saying, "Don't weaken the President's position in dealing with the Arab nations"; "Don't weaken the President's position in the conduct of our foreign affairs." What on earth are we doing to the President's position in the conduct of our foreign affairs when voices are raised in the Congress of the United States, saying, "We have to pull out of South Vietnam"? We have lost 281 lives fighting the Communists in South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese have lost over 20,000 lives fighting the Communists in South Vietnam. We talk about their will to fight, but what on earth do you think it does to their will to fight when the Halls of Congress ring with the demand that we abandon them?

America has to be something more than a hardware store selling fine military hardware. It must remain the principal advocate of those principles in which the free world believes if it is to retain any claim to its position as the leader of the free world. We believe in the right of human beings to guide their own destinies, and we believe in free elections as the means by which people guide their own destinies. We believe in social evolution through political means, and not through war, but we do not recognize kidnapping and assassination as legitimate political means.

The call will be for a neutralization of South Vietnam. In 1954 the call was for a neutralization of all of Vietnam. Any time that the Communists indicate any desire to abide by the Geneva accords, I believe that our people would be delighted to pull out of Vietnam. But I

do not believe that so long as the Communists persist in the techniques of subversion, of bombings of civilians, of the kidnapping and assassination of civilian governmental officials, that our people are prepared to abandon another people who fight such techniques.

The Communists say, and the Communists believe, that we have lost the will to resist communism. Those who say, "Negotiate," are rendering a great disservice to the cause of freedom, unless they also say, "Negotiate from a position of strength. Negotiate not simply for the disengagement of American forces, but for the preservation of American ideals."

Perhaps we have lost our will; perhaps we have become too fat from eating what we should have saved; perhaps we have become too soft from riding where we should have walked; perhaps we have become too dulled from watching where we should have participated; perhaps we have become so spoiled from being one of the most pampered people the world has ever seen, that we have lost the will to respond to the cry of humanity in trouble.

I believe, and pray, that we have not. Our enemies have always underestimated us; our enemies have always underestimated our dedication to the cause of freedom, our determination that man shall be the master of his own destiny. Each generation of Americans in its time has been tested, and no generation of Americans has been found wanting. For us to be found wanting at this hour will not only mark the end of America's day as the leader of the free world, it will mark the beginning of the night for freedom everywhere.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. PRICE). Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PUCINSKI] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON].

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. I would like to take just a moment to commend the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] for taking this time so that all of us who feel, as he does, that the President is doing a brilliant job in handling the Vietnamese situation might have a chance to express that sentiment publicly.

The gentleman may recall that early in January I had occasion to speak briefly on the floor of this body to express my concern over the fact that some Members of the other body were talking about negotiating and talking about getting out of Vietnam. I had occasion then to say that I felt this was extremely dangerous, that this talk was jeopardizing our position there, and that it would be as foolish for us to pull out of the commitment we had made in Vietnam as it would have been to pull out of the commitments we had made in Greece or in Turkey or the commitment we had made in Berlin or the commitment we had made in Korea and in the Formosa Straits.

Since that time, of course, President Johnson has taken actions that rein-

force, as the gentleman from New Jersey has pointed out, our determination to stay in Vietnam not only with the strikes against the north, but also, as today's news reports indicate, with American-piloted jet attacks against the Vietcong in South Vietnam. Both actions are designed to demonstrate to the Communists that their continued support of infiltration in the south will be increasingly costly to them and to convince them that perhaps they might agree to live up to the promise the gentleman from New York [Mr. PRICE] mentioned a moment ago they had made way back in 1954 and have since been violating.

I fully support President Johnson in these actions and I agree with what the gentleman from New Jersey says with regard to these demands for negotiation. There have been Members of the other body and there have been people in the press too who say, "Why, does not the President go on television and tell us what our policy is?" Well, perhaps one thing that this special order today can do is to reiterate the very simple policy that, as I see it, we are following; namely, we are doing in Vietnam the same thing we did with the Marshall plan, the same thing we did in Greece and Turkey, the same thing we did in Berlin, the same thing we did in Korea, and the same thing we did in Formosa and in Cuba—we are resisting and trying to contain the spread of aggressive expansionist communism.

If we were to pull out of Vietnam now under such circumstances I think a very substantial part of what our courage and our money and our patience accomplished in years past would go down the drain, as the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] has so eloquently demonstrated. Certainly there is no unwillingness on our part to sit down around a table and talk at any time. But as the gentleman from New York [Mr. PRICE] mentioned a moment ago, if the Communists are prepared to agree to get out of South Vietnam and to leave the South Vietnamese people alone, and to abide by the commitment they made in 1954, we would all be happy. But any other kind of agreement, any other kind of negotiation, would, as Senator DIRKSEN stated on the floor of the other body some days ago, be tantamount to running up the white flag of surrender. I believe our policy is that the commitment in 1954 be honored by the North Vietnamese Communists.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to say one further thing. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PUCINSKI] mentioned that the Gallup poll indicates that 83 percent of the people of this country are behind the President in this matter. I would like to add a personal experience to back that up. Over the past weekend I had occasion to go back to my district and, without feeling that this was necessarily the popular view, I took advantage of several speaking engagements to reiterate this particular position in support of the President on Vietnam. I would like to advise the gentleman from New Jersey that I was surprised and pleased to find the sentiment in my district of upstate New York overwhelmingly in

favor of this policy and behind the President of the United States.

I think it is time, as the gentleman has said, for us here in the House to say this out loud, and make crystal clear that we in the Congress are not about to throw away the long and successful history of American responses to Communist expansion in critical areas around the globe.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, I should like to commend the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] for his presentation today and for the opportunity which it gives all of us to discuss a very serious subject. This situation in Vietnam is, of course, quite sensitive, because there are admittedly differences of opinion back home and here in Washington, too, as to what the appropriate course of this country should be.

Let me state that in my opinion it is important that we remain firm with respect to our policy in Vietnam. In my opinion, also, our present policy is correct. It seems to me a most inopportune time for us to be considering publicly the possibility of a neutralization which almost surely would not be meaningful, of southeast Asia or of South Vietnam. It seems highly unlikely that discussions at this time would ever result in conditions that would bring about an end to the tensions which plague that area. For that reason I think we have really no alternative but to proceed along the course we have taken.

Unlike some, I do not believe this is a question of whether the Gallup polls support the position of the President of the United States. National policies need the support of public opinion, but public opinion should not be the decisive factor in determining the wisdom of national policies. Nor do I think it is a question of deciding whether or not the President is doing a brilliant job. There is room for differences of opinion about the way in which he is exercising his responsibilities for leadership.

I do feel, however, that we could undercut the vital interests of this country if we should, for one reason or another, decide to abandon what we have been doing. If we do not show steadiness of purpose, if we do not recognize that a firm response is necessary to the continuing subjugation and aggression which has been occurring, we might well contribute to the political instability in Saigon, which is presently one of the problems that South Vietnam faces. For that reason I think we should support the administration in its efforts to see to it that the Communists do not take over South Vietnam. Should this occur, it would inevitably increase the possibility of widening Communist aggressions still further. I should hope that differences of opinion among us will not confuse us as to the essentiality of what we are attempting and the justification for the

course we are following at the present time.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentleman for his enlightening remarks, his observations, and his contribution to the discussion.

Mr. DANIELS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PUCINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

(Mr. DANIELS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DANIELS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I wish to compliment my able colleague from New Jersey for his stand and views on this most important issue and wish to associate myself with him. Increasingly, we are hearing calls from colleagues in both Houses and from the press for negotiations leading to a political settlement in South Vietnam. The argument is made that neither side can win a guerrilla war in Vietnam, that the South Vietnamese people are weary and unwilling to support the war further, and that the United States and South Vietnam are risking a major conflict by bombing targets in North Vietnam.

The position of the U.S. Government is frequently interpreted as not favoring the idea of negotiations leading to a political settlement. Obviously, our Government wants the killing of soldiers and civilians in South Vietnam to cease. It wants to see an end to the wanton destruction of property, and the cruel disruption of the lives of the Vietnamese population. Our administration leaders have made it clear that the United States does not seek the destruction of North Vietnam. Our country seeks no special privileges or concessions in South Vietnam, and we would be glad if all our assistance could be channeled into the peaceful economic development of the country instead of into arms, military assistance, barbed wire, and floodlights.

The very real question before us today is: What is there to make us think that a new political settlement would solve the problems of South Vietnam when there has already been a political settlement?

On July 21, 1954, there was concluded at Geneva a treaty which bound the participants to respect the independence and territorial integrity of both North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. These 1954 Geneva Accords were agreed to both by North Vietnam and Communist China. North Vietnam specifically agreed to withdraw its military forces from South Vietnam and not to interfere in the internal affairs of that country. The U.S. Government had reservations about a political settlement which handed over the entire territory of North Vietnam to Communist administration. Even though we did not subscribe to the Geneva Accords, however, we issued a statement at that time promising to respect them and warning that we would view renewed Communist aggression in violation of the Accords as a serious threat to the peace and security of the area.

We all know what has since happened.

The North Vietnamese Communists,

confident that the chaotic political and economic situation existing in South Vietnam would soon lead to a total breakdown, bided their time for several years in the belief that South Vietnam would drop into their hands like a ripe mango. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had secretly left behind in South Vietnam a large number of Vietcong agents and numerous arms caches, ready to be activated in the manner of an explosive device when the proper time arrived.

When it became apparent to North Vietnam that South Vietnam was growing stronger instead of weaker, and would not easily fall victim to North Vietnamese subversion, the decision was taken in Hanoi, initially in 1957 and then on a more ambitious scale in 1959, to activate the subversive apparatus already present in South Vietnam and to step up the rate of infiltration of guerrilla fighters, arms, and terrorism into the southern part of the country. Last year, an estimated 37,000 guerrillas were infiltrated from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. This is the peak figure which has been steadily increasing during the past 5 years.

The South Vietnamese efforts to defend themselves, their appeal to the United States and other free world nations for assistance, and the events which have flowed from these Communist and South Vietnamese decisions are well known to all of us. Ever since 1954, on a day-month-and-year basis, the Communist North Vietnamese have willfully and systematically violated the Geneva Accords—they are pledged to observe. These violations have also extended to North Vietnamese obstruction of the work of the International Control Commission teams to inspect reported violations of the Accords, which established the ICC's right of operation in both North and South Vietnam.

In these difficult circumstances, the South Vietnamese Government and people have and are taking military action to defend themselves. This action, and the U.S. military assistance given in response to requests for help from South Vietnam, is consistent with international law and with the Charter of the United Nations—every nation possesses the right of self-defense.

Since there already exists a political solution for Vietnam which has not been lived up to by the Communist side, what is present today which would make us believe that a new negotiated agreement would solve all our problems? Certainly the record of Communist actions since 1954 gives us no cause for assurance on this score.

The late President Kennedy once stated that we would never negotiate from fear, but that we would never fear to negotiate. The United States has never shut the door to negotiations on any matter. What is required in the present situation, however, is an end to North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam and evidence that the North Vietnamese Government is prepared to leave its neighbors alone. The decision will be made by Hanoi. Should it decide to cease attacking its southern neighbor,

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3353

Mr. MICHEL. Is this really the biggest deterrent or detriment to political stability?

Mr. GALLAGHER. The gentleman has stated it correctly. Political stability is the most significant detriment or deterrent to military victory and the saving of freedom in South Vietnam from the Communist aggressors. If they have stability I think we can move on to victory without escalation.

Mr. MICHEL. Does the gentleman feel our retaliatory strikes to date have been effective, and that they should be stepped up or continued?

Mr. GALLAGHER. No doubt they have been extremely effective. I think the Communists now know they are not going to have an easy time if they pursue their present game. They are no longer immune from the violence they enjoy handing out. It is becoming quite costly to them.

Mr. MICHEL. What answer would the gentleman have to those who argue or say we ought to recruit volunteers from some of the other neighboring Asian countries out there to help South Vietnam defend their own land or for that matter to carry on guerrilla warfare in the north?

Mr. GALLAGHER. I would agree to that. In some of the other countries that I visited on my way to Vietnam I found there is a growing desire to send troops and trained guerrillas, especially in the Philippines. They are prepared to send a regiment. They had a similar problem during the Huk uprising, so they are knowledgeable to the ways of this war. There is a stability there now, freedom is flourishing. I think there have been five or six nations that already indicated a desire to send volunteers.

Mr. MICHEL. Does the gentleman feel our Government, as such, is giving sufficient encouragement to that venture?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes, I do.

Mr. MICHEL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentleman very much for his remarks. They were most helpful.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I should like to join in commending the gentleman from New Jersey for taking this time to make possible a discussion of a subject that I think is more on the minds of the American people today than any single subject in America. I am sure the gentleman will be most encouraged to know that the very inspiring statement he made here in attempting to define American policy in Vietnam is supported by more than 83 percent of the American people.

It was my privilege to include in the RECORD last Monday the latest Harris survey which clearly indicates that 83 percent of the American people support President Johnson's policy of measured retaliation against military staging areas in North Vietnam from which the Communists launch their aggression against South Vietnam.

I am sure that the discussion here today in the House, being led by a distinguished member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, will be of great solace and comfort to the people of South Vietnam. It gains in significance particularly when they hear of the statement made by the highly respected majority leader of this Chamber, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. ALBERT], and also the statement of the very capable and dedicated Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House, Dr. MORGAN, all joining ranks behind President Johnson in his determined effort to keep the spirit of freedom alive in South Vietnam.

The gentleman from Iowa read a dispatch from the wire services which referred to efforts being made by Secretary General U Thant to resolve the problems in Vietnam. There also are reports that the British have been engaged in similar efforts to find a solution to this problem. Certainly we as Americans have no objection to either U Thant or the British, or any other responsible government, trying to find a solution to the problem of Vietnam. This indicates that Vietnam is not a battle in which we alone are involved, but one that properly concerns the entire world; at least that segment of the world which should be interested in preserving freedom for the people of South Vietnam.

But I think that notwithstanding these efforts, well meaning as they may be, the President of the United States, Mr. Johnson, has set forth our policy as clearly and succinctly as anyone I know of, a policy that all Americans can support and rally behind regardless of their political affiliation. Mr. Johnson has made it clear that our position on South Vietnam is to remain there and continue helping them until the North Vietnamese Communists have withdrawn all their forces from South Vietnam; cease their aggression, and stop their subversion. We can then, and only then, begin seriously considering some form of discussion or negotiation for settlement of the conflict between North and South Vietnam.

I believe it would be unfair to President Johnson and indeed to our Government, to try to read into the actions of U Thant or the British action, some meaning that the United States plans to withdrawn its commitment to the people of South Vietnam. President Johnson has never closed the door to a discussion about methods to peacefully resolve the conflict but he has made it crystal clear that we shall remain in South Vietnam until the freedom of her people is secure from Communist aggression or subversion.

We have never refused to consider negotiations, but we are reminded that it was only 10 years from Manchuria to Pearl Harbor. It was only 18 months from Moscow to the rape of Poland. Both of these tragedies occurred while the world was negotiating.

We must never forget that we were negotiating in Panmunjon for 11 years. President Eisenhower went to Korea in 1953 in good faith. He won a truce while both sides were to negotiate

a peace treaty. There were specific conditions laid down for this truce. One of the conditions was that the Communists would not move in any additional troops or firearms, aircraft, or ships or build any military installations in North Korea, and we would do likewise in South Korea. Yet the fact of the matter is that while we have been negotiating in Panmunjon, the Communists have moved large supplies of aircraft and munitions into North Korea during these past 11 years of negotiations. North Korea has become one of the most powerful Communist bastions in the world.

We are also aware that in Warsaw we have been holding informal discussions with the Peiping Communists. We have had more than 128 meetings with them. Not in one instance have they shown their willingness to stop their aggression and subversion in Asia and conduct themselves as civilized people.

In southeast Asia, indeed, there have been many other examples of negotiations, all falling to Communist infamy. We need only look at the broken Communist promises in Laos. Furthermore Mr. Speaker, we would not be in South Vietnam today if the North Vietnam Communists had not violated the pledges we negotiated from them in the Geneva Conference in 1954.

So it would seem to me, Mr. Speaker, that this discussion today is essential because it helps emphasize the determination of the American people to stand firm in South Vietnam.

It would be my hope that the Member in the well and the other members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs would give careful and favorable consideration to House Joint Resolution 341, which I introduced last week. I should like to read it:

Announcing the sense of Congress in support of President Johnson's policy of measured retaliation against North Vietnam military installations as the situation requires.

Whereas the United States, during the administrations of President Truman, President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and President Johnson, has been committed to a policy of assisting the people of South Vietnam preserve their freedom and independence from Communist aggression; and

Whereas the North Vietnamese Communists have in recent months stepped up considerably their aggression against both civilian and military installations in South Vietnam; and

Whereas this aggression has caused the serious loss of life to South Vietnamese soldiers and civilians and to American observers presently stationed in South Vietnam to help train South Vietnamese troops against Communist aggression; and

Whereas the President of the United States has had to order carefully measured retaliatory action against the North Vietnamese military staging areas where Hanoi and Peiping Communists have been or are being trained for aggression against South Vietnam; and

Whereas the President of the United States has made it abundantly clear that to withdraw American assistance from South Vietnam would expose the whole of southeast Asia to occupation by the Chinese Communist forces; and

Whereas such occupation would violate all the principles of the Geneva Conference of 1954 in which South Vietnam was guaran-

teed its independence and freedom from Communist aggression; and

Whereas withdrawal of American support from South Vietnam would only serve to hasten the day when Communist forces in Asia and China would wage all-out aggression against the rest of the world; and

Whereas the Hanoi and Peking Communists have failed to show a single overt sign which would indicate the problems of Vietnam could be settled through negotiation: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is the sense of Congress, speaking for the American people, that

(1) This Nation stands firmly behind President Johnson's determination to wage carefully measured and meaningful retaliation against military installations in North Vietnam which serve as the staging areas for training Communist forces to carry on continued aggression against South Vietnam,

(2) That the people of the United States stand firmly behind the people of South Vietnam in their long and tireless efforts to preserve for South Vietnam freedom and independence, and

(3) The people of the United States, through their elected representatives in the Congress of the United States, send to the people of South Vietnam their heartfelt admiration for the great sacrifices which the people of South Vietnam have endured during the past twenty years in their struggle to retain self-determination and human dignity.

I sincerely hope the Congress will approve the resolution as a reaffirmation of our position in supporting President Johnson and the people of South Vietnam.

It would be my hope that this joint resolution would do much to strengthen the spirit of the South Vietnamese. Very often we hear people say, "Do the Vietnamese have the spirit to win?" Any nation, any people, who have survived and endured the hardships of Communist aggression and subversion for 20 years as the people of South Vietnam have done, certainly do not need any further proof of their will to win. While we are aware and concerned about the internal problems in South Vietnam, we must understand that these are problems which frequently follow in nations in turmoil. But the fact of the matter is that the South Vietnamese also have the right to ask to what extent the free world is ready to help them in their heroic struggle.

I think the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] and the Members who have participated in this discussion have made a great contribution today in sending word to the people of South Vietnam and in the final analysis it is the people of a nation who really count—that we stand firmly along side of them in their heroic struggle and we shall remain in South Vietnam until her brave people can take their place among the free peoples of the world.

Again I congratulate the gentleman from New Jersey for leading this very significant discussion here today.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the gentleman.

(Mr. PIKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Speaker, I, too, want to congratulate the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] for taking this time today. We have heard so much of the voices of criticism and the voices of opposition.

It is so easy to stand back and snap at a policy that somebody else has to carry out.

Mr. Speaker, we have heard very little of the support I feel is in the hearts of the American people. I appreciate the opportunity to add my own support today.

Mr. Speaker, in common with every other Member of Congress, I have received a great many letters from my constituents calling for "negotiations" to end the war in Vietnam. Almost without exception the writers refer to some vague "international guarantees" which can assure security there. Some call for "United Nations' guarantees of the peace," while others call for turning the matter over to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. These people are indulging in wishful thinking, and I would expect that deep in their hearts they know they are indulging in wishful thinking.

In the year 1954 there were negotiations of exactly the type which they request, and these negotiations resulted in the division of Vietnam into two nations, a North Vietnam which was to be Communist, and South Vietnam, which was not. The United States was not a party to these negotiations, nor to the Geneva Accord which resulted from them, but it has abided by them.

The Communists of China, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam were a party to those negotiations, and that accord, and let us examine whether they have abided by them. From 1954 to 1959 the new nation of South Vietnam was becoming the success story in southeast Asia. One hundred and forty thousand landless peasant families were given land through an agrarian reform program. The principal crop, rice, jumped from the prewar production of 3½ million tons to 5 million tons by 1960. Rubber production exceeded prewar totals. School enrollments had tripled; primary school teachers had tripled; almost 3,000 medical aid stations and maternity clinics had been established throughout the country.

What had happened in North Vietnam? Its per capita gross national product was 38 percent lower than South Vietnam; its per capita food production was 10 percent lower by 1960 than it had been in 1956; so North Vietnam, which had participated in the negotiations, and which had signed the Geneva accord of 1954, cast hungry eyes southward.

In 1960 Ho Chi Minh stated that the north was being "more and more consolidated and transformed into a firm base for the struggle for national reunification." Just 6 years after the Geneva Accord, the head of North Vietnam publicly declared his intention to violate it. To those who say that shooting is not the answer, I can only say, I

agree. But let them remember that in 1959 the Communists embarked in South Vietnam on a program of sabotage, terror and assassination, in a program of attacks on innocent hamlets and villages, and on a program of the coldblooded murder of thousands of schoolteachers, health workers, and local officials who opposed their form of liberation. This was how the Communists who had signed it honored the Geneva accord.

In the years 1960 and 1961 almost 3,000 South Vietnamese civilians in and out of government were assassinated; 2,500 were kidnaped. So to those who say "Let us negotiate," I say, "What is the purpose of negotiating a new treaty with people who will not honor the treaty already negotiated?"

Negotiation is not an end in itself, but is only a means to an end. All of us recognize the frightful dangers implicit in an escalation of the war in Vietnam, or in the latter half of the 20th century of any other war, any other place, any other time. But does this mean that at all times and at all places we will make meaningless treaties rather than fight for those things to which Americans have always been most deeply committed? Do we fail to recognize the equally frightful dangers of making aggression easy and attractive? Have we learned nothing from the lessons of recorded history? Do we fail to recognize the dangers of an escalation of appeasement? The situation in South Vietnam is in a state of daily change, and we live in a time of peril where all of the alternatives are ugly alternatives, but I submit that the ugliest of all of them would be for an American retreat which would make aggression look easy and attractive.

In this time of change, the one thing which does not change, and the one thing which has not changed throughout recorded history, is that when aggression is allowed to become attractive anywhere, when aggression is allowed to become easy anywhere, when aggression is unopposed anywhere, then attractive, easy, unopposed aggression breeds more aggression, as surely as the night follows the day.

There are those who say that South Vietnam is not the right place to fight communism; that the South Vietnamese people and their leaders are neither the right people nor the right leaders with whom to fight communism. I believe that the place to fight communism is where communism is being fought. In 4 years of American military commitment in South Vietnam we had, as of February 15, lost 281 lives due to Communist military action. In the year 1964 alone, in the county in which I reside, we lost 202 lives in traffic accidents. I have not received one letter condemning the waste of lives upon our highways. We accept it as part of the American way of life, and it may be part of our difficulty that we accept too much as part of our American way of life; that we take the kind of government under which we have prospered so much for granted that we assume it to be some sort

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3351

We should have learned from that experience and many others since that no nation's independence is expendable, that every loss of freedom on the part of some other people chips away at our own and merely postpones an inevitable showdown with the forces of aggression. We are supporting ourselves in supporting the people of South Vietnam.

There must not be any American Dien-bienphu. Let us not negotiate ourselves into one, either, for the effect could be the same.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to recall to this House the text of the joint resolution of the 88th Congress last August in support of President Johnson's response to the Gulf of Tonkin attack:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Mr. Speaker, President Johnson deserves our support on Vietnam at this time—even more than he did last August. I am confident that the Congress and the American people will continue to support him. Let us be ever mindful that our security and the security of the free world depends in large measure on our success in Vietnam. It is his determination to assure our security which guides the President in the difficult decisions he must make in this critical situation.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. ALBERT. First, Mr. Speaker, I desire to associate myself with the remarks of the able gentleman from New Jersey, who is a very industrious, constructive, and effective member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. He has stated this matter succinctly and he has stated this matter well. I commend him on the high quality of his statement.

Next, Mr. Speaker, I cannot let this discussion pass without taking the opportunity to speak out in support of the courageous and difficult policy President Johnson has followed in the Vietnam crisis.

Let me, at the outset, disassociate myself from those who would question the motives of those who disapprove of these policies. God knows, Mr. Speaker, these are not days of ease and comfort in our Nation's life. American men are engaged in a life and death struggle in Vietnam. Their own lives and the life of this Republic are both involved. If we

believe, as I believe, that a democratic society can best make its greatest decisions through discussion, then we must encourage free and searching discussion of this problem. We can only have such a discussion if we are prepared to assume that difference of opinion does not involve divergence of objective—that those who agree with the details of a given policy are not necessarily more patriotic than those who disagree.

Further, Mr. Speaker, I hope we can all find common ground on the proposition that neither political party can gain any partisan advantage from this debate. There are vast areas of public policy in which each of the two great political parties can, with pride, point to its own position and criticize that of the other party. But in foreign policy, when the future of the whole people is the stake, a striving for partisan advantage is, at the very least, in poor taste. I hope we can avoid it now, and in whatever circumstances the present crisis may bring forth.

Mr. Speaker, I support the President. I support him because it seems to me that he is making every effort to prevent the collapse of an important bastion of the free world. I support him because he has adopted a cautious policy of the use of American strength on a scale precisely measured to fit the needs of the situation.

We could, of course, lash out against the Vietcong or their allies with all the overwhelming strength of American arms. We could bring to all of Indochina—perhaps all of southeast Asia—the all-pervading peace and quiet of the graveyard. This is a solution that is not open to us alone. If it were a morally acceptable choice—which I question—it would still hardly be a strategically sensible option.

At the other extreme of the spectrum of choice lies paralysis or retreat. We could let a healthy respect for what can happen degenerate into a craven fear of the consequences of any action at all.

Hesitating—and Mr. Speaker, we ought to hesitate—before we throw ourselves fully into an all out war, we could decide that no risks are worth such stakes.

President Johnson has shown himself to be able to steer capably between both these dangerous alternatives. He has used force effectively. He has used it in a way and at a level calculated to make our position in southeast Asia crystal clear—and yet he has neither plunged over any brink himself, nor has he pushed our adversaries nearer to one.

I am reminded, in these critical days, of the tense 2 weeks in October 1962, when John F. Kennedy was guiding the Nation—and the free world—through what we all knew could have been its ultimate crisis. In those dramatic days, John F. Kennedy coolly weighed the alternatives, courageously prepared himself to wield the mightiest weapons man has ever developed—and patiently sought a means by which those weapons might remain unused.

He succeeded and his Vice President, who sat with him throughout that 2 weeks, and who has now succeeded to those awful responsibilities—is follow-

ing that same prudent, proud, and patient path.

Lyndon Johnson's task is, if anything, more difficult. The nature, even the identity, of our enemy is more obscure. The strategic stakes and the tactical imperatives are less obvious. In the Vietnamese crisis, to an even greater extent than in the Cuban missile crisis, the full facts, in all their intricacy, must of necessity, be known only by the President and his immediate advisers.

During the Cuban crisis, there was an outpouring of national dedication to the task ahead that must have been very encouraging to President Kennedy. People who had, a week earlier, bitterly criticized the President, then picketed the White House in support of his stand. Without knowing of and drawing strength from, the ability of this great people to face whatever the dawn might bring, even the cool courage of John Fitzgerald Kennedy might not have been equal to the task.

Today, with the stakes as great, with the need for patience, understanding, and courage even greater, the President of the United States deserves to be told that his countrymen are behind him. Debate and honest criticism are very much in order—as they always are among free men.

But expressions of what I believe to be the sentiments of the great majority of the American people are also in order.

Mr. Speaker, I hope this discussion will show the President—and the tough-minded adversaries he faces on our behalf—that his prudence meets our demands, his determination is matched by our readiness to support him, and his courage is rooted in that of a free people.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey is to be commended for securing this time to focus on U.S. policy and actions in Vietnam. As chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I have kept posted on developments in that troubled area, and I am personally convinced that President Johnson is cautiously following a course of action there which is aimed primarily at serving our long-range security interests and needs.

The constant probing aggression of the Communist forces in Vietnam is proof of their savage and implacable resolve to impose their control in every area lacking strength to oppose their creeping conquest. We are in South Vietnam because it is in our security interest to help these people retain their freedom from Communist aggression. We are there at their request.

Our President has wisely followed the course of firmness in Vietnam. He has demonstrated a strong desire to achieve a realistic peace on honorable terms. He has shown every wish to limit conflict and steer the conduct of operations in Vietnam toward the goal of peace.

At the same time, the President has resisted premature demands for negotiations with the aggressors. We would all like to see negotiations leading to peace, but to negotiate now would be to repeat and compound the folly that lead Chamberlain to compromise with Hitler. Neither our generation nor those that follow us can forget the terrible aftermath of those futile negotiations.

While the situation has deteriorated in Vietnam, we must remember that the people of that country have had a long history of disunity, and unlike the British in India, the French, on departing, left no legacy of equipment for self-government. In spite of this, the struggle for freedom has gone on and in some respects has even improved recently.

This is not the time to urge the President to relax in the firmness of his policy. When the North Vietnamese give satisfactory assurances of a real desire for peace on honorable terms, there will be no problem in negotiating. Until then, the President deserves and merits our strongest support in his efforts to win our goals in Vietnam. We must never allow ourselves to forget that this is but another of many Communist probes, in which they tirelessly seek to press their conquests in areas where the free world might fail to marshal its forces to stop them. If we let premature negotiations cost us the eventual enslavement of South Vietnam, we can only look forward to a renewal and an escalation of Communist aggression in other areas.

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate this opportunity to express my full confidence in our President, in the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in the bipartisan leadership who all stand united in support of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman of our committee. At this time I yield to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Gross], a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I have asked the gentleman to yield so that I may read a short two-paragraph news dispatch of this afternoon. It is as follows:

UNITED NATIONS.—Secretary General U Thant disclosed today he had been engaged in private discussions for some time with the United States and other parties to the Vietnam conflict and had made concrete proposals aimed at a negotiated settlement.

He declined to disclose the nature of his proposals, but told a news conference he was confident a formula could be found which would end the fighting and enable the United States to withdraw gracefully once stability has been achieved.

Mr. Speaker, I wonder how this gentleman injected himself into the picture in the nature of a peacemaker or an alleged peacemaker?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his comments and observations. I think the statement he read reflects the desire of the administration to leave South Vietnam whenever the Communists decide to leave that nation to its freedom. If the Communists go on home and call off the war I

am sure we would be happy to make a graceful exit.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from New Jersey has made a constructive and a statesmanlike speech, and I commend him for his firm statement of support for President Johnson's policy in Vietnam.

I want to join the gentleman from New Jersey, and our distinguished majority leader, in declaring my own support for the President's strong stand in Vietnam, and for his declared determination to prevent any expansion of Communist power in Asia.

This is an issue on which all Americans should stand united, and on which we can have only one Commander in Chief—the President of the United States.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GALLAGHER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I want to say to the gentleman from New Jersey that I appreciate his having taken this special order to open up the discussion of this subject matter.

I do not happen to be one of those who feels that a discussion of this nature in the foreign policy field should be limited to the other body. It is a legitimate area for discussion in the House of Representatives.

I am sorry that I did not get to hear all of the remarks of the gentleman from New Jersey but I believe in essence I heard the greater part of them. I hope the gentleman will correct me if I am in error, but the gentleman takes the position, does he not at this time, that he is opposed to our going into any negotiations at the present time and that the gentleman's position in a general way would be opposed to one of neutralizing the area?

Mr. GALLAGHER. I believe that the gentleman from Illinois states the case with regard to my position on neutralization of South Vietnam.

I believe that history has demonstrated that the course of neutralization merely means a new Communist campaign of insurgency to begin the next day in another country.

I do not believe that it has ever been the policy of our country to refuse meaningful and honest negotiations. We are perhaps the greatest negotiators in history. But I do not believe we should run to a conference table at which no one has yet taken seats. I believe if we panic ourselves into a position of negotiation, disregarding our moral obligation not to barter away another nation's freedom, that this in itself would be the greatest detriment to a diplomatic termination of the struggle now going on in Vietnam.

Mr. MICHEL. If the gentleman will yield further, I recall the gentleman's reference to the year of 1938 at the time of the partitioning of Czechoslovakia.

I had occasion to look up the direct quote of Winston Churchill with reference to that in which he said:

The belief that security can be obtained but by throwing a small state to the wolves is a fatal delusion.

Mr. Speaker, I feel that this statement is very apropos for the present day with respect to South Vietnam.

Might I ask the gentleman from New Jersey, if he will yield further, if he feels, as I do, that before we go into any negotiations, we want to go into such negotiations from a position of strength? How does the gentleman feel we could strengthen our position in South Vietnam in order to go to any kind of a conference table for a negotiation from that position of strength to which I am sure he referred?

Mr. GALLAGHER. I thank the gentleman for participating in this discussion as well as the other Members of this body. We are demonstrating staying power. The Communists seem to feel that we will grow tired and weary of the battle there and will withdraw. I think the President has demonstrated strength, prudence, and a desire to protect freedom. He is demonstrating the staying power of the United States.

Just today we have learned of the first use of heavy bombers in the fight in South Vietnam. So I think the demonstration of our determination to remain there, if need be, is the best way to let the Communist leaders know that we mean business and, perhaps, they will then live up to the agreements to which they themselves were a party in 1954 and in 1962.

Mr. MICHEL. If the gentleman will yield further, I am sure the American people are somewhat concerned over these frequent turnovers of government and of generals themselves tossing out one another.

Since the gentleman from New Jersey has just come back from that area, did he obtain any kind of impression as to whether or not the generals in the military themselves, the South Vietnamese, were wearying of the battle? Is there still that determination from top to bottom among the military in South Vietnam to the effect that the fight should continue to be joined?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Strangely enough, when you leave Saigon in South Vietnam and go out into the country you find a fierce determination on the level of field officers and company commanders as well as the provincial governors to continue the fight. These people are each day fighting and dying to protect their country and for the cause of freedom.

Of course, it is my own opinion—that until there is political stability in Saigon the military plans cannot move ahead in the field. In other words, if the field commander must keep one eye on Saigon and the other eye on the enemy, it is difficult for them to carry on the fight with maximum efficiency.

I think the forces that are presently there are sufficient to do the job, but no job can be done well unless we have political stability in Saigon. So, I think that the generals and religious politicians should start putting their country ahead of their own personal feuds.

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

3349

gomery County would receive \$572,864 from this bill.

Compare this with the poorest of all the Nation's counties, Tunica County, Miss. The median family income in Tunica is \$1,260, only 22 percent of the national median family income; and 77.8 percent of its families earn less than \$3,000 per year. Over one-half—54 percent—of its school-age children are from families with less than a \$2,000 income. There are 2,965 such children in Tunica. Yet Tunica County would receive only \$357,283 from this bill—or \$215,581 less than wealthy Montgomery County.

Mr. Speaker, this situation is even more ridiculous when we consider that Montgomery County last year got nearly \$4 million in Federal impact aid for its schools. In fact, the second and third wealthiest counties in the United States are nearby Arlington and Fairfax in Virginia, and these three wealthiest counties last year received over \$11 million in impact aid for their schools. Under this bill, they would total over \$1 million additional Federal aid for their schools.

I am not picking on these three counties, but this bill is a strange way to fight poverty in our schools.

One more example should suffice to show that the administration bill is wildly inconsistent with its supposed purpose of concentrating Federal funds in poverty-ridden schools. Compare Westchester County, N.Y., and Williamsburg County, S.C. Each has just over 6,000 school-age children from families with less than \$2,000 annual income.

Westchester is the sixth wealthiest of our 3,000 counties. Its impoverished children represent only 3 percent of its total school-age population. Its schools are about as good as money can buy. If more money is needed to help the schools, Westchester County should be able to find it.

Williamsburg is one of the Nation's poorest counties. Its median family income of \$1,631 is one-fifth that of Westchester's; and 41 percent of its school-age children come from families with under \$2,000 annual income. Yet, with the same number of eligible children, Williamsburg County would receive \$810,000 from this bill, less than one-half the \$2,189,026 that would flow into Westchester County.

Mr. Speaker, our committee may tinker with this bill, but mere tinkering is not enough. For example, we could raise the qualifying family income level to \$3,000 and cut the percentage of the State per pupil educational expenditure to 25 percent. That would change a few of these appalling figures a few dollars one way or the other, but it would not change the overall effect.

We need a whole new look at the problem of educational finance and a whole new approach from that found in this bill. Surely the States themselves, if they were permitted to distribute these funds, would not squander \$9 million on our 10 wealthiest counties.

Mr. Speaker, I do not speak out, here on the floor of the House, in a sense of partisanship. I would call the attention

of the House to the inequities in this measure. I believe that you can but agree with me that this bill does not meet the objectives for which it was intended.

If we were to be honest, we would retitle this bill and change it to read: "A bill to assist schools by providing the most help where it is least needed and the least help where it is most needed."

Equality of opportunity through education should indeed be our goal. The proposed bill does not further our attempts to bring this most worthy objective into reality.

J. P. [Signature]
THE DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING
THE REASONING OF THOSE WHO
ADVOCATE NEGOTIATED PEACE
IN VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. ALBERT). Under previous order of the House the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLAGHER] is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. GALLAGHER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, it is difficult to accept the reasoning of those who advocate, at this time, a so-called negotiated peace in Vietnam. Need we be reminded that the aggressions of the Communist Vietcong, supported and directed by the Communist government of North Vietnam, and encouraged by the Government of Red China, are already a violation and abuse of a negotiated peace?

It is even more difficult to rationalize the statements of those responsible citizens who urge withdrawal from South Vietnam. This we must view in the harsh light of political realism as a first step toward ultimate abandonment of the free nations of southeast Asia to Communist control.

In the face of some stepped up Communist pressure in South Vietnam and mounting political frustrations, an easier course may appear, at least for the present, to be one of those actions.

I am certain that situations somewhat like that which confronts us in southeast Asia are precisely what the late President Kennedy had in mind when he said in his inaugural address, "Let us never fear to negotiate, but let us never negotiate from fear."

Certainly we must keep open the door to negotiation, but shall we fall on our knees and hammer on a door that was slammed on our face? If we are not to negotiate from fear, let us not negotiate either from a position of "peace at any price." To compel negotiation let us walk in dignity to any conference table but let us not run before anyone is there at a time when it appears that the psychological and political resources of the defender are at a momentary low ebb is the long-range objective of the Communists in their war of insurgency. Negotiation under these circumstances is capitulation, and I do not believe the American people are any more in favor of

giving ground to the Communists in southeast Asia than they are in favor of abandoning our positions in Europe or Korea.

Hanoi and Peiping have been intractable in their demands that we not only terminate our assistance to South Vietnam, but that we surrender the entire western Pacific to Communist domination. This hardly leaves room for genuine negotiations at a conference table.

The fact is that there already have been two political settlements with the Communists in southeast Asia; the Geneva accord on Vietnam in 1954, and the Laotian agreement in 1962. Both of these conferences attempted to effect a permanent settlement by political means. The agreement at Geneva committed North Vietnam and Communist China to respect the independence of South Vietnam. But since 1954 these two countries have masterminded the Vietcong campaign of terror against South Vietnam. They have continually violated the Geneva agreement by providing material support to the Vietcong, and in the case of Hanoi, by providing thousands of soldiers and technicians to the Vietcong—the stepchild they have tried to foist off as a homegrown "liberation front."

Furthermore, the ink was still moist on the Laotian agreement in 1962 when it became clear that North Vietnam was not withdrawing its military personnel, as required by the agreement; that North Vietnam was using the corridor in Laos to supply men and equipment to both the Pathet Lao and the Vietcong, again in violation of the agreement; that in short, Hanoi and Peiping still had no intention of abandoning their expansionist plans among their Asian neighbors.

Negotiation at this time and under existing circumstances would be merely a renegotiation of the Geneva agreement and once again the only thing to be negotiated is our part of the last negotiation, South Vietnam. Under existing conditions, the advantages would be wholly on the side of the Communists.

Negotiated settlements mean absolutely nothing unless they are kept. If the Communists cannot keep the agreements they already have signed in regard to southeast Asia, what reason is there to believe they would keep a new one?

Since the beginning the Vietcong campaign has been directed politically and militarily by the Communist regime in North Vietnam. With typical Communist inconsistency, Hanoi has, from time to time, dropped the masquerade, and admitted that its objective is to "liberate" South Vietnam by all the means at its disposal.

The Vietcong effort is supplied by weapons and equipment sent by North Vietnam which is in turn supported by Red China. And there is substantial evidence that the flow of Chinese Communist weapons and military supplies has been increasing steadily.

Our Military Establishment also has proof that the infiltration of North Vietnamese military personnel into South Vietnam has strongly increased during the past year. Although much of the

Vietcong enlisted force is recruited in the south, largely through intimidation, the hard core units, including most of the Vietcong leaders and technicians, are supplied from North Vietnam.

The talk of neutralization and abandonment of our commitment in southeast Asia gives new validity to the argument of the Communists that we will grow tired, impatient, and weary in Vietnam and retire and leave the field to them and that their conquest will be won by default.

It seems to me that this is the biggest impediment to a diplomatic termination of the agony of Vietnam. Diplomatic termination will come only when we demonstrate our resolve to protect freedom, and reassure them of our staying power.

Our President has made it clear that we are willing to withdraw as soon as the foreign powers supporting the Vietcong leave the field and live up to commitments they agreed to in 1954 and 1962, which means a free nation in South Vietnam.

Does such a thing exist as unilateral negotiation? For if Peiping and Hanoi remain intractable in their right to subvert a free government in violation of our existing agreements, what is there to negotiate except the abandonment of freedom? It would mean stepped-up military activity on their part and a need for an accommodation with the Communist powers by those who are now free in southeast Asia, as well as a defeat by default on our part.

Can anyone seriously believe that neutralization of South Vietnam would not mean immediate Communist takeover there and a new battle beginning in Thailand the next day?

The advocates of such a policy must understand that our abandonment of commitments to protect freedom in southeast Asia is a recognition that we expect Communist China to absorb all of southeast Asia. Are we prepared for some future negotiations for the partitioning of Hawaii which is on the collision course of the Communists on their way to Seattle?

Vietnam must be viewed in its military and political context and as its status relates to the whole of southeast Asia. I do not necessarily subscribe to the so-called falling domino theory, which to my mind is an oversimplification of the problem. I am certain, however, that abandonment of South Vietnam to the Red hordes of China and North Vietnam, either through negotiation or withdrawal of military support, will lead to increased Communist pressures on the other countries of southeast Asia and their eventual takeover by the Communists.

We are not seeking in South Vietnam only to save a nation. We are attempting to hold a militarily strategic land area encompassing four countries without committing the U.S. military in forces of sufficient size to do the job itself. Our goal is to eventually bring about in all of those countries—South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand—the political, economic and military stability that will permit them to

stand alone as free nations and free from Communist aggression or subversion.

We must weigh, the strategic importance of South Vietnam as a critical landmass bordering the South China Sea and as a holding point against Communist military aggressions in Malaysia and the other independent countries that dot the south Pacific. They are themselves of strategic value because they stand as outposts along the air- and searoutes that lead to Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the Philippines.

We must consider South Vietnam as a holding point essential to the continued independence of Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma as tenuous as that independence may be. Occupation of the landmass incorporated in those countries would give Red China a corridor to and control of the Indian Ocean.

These are the military factors that must determine our policies and actions in that part of the world. South Vietnam is a link in the free world perimeter and I do not expect that a marauding force of Communist guerrillas, no matter how well supported by the Communist governments of North Vietnam or Red China, will be able to snap that link or thwart the determination of the United States and her allies to stand unyielding on a line that was defined and agreed to in the Geneva accord of 1954. That accord is not subject to renegotiation so long as the Communist government of Ho Chi Minh continues to support and direct from its command post in Hanoi a campaign of terror and insurrection in South Vietnam in total disregard of conditions to which it agreed a decade ago.

To talk of new negotiations when the Communists show no inclination to honor past agreements is merely a sign to them of weakness on our part. To talk of withdrawal from South Vietnam merely encourages the schemers in Hanoi and Peiping to plan new aggressions in southeast Asia.

I returned recently from a factfinding trip to South Vietnam convinced that all in that country is not as bleak as newspaper accounts from Saigon would indicate. The years of intelligent and dedicated work by U.S. military advisers in organizing and training the South Vietnam Army and the regional and popular forces are showing even better results. I was impressed too, by the desire of the South Vietnam forces to fight and die in defense of their country and its freedom and each day they are doing just that. Increasing numbers of technically qualified officers and non-commissioned officers and specialists are being graduated from army schools which are conducted under our guidance. This phase of our effort brings improvement throughout the armed force. I was assured by U.S. military advisers that the leadership and command of the South Vietnamese Army are improving.

I was impressed by the assurances of our advisers that the efficiency and combat effectiveness of the greater number of units in the regional and Popular forces are improving. Certainly the army and its reserve elements do not

measure up to our standards, but George Washington's army was thought to be substandard when it fought for freedom. The South Vietnamese Army was described to me by U.S. officers as being, "sophisticated and well trained considering the relatively few years it has been organized." It would be, in my opinion, sheer folly to abandon our military advisory effort at a time when its years of effort are showing cumulative results.

I was similarly encouraged by favorable reports by U.S. Air Force advisers who are helping to train the fledgling South Vietnam Air Force.

The United States has a tremendous investment in that military force and I shudder at the prospect of turning it over—rifle stock and gun barrel—to the Asian Communists, which is what could well happen as the result of renegotiation at this point and what would certainly happen if we were to withdraw our support from South Vietnam.

During my stay in South Vietnam I was made aware of the many accomplishments of our Agency for International Development whose programs parallel our military effort in that country. Here, too, the many years of dedicated effort by AID men and women are bearing fruit. Our investment in dollars and human effort is too great to consider abandonment.

There is no easy path to the accomplishment of our whole task in South Vietnam—nor is there a shortcut. The trail is long, arduous, frustrating, and complex.

I rise, Mr. Speaker, to voice my full support for the manner in which President Johnson and his administration has responded to the events of the past several weeks in Vietnam. Many Americans tend to reduce complicated issues such as Vietnam to fairly simple alternatives.

The Chief Executive—who is privy to far more information and many more considerations—must avoid what often appears to be the easy and most popular course and choose the course that reflects the best interests of the American people and the free world.

Let none delude themselves that the conflict in South Vietnam has been a civil war. The aggressive actions of Hanoi and Peiping have made the fate of South Vietnam our most important responsibility in world affairs today. This is not, Mr. Speaker, a partisan issue. I would like for the Record to state that the actions taken by President Johnson on Vietnam have the support of former Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Wilson, the distinguished minority leader of the Senate, the Honorable EVERETT DIRKSEN, Gen. Lucius Clay, Gen. Mark Clark, and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

If we are to remain a great power, risks such as we are taking in South Vietnam are unavoidable. But we should realize that the risks of inaction are surely as great as the perils of action. If some risk had been taken on behalf of Poland in 1938, the Second World War could conceivably have been avoided.

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3395

table until March 2 for additional cosponsors.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the joint resolution will lie on the table as requested by the Senator from New York.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 52) to establish the fourth Friday in September of every year as American Indian Day, introduced by Mr. JAVITS (for himself and other Senators), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

TERCENTENARY COMMISSION TO COMMEMORATE THE ADVENT AND THE HISTORY OF FATHER JACQUES MARQUETTE IN NORTH AMERICA

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a joint resolution to establish a Tercentenary Commission to commemorate the historic presence of Father Jacques Marquette in North America.

The function of the Commission will be to develop and execute suitable plans for the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the arrival of Father Marquette at Quebec on September 20, 1666. In conjunction with these plans, the Commission, in cooperation with the Secretary of the Interior, will investigate the desirability of establishing a permanent national monument or memorial.

Mr. President, Michigan is proud to claim Father Marquette as one of her own. Two years after his arrival in North America, he established a mission at Sault Ste. Marie. Later in 1671 he founded the Mission of St. Ignatius at the Straits of Mackinac, and this remained his home until his death.

Returning from a missionary trip to Illinois in 1675, he died on the eastern shore of Lake Michigan near the present city of Ludington. He is buried in our State. Michigan rivers, counties, towns, cities, and streets proudly bear his name.

But Father Marquette is known in American history for what he accomplished beyond our boundaries. Two hundred and ninety-two years ago, Father Marquette and the renowned explorer, Louis Joliet, set out to explore our continent's greatest river—the Mississippi. The histories say that on May 17, 1673, Father Marquette and Joliet left St. Ignace with two bark canoes, five French guides, and a little smoked meat and Indian corn.

In 4 months they descended the Mississippi to the mouth of the Arkansas, satisfied themselves that the river emptied into the Gulf of Mexico, and returned to St. Ignace—a journey of 3,000 miles. They brought back with them knowledge of America's greatest river and richest wilderness.

Today as we puzzle the complex problems of science, space, economic growth, and human relations, I believe it not inappropriate that we give thought to those early pioneers—among them Father Marquette—who met with determination

and courage the basic and compelling challenges of their day—the exploration of a vast uncharted continent, and the planting in its rich soil of the tender shoots of civilization.

Mr. President, I hope Congress will act to make possible an appropriate anniversary observance in commemoration of Father Marquette's contributions to our country.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The joint resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 53) to establish a Tercentenary Commission to commemorate the advent and history of Father Jacques Marquette in North America, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. HART, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROCUREMENT OF VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT AND CONSTRUCTION OF SHORE AND OFFSHORE ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE COAST GUARD—AMENDMENT (AMENDMENT NO. 43)

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, by request, I submit an amendment, intended to be proposed by me, to the bill (S. 1053) to authorize appropriations for procurement of vessels and aircraft and construction of shore and offshore establishments for the Coast Guard. I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be printed in the Record, together with the letter from the Secretary of the Treasury requesting its submission.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be received, printed, and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the amendment and the letter will be printed in the Record.

The amendment (No. 43) was referred to the Committee on Commerce, as follows:

At the end of the bill insert the following new section:

"SEC. 2. Any of the authority in the first section of this Act may be utilized for alteration, addition, expansion, and extension to facilities acquired from any military department: *Provided*, That the total cost of projects constructed under this section shall not exceed \$5,000,000."

The letter presented by Mr. MAGNUSON is as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, February 17, 1965.
The Honorable WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On February 1, 1965, this Department transmitted to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a draft bill to authorize appropriations for procurement of vessels and aircraft and construction of shore and offshore establishments for the Coast Guard. The draft bill was referred in the Senate to the Committee on Commerce and introduced by you as S. 1053 on February 9, 1965.

Since the submission of this bill, the possibility has developed that the Coast Guard will acquire facilities which are to be closed or deactivated by the Department of Defense pursuant to the recent announcement of

such closings throughout the United States. At least one such facility will be acquired by the Coast Guard when it is vacated by the Department of the Army and in connection with that acquisition, construction and rehabilitation to make the facility suitable for Coast Guard use is required.

In the circumstances, the Department recommends the addition of the enclosed new section to S. 1053 in order to permit the Coast Guard to use funds authorized by the bill for the construction and rehabilitation required at this facility. Since the acquisition will take place prior to the end of the next fiscal year, it would be inexpedient to await submission of the next authorization bill to provide for the necessary work. The language of the section would establish a maximum limit on the total amount of funds appropriated for acquisition, construction, and improvement which could be used for the work contemplated. If necessary, these funds would be made available through the deferment of projects which have previously been authorized.

In support of this addition, information will be furnished to the committee as to the projects which are intended to be accomplished in a form similar to that for the items listed in the first section of the bill. Additionally, the Department will be prepared to submit any other available data that the committee or staff may require.

An identical proposal has been transmitted to the chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

The Department has been advised by the Bureau of the Budget that the proposed legislation would be in accord with the President's program.

Sincerely yours,

DOUGLAS DILLON.

AMENDMENT OF INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ACT, RELATING TO AN INCREASE IN THE RESOURCES OF THE FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (AMENDMENT NO. 44)

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I offer an amendment which I send to the desk. The amendment proposes to change the authorization for increased capital from the recommended sum in the bill of \$900 million to a reduced sum of \$480 million.

Under my amendment the U.S. Government would obligate itself to pay \$200 million a year for 2 years, instead of \$250 million a year as provided in the bill now pending before the Senate.

Mr. President, I ask that the amendment be printed.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment will be received, printed, and lie on the table.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the junior Senator from Idaho [Mr. JORDAN] be added as a cosponsor of S. 21, a bill to provide for the optimum development of the Nation's natural resources through the coordinated planning of water and related land resources, through the establishment of a water resources council and river basin commissions, and by providing financial assistance to the States in order to increase State participation in

3396

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

February 24

such planning, and that his name be listed in the next printing of the bill.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, in introducing my bill for establishment of the Lincoln Trail Memorial Parkway extending from Hodgenville, Ky., to Springfield, Ill., I correctly stated in my remarks that it had the cosponsorship of all six Senators from the three States involved. However, the name of the senior Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] was inadvertently omitted from the bill as it was sent to the Printer. In order to correct the Record, and to make clear that my statement was correct, I ask unanimous consent that his name may be added at the next printing, as it should have been in the beginning, as one of the cosponsors of S. 1226.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MARINE EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT—ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILL

Under authority of the order of the Senate of February 10, 1965, the names of Mr. FONG, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts, Mr. KUCHEL, Mr. MORSE, Mr. MUSKIE, Mrs. NEUBERGER, Mr. TYDINGS, and Mr. YARBOROUGH were added as additional cosponsors of the bill (S. 1091) to provide a program of marine exploration and development of the resources of the Continental Shelf, introduced by Mr. BARTLETT (for himself and other Senators) on February 10, 1965.

NOTICE OF FINAL HEARING ON BILLS RELATING TO THE FORMATION OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE REORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the information of the Senate and other interested persons that the Senate Subcommittee on the Standing Rules has scheduled a final hearing on bills relating to the formation of a joint committee on the reorganization of Congress. The hearing will be held on March 1 in room 301, Old Senate Office Building, starting at 2 p.m.

Any Senator or other person wishing to testify at the hearing should notify the staff director, Kent Watkins, room 133, Senate Office Building, extension 2235, in order to be scheduled as a witness.

NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION BEFORE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the following nomination has been referred to and is now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary: William P. Copple, of Arizona, to be U.S. attorney, district of Arizona, for a term of 4 years, vice Charles A. Muecke, resigned.

On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all persons interested in this nomination to file with the committee, in writing, on

or before Wednesday, March 3, 1965, any representations or objections they may wish to present concerning the above nomination, with a further statement whether it is their intention to appear at any hearing which may be scheduled.

NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING ON S. 1228

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, as chairman of the standing Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, I have previously announced that the subcommittee will conduct a public hearing on bills pending before the subcommittee to fix the fees payable to the Patent Office. Subsequent to this announcement, Senator JOSEPH D. TYDINGS, introduced S. 1228, which likewise fixes Patent Office fees.

I wish to announce that S. 1228 will be included as part of the subcommittee hearing which will commence on Wednesday, March 3, 1965, at 10 a.m., in room 3302, New Senate Office Building.

The subcommittee consists of the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART], the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. BURDICK], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. SCOTT], the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. FONG], and myself.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. HARTKE:

Address delivered by James G. Patton to the Indiana Farmers Union Convention, at Indianapolis, Ind., on February 3, 1965.

Resolution of the National Lutheran Council commending the VISTA program of the Economic Opportunity Act.

By Mr. THURMOND:

Editorial by radio station WOKE, of Charleston, S.C., in opposition to H.R. 2998, to extend the life of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

By Mr. METCALF:

Resolutions of the Mid-West Electric Consumers Association, which will appear hereafter in the Appendix.

Resolutions of the Upper Missouri Water Users Association.

By Mr. JAVITS:

Request for an Empire State Building commemorative 5-cent postage stamp.

By Mrs. NEUBERGER:

Article entitled "A Topsy-Turvy World," written by Rabbi David Polish, of Evanston, Ill.

REFLECTIONS ON VIETNAM FACTS—ARTICLE BY ERIC SEVAREID

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article entitled "Reflections on Vietnam Facts," written by Eric Severeid, and published in the Washington Evening Star of February 23. In part, the article reads as follows:

No vital facts are being withheld from us. The difficulty is that one set of facts falls from one side of the road, another set from the other side, and the result is a roadblock.

Elsewhere in his article, Mr. Severeid says:

There are no good solutions; there are only choices between evils, some of which, we must remember, are more evil than the existing evil.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

REFLECTIONS ON VIETNAM FACTS

(By Eric Severeid)

My credentials as a card-carrying columnist and compulsive commentator would surely be revoked by what follows, if a committee of professional censure existed in this calling. Like all those whose slow brain must make the daily race with rapid events, I have periodically longed for a week, say, of enforced illness, be it at home, in a hospital, or jailhouse—a week for nothing but reading, listening, and reflection. Ah, the mental mists that would melt away, the clarity that would emerge.

Now I have been granted the blessed week—in a most accommodating hospital, ordered thence for rest and routine tests of minor ailments; and I have read, listened to, and thought about virtually nothing but Vietnam, in detail and in cosmic consequence.

No, that is somewhat misleading. What I have read, what I have listened to, are other men's reflections on Vietnam, and what I have found myself actually reflecting on is this mass of reflection. I cannot recall an intellectual stalemate quite like this one over Vietnam and what the U.S. course should be. An intellectual blockade, really, since the mass of suggestions, which run the gamut from A to B—from the preposterous to the dubious—confuse, in their totality, far more than they clarify.

This is a prime example of the falsity of the cliché that if only the people are given the facts they will always find the road. No vital facts are being withheld from us. The difficulty is that one set of facts falls from one side of the road, another set from the other side, and the result is a roadblock.

But our system ordains that writers must write, speakers must speak, and politicians must do both. The net result amounts to a supreme example of what Voltaire meant by his remark: "The necessity of saying something, the embarrassment produced by the consciousness of having nothing to say, and the desire to exhibit ability, are three things sufficient to render even a great man ridiculous."

I find myself in the same predicament with the great. I must say something since newspaper space, like nature, abhors a vacuum, but I can illuminate nothing. If I feel less ridiculous about this than most, it may be because when I first began a career of uttering in public, the remarkable man who hired me, Ed Murrow, gave this unprecedented advice, "When there is no news, just say so. When you are unsure of your facts, admit it. When you have no solution to offer, don't pretend otherwise. Who knows, people might appreciate that."

The only facts I feel sure about are mostly negative in nature—the heaviest conceivable bombing of the supply lanes from North Vietnam will not stop the supplies, since there is always the night and the brush; even a very large American air- and road-oriented ground force will not destroy a guerrilla force; pinpoint bombing inside North Vietnam will not seriously injure them militarily or weaken their will; saturation bombing of North Vietnamese harbors, railways, bridges, and factories may produce favorable political results (it may also bring a mass infantry invasion of South Vietnam), but we would kill hundreds of women and children in the process; negotiation for a neutral and unified Vietnam is a hopeless idea, since it implies ask-

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3397

ing the northern Communists to abandon communism; negotiation for a neutralized South Vietnam can probably be brought about only if the Vietcong agrees to a cease-fire; and a neutral South Vietnam could be maintained only by a heavy internationalized presence that the United Nations, at least, can no longer risk or afford.

There are no good solutions; there are only choices between evils, some of which, we must remember, are more evil than the existing evil. This remains very limited warfare. The political world has not been overturned by our bombing retaliation; the basic alignments and hostilities among the great powers remain as they were. I do not believe that great power war is going to grow out of the mess in southeast Asia, partly because Communist China will probably not risk winning a war on foreign ground at the cost of all she has built up at home.

I fail to follow the argument that a withdrawal from South Vietnam would mean the retreat of U.S. military power to Pearl Harbor. I fail to follow the contrary argument that getting off the Asiatic mainland and resting on our air and sea power would leave us in a stronger position. If air and sea power cannot prevent the subversion of South Vietnam, I don't see how it could prevent the subversion of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

What we are doing now is stalling and muddling through, hoping that something will turn up. This is unsatisfying to the American temperament and tradition, but the scoffers should remember that an astonishing number of Micawbers in life avoid heartbreak as well as heart attacks. Time and patience don't always heal, but often enough they do.

Put this down as the special prejudice natural to anyone doing his reflecting from a hospital bed.

SIXTH ANNUAL INTERVIEW OF WALTER LIPPMANN ON COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on February 22, a telecast—the sixth in an annual series—of an interview with Walter Lippmann was carried on the CBS network. Mr. Lippmann was interrogated by Eric Sevareid.

Mr. Sevareid's expert questions led this distinguished journalist through a wide ranging and penetrating survey of the situation—domestic and international—in contemporary public affairs. The results of the interview, as transcribed, are of immediate value to public understanding of these affairs as well as of historical value.

I ask unanimous consent that the transcript previously described be inserted at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the text of the interview was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CBS REPORTS "WALTER LIPPMANN, 1965" AS BROADCAST OVER THE CBS TELEVISION NETWORK, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1965, 10-11 P.M., E.S.T.

THE ANNOUNCER. Six years ago, at his home on the coast of Maine, Walter Lippmann, newspaperman, whose column appears in 285 newspapers here and abroad and who has been called one of the essential Americans, made his television debut on "CBS Reports." He has been a television tradition ever since. Tonight, that tradition continues as Mr. Lippmann discusses with CBS News Correspondent Eric Sevareid the state of the Nation, and the state of the world, from our

dilemma in Vietnam, to De Gaulle, to President Johnson and his Great Society.

Now here is Mr. Lippmann and Eric Sevareid in a conversation filmed in Washington 4 days ago.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, there's a great deal we'd like to hear from you tonight. This is the 20th year since the end of the great war. We seem to be surrounded by a lot of paradox. We're the most powerful country in the world, and we can't seem to find either victory or peace in a small Asiatic land. There's almost a feeling that this is a prewar period. What do you think the President's real choices are now in Vietnam?

Mr. LIPPMANN. The President has a very hard choice to make. He's really in a dilemma, and either horn of that dilemma is extremely uncomfortable, and unpleasant. One horn is to escalate, that is to widen and increase the war, which is a very terrible choice because it almost certainly would lead us into a war with China before it ended. And we can't tell what Russia would do in the case of a war with China. Anyway, the risks are incalculable of widening the war, and the President, of course, is doing his best to avoid that.

The other dilemma is to negotiate a truce in Vietnam. We're not sure that we can because the interior situation in South Vietnam is breaking up, crumbling, and that is what the victory of the Vietcong is feeding upon. We're not sure that the Chinese or the North Vietnamese, who think they're winning and have good reason to think that they're winning, would be willing to negotiate something that, that stopped them short of complete victory. Complete victory would be a collapse of the Vietnamese Government, and a setting up of a new government which would invite the United States to go out, to leave.

The reason that dilemma is so bad is not only that it would be embarrassing and humiliating, but because we have, in the course of these years we've been in there, whether we ought to have been there in the first place is another question, but having got in there, a great many Vietnamese have become dependent on us, and the chances for their future if we leave is very slim. I don't know that they'd all be liquidated, some of them would have to flee the country, but we have a debt of honor to these Vietnamese who have thrown themselves on our side in this civil war. And therefore, it's very hard for the President to choose that side which is disengagement. What he is doing now, of course, is to try to find something between these two extremes.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, you've called this a civil war. The administration talk is always about the intervention from North Vietnam, another state. You really think it is just a civil war?

Mr. LIPPMANN. I think it is, but like all civil wars, foreign outer powers intervene in them, and that's been true of every civil war you can think of, from our own, beginning with the French intervention in that. The intervention from the outside is very important, but it isn't the revolution. The American Revolution wasn't made by the French, it was made by the Americans, and all these revolutions, the Russian revolution, the Chinese revolution, all were made by the people of the country itself, and that's true also in Vietnam, in my view.

Mr. SEVAREID. What is the most we can hope for as the outcome of negotiations, however it takes place?

Mr. LIPPMANN. The most we could hope for, is that there will be a sufficient political truce in the civil war, for a period of time—some years—so that they can adjust themselves to each other—I mean the people who have been fighting on opposite sides in the civil war. This can heal their wounds, and

that's about all. I mean, we can't make South Vietnam, and we can't make southeast Asia, an American outpost. We don't want to, the President says we don't want to. And we can't do it. What we can do is see that it doesn't become a Chinese military outpost, which is quite a different thing from saying that it will be eventually within the Chinese sphere of influence.

I don't know of any man living who thinks that 35 years from now, when the Chinese are one-half of the whole human race, they aren't going to be the dominant power in southeast Asia. Of course they are, but they're not there now, and we have to protect the people who would be liquidated, killed, really, persecuted if we suddenly disappeared. That's our problem.

Mr. SEVAREID. Isn't much of the dilemma whether you actually can get the negotiations going?

Mr. LIPPMANN. It is a real question whether we can rally enough world opinion, and enough diplomatic support from the Soviet Union particularly, and from Japan and India and other Asiatic countries, something to induce them to negotiate. So we have to find ways of going behind the scenes. And there are many ways behind the scenes to China, to Moscow, to Tokyo—of course, there's no great difficulty for us—and New Delhi, and so on, also to London and Paris, to create a situation diplomatically which nobody in the world can define today, which will make it advantageous and necessary for the Communists to negotiate.

Mr. SEVAREID. You'd need a cease-fire from the Vietcong before such negotiations.

Mr. LIPPMANN. You'd have to do the diplomatic exploration which I've been talking about, which is not a conference, you'll have to do that before there's a cease-fire. Now, one of the terms I would think indispensable to a negotiation, or any kind of talk, back and forth, would be that before we would not withdraw while the thing was going on. You see, we are faced with an ultimatum—have been from Hanoi, and Peiping, that we must get out, and then talk. Now, that we can't do, because that means abandoning all our friends and all our interests and that would be scuttling the ship.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, there are complaints in the press that this is not only an undeclared war we're conducting, but an unexplained war, and the President is criticized for not talking to the public about this involvement. Do you think he should?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think he's in a very difficult position. An irresponsible journalist can tell the truth, but if the President of the United States tells it, morale will probably collapse in Saigon. That government would just blow up. If he tells what he wants to do, on what terms he would be willing to consider negotiating, they'll immediately reject them publicly, which makes it impossible for them to accept it in the end, and here, there'll be a great outcry from the war hawks that he's appeasing. So he's caught in a jam and I don't think he can explain the war more—I think he has to work, because of the nature of this involvement, and that's one of the mischiefs of getting involved in it—he has to work through really what amounts to secret diplomacy.

Mr. SEVAREID. In your own work here in Washington, do you really find a serious war party, warhawks so to speak, who want to make a big roar out of this war in Vietnam?

Mr. LIPPMANN. They're very strong and powerful. I don't think they're a big camp, but I think they're quite powerful and influential.

Mr. SEVAREID. Do you care to say in what areas they would be found?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think as a matter of fact, they would be found in the military

February 24

3398

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

area, and to some degree in the diplomatic area. But they're not found in the interior and at the top of the White House. That I feel sure of.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, in the White House there's only one topman, so I assume that you mean that you're convinced that the President—

Mr. LIPPMANN. I mean that the President is not a warhawk. The warhawks want to bomb Hanoi, and all the industries. They want to knock out the whole industrial system of North Vietnam; if anybody says "Well, the Chinese will come in, intervene if he does," he says, "Then bomb China, too." The President's policy in bombing is a very strictly controlled and regulated policy. We're not bombing North Vietnam, we're bombing the borderland above the 17th parallel, which is a rather empty country, and we signal our attacks and they know when we're coming. There's no surprise attack, and they are really public relations jobs, much more than they are military jobs.

Mr. SEVAREID. They're political bombing—

Mr. LIPPMANN. They're political bombings, and they don't kill many people. I don't think they kill anybody. There's no evidence that they do, because what we bomb is wooden sheds. Now, I don't think there's any doubt at all, that if we bomb North Vietnam the way the warhawks want it bombed, and make it uninhabitable, the Vietnamese Army, which by the way is the largest land army in eastern Asia, except China's, will move right down into South Vietnam where they can't be bombed, and where there are rich prizes, and I don't think South Vietnam will resist them. They couldn't.

Now, the warhawks' answer to that is: Yes, it's so important we must send troops in. And they're talking when they—when they, you really press them, in hundreds of thousands of American troops to hold the line. If we are in the position in Vietnam that England was under with Churchill in 1940, if they were on our beaches, we'd have to do that, but 8,000 miles away, I don't think we have to do that, and I don't—I hope we won't.

Mr. SEVAREID. Suppose, Mr. Lippmann, in the showdown the war hawks, so to speak, have their way. Then what happens?

Mr. LIPPMANN. At first, if the war hawks prevail, and we become involved in a big war, they will rejoice, but in the end the people will weep.

Mr. SEVAREID. You don't agree then, with those who say that South Vietnam is another Berlin or Korea?

Mr. LIPPMANN. No. It's not a Korea, because it's not an invasion as Korea was. That was an open, old-fashioned invasion by an army that crossed a frontier and you had battles in the open. This is not. This is like a flood, like water spreading, and you can't beat it back or shoot it with a shotgun. It won't go back.

Mr. SEVAREID. One would suppose the war hawks learned their own lesson, a military lesson from Korea when the Chinese came into it.

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, they will tell you, they say the Korean syndrome, they call it, has made the Americans frightened. Well, I don't know, maybe they've learned from experience. That's another way of putting it.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, there are many people here who think that if we do withdraw from that part of southeast Asia, however it happens, that we will have suffered an enormous and historic American defeat.

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I tell you, if you made a mistake, and I think we made a mistake to involve ourselves in a war on the land in Asia, contrary to all previous American

teaching, military teaching and doctrine, we have to expect to pay some price for it. You can't expect to get out gloriously from a mistake. But if you mean by that, that the United States will cease to be a power in Asia because it negotiates itself out of Vietnam eventually, the answer to that is not true. The United States controls the whole Pacific Ocean, all the water, all the air above it, and all the air over the way into the interior of China and so on. Now that is a situation which has never existed before in American history, and that will continue to exist.

Mr. SEVAREID. I take it you're not concerned about any immediate toppling of dominoes in the rest of southeast Asia.

Mr. LIPPMANN. Not immediate. But I never deceive myself. I never believed in going into southeast Asia, I've said many times, and written it in all kinds of things. I've never believed we ought to be there, but as long as we are there, I believe what we have to do is to stay there long enough to make the process orderly rather than disorderly and violent.

Mr. SEVAREID. Does this Government have an overall policy for Asia?

Mr. LIPPMANN. We have objective commitments, which I do not believe is policy for the long run. I'm not talking about tomorrow, but 5, 10, 15, 20 years from now, are not tenable. We have these commitments as a result of our victory over the Japanese Empire in the Second World War. We find ourselves in places where we can't expect to stay for the rest of time. We aren't going to stay forever in South Korea, and we aren't going to stay forever in South Vietnam, nor forever in Taiwan, nor in Okinawa, which is part of Japan. If we have any sense, any maturity, we will adjust our minds to the fact that over the generations, there's going to be—the tide is going to recede to something more normal and natural.

Mr. SEVAREID. What you're saying then, as I understand it, is that in the long run, we must be prepared to live with Chinese Communist domination of southeast Asia.

Mr. LIPPMANN. The situation for us in the Pacific is very like what happened in Europe with the Russians. We have lived with the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe since 1945, and look at it now. It's dissolving. If we can hold China, in a great military sense, from building a navy like the Japanese Navy was at Pearl Harbor, becoming a real threat to our peace, and wait as we've waited with the Soviet Union, in the end the same forces will work in China that have worked in the Soviet Union. She'll relax her grip.

Mr. SEVAREID. But East Europe is confronted with a countervailing force in the sense of the great weight and prosperity of West Germany and the rest of West Europe pressing close on East Europe's very borders. You wouldn't have that, really, would you, in the Far East? Where would the contrast and the other force come from?

Mr. LIPPMANN. The best I would expect on looking now at the long run, I mean, we can get the kind of pause, and interlude—that I think, is the best we can hope for. I think that, for instance, Vietnam, which was always anti-Chinese, will follow the same line that Tito has followed in Europe as against the Soviet Union. It will be Socialist or Communist in a manner of speaking, because those words don't apply very well in Asia, but it'll be tending to be anti-Chinese and independent and that will be, from our point of view, quite satisfactory.

Mr. SEVAREID. Do you fear the Chinese possession of the bomb?

Mr. LIPPMANN. I certainly do. I fear it very much. I'm not having hysterics about it, because it's a long way off, before it's a threat to us. And I'd be willing, I haven't absolutely made up my mind about it, but I think we probably could afford to offer the

countries that are threatened by the bomb, which would be India, Japan—those would be the two important countries—they can't use the bomb on South Vietnam, or something like that—India and Japan—a guarantee not that we'd defend them with troops and ships and everything else, airplanes, but that if they are hit with a nuclear bomb, we'll hit back with a nuclear bomb. We could give a nuclear guarantee to them, and while I'm not sure that that's the right policy, I think we ought to consider it very carefully.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well then, that would make a full circle, wouldn't it, of American commitment? We have made this commitment for Europe, for Latin America under Mr. Kennedy, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and now you would include Asia, too.

Mr. LIPPMANN. That is a commitment which we are able to fulfill. Holding villages in the jungles of Vietnam is not a commitment that the American troops can really fulfill.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, do you think what's happened recently in Vietnam, including our bombing, has altered the relations between Moscow and Peiping?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Moscow is forced to align itself with Peiping, but the underlying differences between those two powers are so deep that I don't think in the long run, they can become one power again, and I think therefore, we can count on, in this diplomatic offensive which I was talking about before, on quiet Russian support. First of all, they have a territorial conflict, over a frontier which is the longest in the world, and the most badly defined, stretches 4,000 miles across Asia between Siberia—Soviet Siberia, and China, with territory in dispute all along the way. That doesn't make for peace, and there's been a lot of fighting going on that never got reported on that frontier.

The other thing is, that they're in different stages of development. The Russians have passed the revolutionary stage in their own development. They have a going society with big industry, and they don't have to keep the country in a state of war alarm—war tension—in order to get the people to endure the hardships that the regime requires. China doesn't want a war any more than Russia does, but she wants a state of war feeling, because she needs it for her own affairs, and Russia needs the opposite. She needs intercourse and commerce with the West. That was the original—that's the original root of the quarrel between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung, and it continues with Khrushchev's successors, and that's an irreconcilable difference.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, when China is a highly industrialized country, she's apt to be much more cautious, is she not? She'll be more vulnerable to atomic attack and destruction, for one thing, than she is as a village.

Mr. LIPPMANN. She'll go through the same evolution that every revolutionary society goes through. She'll become middle class, which is what the Russians are becoming. And when they're middle class, they don't like to have their property destroyed, and their families broken up, and their savings lost, and in other words, they become soft. And that softening process has happened in Russia, and it will happen if we can hold off war long enough, for say 15, 20 years, in China.

The ANNOUNCER. You are watching Walter Lippmann, 1965, a 1 hour conversation between America's distinguished newspaperman, Walter Lippmann, and CBS News Correspondent Eric Sevareid.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, may I turn to our relations with Europe now for a minute. There's a sense here, in Washington, that President Johnson has changed the terms of reference in our relations with the NATO Alliance countries; what is this change?

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3399

Mr. LIPPMANN. He has changed them, I think, and changed them for the better. After the World War, and up to President Johnson's time, the United States was not only the protector of Europe, the defender, military protector, but it was the banker, and it was the general political and moral boss, superintendent at least, of Europe. And in the course of that, we got ourselves very badly entangled, first with the British, who thought they were our special friend, resulted in their being excluded from the Common Market, by General de Gaulle. Then we got into a tangle with the Germans, who thought they were the special favorites of the United States. In those days, Chancellor Adenauer was the Chancellor of Germany. He was our chief adviser on European affairs.

We oughtn't to have special favorites among our Allies, and President Johnson, who has kept on excellent terms with the British, and with the Germans, has ended that. And the key to that whole business, that came over this proposal to create a multilateral mixed-manned nuclear fleet, which the Germans would have owned 40 percent of, and that aroused fury all over—in France, among all the people who fear Germany, and there are a great many people who still fear Germany in Europe, all over Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, and he put that on ice, he suspended that.

Mr. SEVAREID. Is this what you once called masterly inactivity?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Masterly inactivity. You see, when you are no longer needed as the leader of Europe, then the right thing to do is to stop trying to lead it. Let Europe develop in its own way, which is I think going quite satisfactorily.

Mr. SEVAREID. Is it going in the direction of a more cohesive united Europe?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Yes; it's going in the direction of the breaking down of the Iron Curtain, between the two halves of Europe. This is a process of trade, and sport and cultural communication between the two halves of Europe.

Mr. SEVAREID. Do you think we could have arrived at that rather favorable point had we not taken the great leadership for many years, had we not had all these troops in Europe?

Mr. LIPPMANN. We had to do it. It was under our protection, and with our financial help, that Europe recovered, but it has recovered. It's like a family, you have to recognize that the child has grown up, it has grown up and you can't treat it as if it were a baby.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, in Germany now, there seems to be a revival of interest in the reunification of that country. Do you see this coming about?

Mr. LIPPMANN. I think it's going to come. I'm not surprised at the revival of interest, because Germany without, divided as it is, not even in possession of its own capital, is a sick country. It's done very well economically, but politically, it's sick. And it will never be well until it's reunified. The reunification can come about, I think, only by the process I was talking about, by the gradual weaving together of the two parts of Europe. When that has taken place, Germany will be reunited in the process.

Mr. SEVAREID. President de Gaulle is now the last of the great wartime leaders of the West, and the most powerful political personality in Europe. Why don't we get along with him better? Who misunderstands whom?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, there's a good deal of misunderstanding both ways, I don't doubt. Memories of the war. He and President Roosevelt didn't get on. He and Churchill had difficulties, but they got on better than President Roosevelt and De Gaulle. But the basic difficulty about De Gaulle, I find this

from lots of people, De Gaulle is like a man who can't see very clearly what's right in front of him, who sees pretty well what's across the room, or halfway down the street, but who sees absolutely perfectly what's in the distance. He has the farthest vision, he can see further, than any man in our time, and I don't even exclude Churchill. De Gaulle foresaw, at the worst moment in the fall of France, how in the end, the war would be won; namely, by the coming in of Russia and the United States. That kind of vision is very annoying to public men who don't see that far.

On the other hand, the fact that he doesn't see very clearly in front of him, and stumbles over the furniture, is very annoying too, and kicks their shins, as he goes, that sort of thing. But that's the problem and the genius of his vision is so important. For instance, he has foreseen, and we have followed—we didn't take it from him, but we are following the same policy by the same logic—he has foreseen, that the reunification of Germany and of Europe, would have to come about through increasing connections with Eastern Europe, between East and West Europeans. He's doing that. He's been much closer to the East Europeans than anybody.

Well, we're doing that too. In the Far East, it is very annoying to us that he recognized China. It was a sign of very great vision, to see that there'd never be peace in the Far East until it was made with China. You can't make it with anybody else, and that kind of thing is the cause of the difficulty.

Mr. SEVAREID. You think President Johnson ought to personally meet with President de Gaulle any time soon?

Mr. LIPPMANN. I'm in no hurry for that. I don't think they're better to understand each other too well. I think they'd better meet through very skillful ambassadors.

Mr. SEVAREID. Apparently the President wants to go to Europe sometime soon, and to Russia too. Do you think the time is really ripe for that?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, if he asked my advice, which he hasn't, I would not advise him to go.

Mr. SEVAREID. Why not?

Mr. LIPPMANN. I'd advise him to get the Great Society going in this country, and we have something in the bank to talk about. His style isn't the style that Europeans naturally understand, this old-fashioned American style, and I wouldn't think he'd do too well, and I don't think you can accomplish anything by face-to-face talk with a man like De Gaulle, or with a man like Kossygin.

Mr. SEVAREID. It's just a mass public relations exercise.

Mr. LIPPMANN. It will be public relations, and too many reporters, and too many cameras, and too many everything, and it wouldn't work, and they'd all say things that they'd wish they hadn't said, when it's over. So I'm in favor of the President staying home. If he wants to travel I think he might go to South America, one or two trips. That might be useful.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, if the President does go to Russia, he'll find a new regime now, Mr. Khrushchev gone since we last had these conversations. Why do you think he did go, and what's different about this new regime?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I don't know. I haven't been to Russia. I don't think—the cards are not face up on the table. We can't read it clearly. If you look at the underlying forces, Kossygin has just as great an interest as Khrushchev had first of all, in avoiding nuclear war with the United States, and also, an interest in getting better relations with Eastern Europe, and the Western World for economic reasons.

I'm told by everybody I've talked to, and I've only talked to one relative of one of the new rulers of Russia, who was here on a

scholarship, they got tired of Khrushchev's inefficiency, and his wildness. He promised things that he hadn't the authority to promise. And that was the reason they said let's get this more organized, and more orderly, and the very noticeable fact is that first, they've divided Khrushchev's jobs into two jobs. Khrushchev was both Secretary of the Communist Party, which was considered the most powerful job, and the other job, he was Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, or Chairman of whatever they call it. Now they have two men, Kossygin and Brezhnev, and it's very interesting, they no longer travel together. They don't go to foreign countries together as in the early days before Khrushchev got the both jobs, he used to travel around with his other man.

Mr. SEVAREID. Bulganin.

Mr. LIPPMANN. Bulganin.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, I suppose one of these two men must be the prevailing one eventually.

Mr. LIPPMANN. Unless there's been a change and this—Russia is evolving unless the evolution is that the Communist Party is no longer the militant world party that it was when Khrushchev first came into power.

Mr. SEVAREID. The established church instead of church militant, in other words.

Mr. LIPPMANN. Yes.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, about Great Britain, I think you were there recently. There seems to be a feeling of deep crisis about that country. Financial crisis for one thing, a government with a bare majority in Parliament, what is really happening with them?

Mr. LIPPMANN. There is a deep crisis in Great Britain, and it may be that the historians will say that it was Labor Party's misfortune to come into power too soon, because the things that prevent the Labor Party from doing what it says it wants to do, and may be able to do which is to revivify Great Britain from within; its industrial life, and its technology and its education, is postponed because they're still dealing with the remnants of their Empire out in Malaya, all the way from Aden to Singapore, and with the remnants of their old sterling area, which is a remnant from the days when London was the banker of the world. Now Labor is having the job of dealing with that, and that's a job that should be done by Conservatives. That's their business.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, did you follow the Churchill funeral ceremonies on television?

Mr. LIPPMANN. I did.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, what was the real significance in your mind of the enormous emotional impact of this? Merely the man as a personality, great turning point in British history? What was it?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Oh, I think the fundamental emotion here, at least the one I felt, and I assume that other people—was one of immense gratitude to this man who had saved the world from nazism, and fascism. That's one of the great achievements of a single man in modern history.

Mr. SEVAREID. You mean, he did this?

Mr. LIPPMANN. He did that. Without him, there was no reason to think that Great Britain could have resisted, or would have resisted.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, did the funeral of this man represent in a sense the burial of the British lion that the world has known for 300 years, everywhere in the world?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I've heard people say that, but I don't think we're in a position to make any such—reach any such conclusion here. I don't think so. I remember a song of Beatrice Lillie, "There's Life in the Old Girl Yet," and we'll probably see that.

Mr. SEVAREID. Were you particularly upset about the fact that the Vice President did not go to the funeral?

Mr. LIPPMANN. No, I think the President made a mistake about this, when he couldn't go himself. I think he was too sick. His head wasn't clear enough to have done the obvious and right thing to do, which was to appoint General Eisenhower as his personal representative. Eisenhower was already invited by Lady Churchill to come to the funeral, but he should have been the American representative. He was the man who was Supreme Commander under Churchill, he had been President twice, he was the man. There was too much confusion in the White House to think out the right thing. I don't blame the President for not wanting the Vice President to leave when he himself was sick.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, a moment ago you said that the President, before he goes abroad, ought to get the Great Society program really working. How do you define this program, the Great Society? What's the essence of it?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think the best way to answer that is to say how it differs from the New Deal, the Fair Deal, or the Square Deal, of all those deals, that have preceded it. All of those older deals were based on the assumption that the amount of wealth in the country was more or less fixed, and that in order to help the poor, or to educate people or to do anything, you had to divide the wealth, take away from the well-to-do, and give it either to the Government or to the poor or somebody. That's why it's called a New Deal. It's the same pack, but you deal it differently—or a Square Deal, and so on.

Now, the Great Society is a result of a revolution that's occurred, a silent and beneficent revolution that's occurred in our generation, under which, we have learned not perfectly, because it's very difficult—it's a new art, we have learned how to control, regulate and promote the production of wealth in an advanced industrial society like our own. We are able to produce more wealth by putting on taxes, interest rates, and all the budgetary arrangements that we use, and make the thing grow, and we finance the new developments, education and everything that we talk about in the Great Society, the beautifying of cities, and everything of that sort out of the taxes on the increase of wealth that we're able to produce. We increased the wealth, the product of the United States by—I don't know—30 billions last year. The taxes on that will pay for the whole of the Great Society, and nobody is any poorer, everybody's richer. Now, that is what the Great Society—that's its basis.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, what's the single most important aspect of the President's program?

Mr. LIPPMANN. It's education, because it's like a vestibule from which all the corridors lead out, unless you have education you cannot take away from the poorest part of the population, the thing which keeps them poor, their inability to—they haven't learned enough and been trained enough to keep a good job, to do a good job. It also leads to research, to production of people to increase the scientific knowledge and the technical knowledge. It's the basic of making the democracy work.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, do you agree with the claims of some people in the press, that President Johnson in trying to govern by consensus, so to speak, is refusing to spend any of his political capital; that he doesn't want to lose any of his mass public support; that a great President ought to be more courageous on that score. Do you feel that way?

Mr. LIPPMANN. On the contrary, I think he's just—I am in entire sympathy with him. It applies internally. Now, when you get abroad, that's another question. But within the country, the only real way to solve a problem like, for instance, the racial problem, is by having an overwhelming ma-

jority in favor of enforcement of civil rights. Unless you get—a consensus, really means that about between 65 and 75 percent of the people are in favor of the policy, that's really what it means. Not everybody's going to be in favor of it, and that's what the President had—he was in that range, when he was elected—and that's what he's trying to conserve. And he's quite right to conserve it. He will, if anybody can solve the civil rights problem in the United States, it will be done that way, having the law, enforcing the law, but getting observance of the law by consent, voluntary consent, by a great mass of people.

The same is true of capital and labor. You can't solve them, except by a consensus, and the same is true of this whole argument that we heard so much about, about the welfare state, and what do you do for the poor, and what do you do for the rich and all that. Now, consensus politics is possible only in a society which has reached the kind of revolutionary condition that we have, where we can control the output of wealth.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, most of us don't think of President Johnson as a philosopher in any formalized sense, or an ideologist in any sense, what's the secret of his appeal to the people?

Mr. LIPPMANN. The root basis of it is that he is really one of them, to a degree, which very few Presidents in recent times have been. He doesn't have to be told what simple Americans, farmers, businessmen, are thinking. He already feels it himself. It's in him, and they know he feels it, and that's what gives—that creates the relationship between them.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, does he have that quality of appreciation instinctively, more than President Kennedy, or President Eisenhower?

Mr. LIPPMANN. He does indeed. If you think of their careers, as compared with his, you'll see that they were as compared with Johnson, outsiders, coming into the political life of this country. But he's right in the heart of it, where it grows, and the thing is in him. He doesn't have to be taught it.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, since we last had one of these conversations, we had quite a considerable national election. The Republican Party, in terms of offices held at all levels in the country, is at its lowest point in about 30 years. Are we in danger of a one party system here?

Mr. LIPPMANN. No, we're in no danger of having a one party system. We may have a condition which we've had several times before in our history when one party was predominant for a generation. But the party system always revives in a free country and we're a free country, so there's no danger. The problem is for the other party to mean something and correct its mistakes. The great mistake of the Republican Party since the time of Theodore Roosevelt, is that it quarreled with the intellectual community in the United States, and they all went over to the Democrats and that gave the Democrats an intellectual capacity for dealing with issues that the Republicans simply didn't have.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, this is the 20th year since the birth of the United Nations. President Kennedy I think, once called it the keystone of our foreign policy. Most people in the world seem to have great hopes for it. What do you think now about its present condition, and its prospects?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think it's in great difficulties. It's going through a crisis. The League of Nations and the United Nations, these two versions of the same idea, both required before they could operate successfully, that peace should be made. The reason the League of Nations failed was that it couldn't make a peace, it needed to have a peace to keep. The same is happening to the United Nations. It's in the grave difficulty because there's no peace in Europe from the

Second World War, Berlin, you know, the occupation, division, and there's no peace in Asia, and I don't expect that the United Nations can make that peace, the great powers have got to make the peace.

After it's made, and on the basis of its being made, the United Nations can function to keep it from tipping over and keeping order and balance and the question is, I think, it's the crucial question for not merely for the United Nations but for the world, is whether we can bridge these next years of 10, 15 years without war, in which case the United Nations will survive, and so will the peace of the world.

Mr. SEVAREID. But surely there will always in this revolutionary time, be outbreaks of one kind or another in many, many places.

Mr. LIPPMANN. There'll be outbreaks and, of course, the world is in ferment, and moving very rapidly, but the great power confrontations, which are a very different thing from rioting, even in the Congo, or a place like that, those great power confrontations have to be put in order, in some balance that is acceptable to the great powers.

Mr. SEVAREID. Would any institutional reorganization of the United Nations be of much value?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think we made a great mistake about the United Nations in, I forget the year, I think it was about 1948. We had wanted to use the United Nations to prevent wars and troubles breaking out, and the Soviet Union vetoed everything, and we wanted to get around the veto, and so we decided let's give the power to keep the peace to the General Assembly, where we then had a perfectly clear and certain majority. Now, that is the decision which the Soviet Union is rebelling against. That's why they won't pay their dues, because they won't admit that the General Assembly ever had the right to raise an army and use it for peacekeeping purposes, and we admit it. Theory that actually, we don't want to have the General Assembly commit us to go into war anywhere. We're willing to, theoretically, we're not really arguing with the Russians. We're just saying these were the rules. The U.N. is bankrupt, Congress won't appropriate money, if you don't pay up, if we pay all the bills, pay up and then we'll go on from there. That's the situation as I understand it.

Mr. SEVAREID. Would there be any great advantage in putting the decisive power back in the Security Council?

Mr. LIPPMANN. The only advantage of it is that that's the only place you can put decisive power. When you have decisive power, you have to give a veto. The Senate of the United States would never have ratified the charter if we hadn't had a veto. And if the Senate of the United States were asked to day, would you be willing to go to war, because 75 of the 112 nations in the General Assembly voted you to go, but you didn't want to go, would you go? Well, of course you wouldn't go.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, the whole affair in the Congo beginning 1960, when the U.N. tried to intervene and stabilize it, this has damaged the U.N. in more than financial ways certainly. But what about Africa and this central part of it, the Congo? How far ought we to go in trying to stabilize that place?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, we've always known, we knew then back in, when was it, 1960, whenever it was that the Congo was liberated, or made independent, we knew then that we didn't want to get in there. We were afraid that the Russians would come in and therefore we turned to the United Nations, and asked Dag Hammarskjöld to take care of the Congo, keep it in order so that we wouldn't get involved and the Russians wouldn't get involved. And that's how the United Nations got in there, and that was done successfully for quite a long time. The original idea of giving it the United Nations was correct. The United States has

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3401

no business becoming militarily involved in Africa. It's had enough to be involved in southeast Asia, but to be involved in Africa, too, would be the height of absurdity, and we couldn't do everything at once.

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, you're not terribly concerned about what happens in the middle of Africa, are you?

Mr. LIPPMANN. I'm rather concerned, but I don't take the thing ideologically as seriously as some people do. I think the war and trouble in the eastern Congo with the Chinese mixing in and so on is tribal fighting and not really a question of communism or anticommunism, and even if it were, what difference does it make in that corner of the middle of Africa, and if it does make a difference, what can we do about it, and why should we have to do it?

Mr. SEVAREID. Well, Mr. Lippmann, there is a great argument here, again this year, and it gets more critical every year about just how far we ought to go in many places in the world in terms of our involvement, even our economic involvement. Now, why has this disenchantment come about, about American economic and diplomatic interventions around the world?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think basically, it's come about because we have involved ourselves in too many places and we couldn't fulfill the promises we made, when we went in and therefore, it's reacted against us. So our involvement causes not friendliness to the United States but unfriendliness and we have to concentrate and focus our effort.

Mr. SEVAREID. One manifestation has been this great wave of riots and burning of our information offices, libraries, attacking embassies. How far can a great power tolerate this, really? Do we just continue to stand by and just ask for apologies?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well I think what we ought to do in a place like say Cairo, if they burned down our library, is leave it burned down. Just leave it there. Don't rebuild it, don't clean the street even, and let it stand there as a monument to the thing. I think they'll soon want to clean it up themselves.

Mr. SEVAREID. You mentioned Cairo, and President Nasser. Sukarno of Indonesia is another example. It would appear that foreign aid from this country is becoming a political instrument in the hands of the recipients rather than the donor.

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I think I'm right in saying that Sukarno told us to go jump in the lake or something like the equivalent of it, about our aid, and I would do that, I would just stop it.

Mr. SEVAREID. Nasser also said we could take our aid and jump in the lake.

Mr. LIPPMANN. I would not—I'd stop the aid.

Mr. SEVAREID. You would?

Mr. LIPPMANN. I'd send him a formal note, and say, you are reported as saying you don't want our aid. Don't you want our aid? And let him say which he wants.

Mr. SEVAREID. Then why don't we stop it?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, don't ask me why we don't stop it. I think I would stop it if I had anything to say about it.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, the brunt of much of what you said in this hour is to the effect that we are overextended in the world, we are in too many places, we will have to pull in our horns to a considerable extent. Is it fair to say that Walter Lippmann, 1965, has become an isolationist?

Mr. LIPPMANN. Well, I don't think those words mean anything or at least I don't care whether anybody uses them. I don't care about the word "isolationism," and I don't care about the word "appeasement." I'm interested in the rights and needs and responsibilities of the United States. We are not the policeman of mankind. We are not able to run the world, and we shouldn't pretend that we can. Let us tend to our own business which is great enough as it is. It's very

great. We have neglected our own affairs. Our education is inadequate, our cities are badly built, our social arrangements are unsatisfactory. We can't wait another generation. Unless we can surmount this crisis, and work and get going on to the path of a settlement in Asia, and a settlement in Europe, all of these plans of the Great Society here at home, all the plans for rebuilding of backward countries in other continents will all be put on the shelf because war interrupts everything like that.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Lippmann, thank you very much.

The ANNOUNCER. "CBS Reports: Walter Lippmann, 1965," was filmed and edited by the staff of "CBS Reports" under the supervision and control of CBS News.

ESTONIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, 47 years ago today, February 24, the people of Estonia celebrated the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Estonia. Like the other Baltic States, Estonia's enjoyment of self-government was brief, for in 1940 the armies of Soviet Russia ruthlessly took over the country.

In spite of the years of Communist oppression, the people of Estonia have kept alive their hopes for freedom and eventual independence. The United States cannot accept the enslavement of these once free peoples. The Soviet action has no basis in international law and is in violation of understandings given by the Soviet Union to the Allied Powers of World War II. The right of self-determination is a principle of international justice and the United States has emphasized over and again that it will never become reconciled to Communist domination of the Estonian and other non-Russian captive peoples.

As we commemorate the anniversary of Estonia's Independence Day, we must reaffirm the hopes of the people of Estonia for the return of self-determination—their zeal for independence must be kept alive by our support. We must use all the resources of diplomacy, morality, and world public opinion in a continued effort to free these captive peoples.

TRIBUTE TO FLEET ADM. CHESTER W. NIMITZ ON HIS 80TH BIRTHDAY ANNIVERSARY

Mr. FONG. Mr. President, today marks the 80th birthday anniversary of a magnificent American—Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy. The name of this brilliant, yet modest, military leader is preserved for all time in the history of World War II, for it was his unfailing overall command in the Pacific theater that turned the tragic debacle of Pearl Harbor into a sweeping Allied victory less than 4 years later.

The people of Hawaii know Admiral Nimitz well and affectionately. From his Pearl Harbor headquarters, shortly after he took command in the dark days after the attack, Admiral Nimitz rebuilt a shattered Navy, unified all branches of our armed services in that vast area, and rolled the enemy back thousands of miles to his homeland.

A most timely article about Admiral Nimitz has been written and published

in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin by its able editor and veteran war correspondent, William H. Ewing. It is a masterly personality sketch of the admiral and his ability to mobilize and transform our military forces from defeat to victory. It is written with sincere admiration and affection.

The people of Hawaii share these warm sentiments. We are proud and grateful to have had such an outstanding military commander directing the war from our mid-Pacific bastion.

In tribute to Admiral Nimitz on his 80th birthday today, I salute him and ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point Mr. Ewing's article which appeared in the Pacifica 20 special edition of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin on February 15, 1965.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

NIMITZ

(By William H. Ewing)

Christmas Day, 1941, fell on a Thursday. But those of us on duty in Pearl Harbor, along with other thousands in uniform or out elsewhere in Hawaii, hardly noted the passage of the day as such. A harbor covered with debris and grimy oil from sunken ships, plus the knowledge that thousands of dead men still lay beneath those waters, was enough to demand our full attention to the tragedy that had befallen us and our country.

It was on this Christmas Day, Thursday, December 25, 1941, that I first saw Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz. With a companion I was standing on the second deck of the Administration Building when an elderly officer and his aide emerged from a door and walked ahead of us. "That's Nimitz," said my friend. "He's come to take over."

I looked again, and I was not impressed. I thought Admiral Nimitz looked more like a retired banker than the kind of hell-for-leather leader we needed to pull us out of the worst hole the country had ever been in. I suppose I, along with nearly everyone else, had formed an image of what kind of man we would require. But Admiral Nimitz had white hair, he had a kindly, fatherly expression, and his khaki uniform was too big. It probably was the first khaki uniform he had ever worn; khaki was new to the Navy, and, having just come from Washington, he probably had changed from his normal blues to khaki en route. He had traveled, incidentally, on a Navy flying boat.

The admiral's gentle demeanor, however, belied completely the firmness and resolution that lay beneath it. Most of the time his steel-blue eyes twinkled but I have seen them glitter when the chips were down and there was an absolute implacability about his determination to go ahead, to win. There was the period of uncertainty after the landing on Tarawa, for example. I happened to see Admiral Nimitz for a moment during this time. He obviously had been up all night at his Makalapa headquarters, and through that long night nobody had been quite certain whether the Marines would stay on Tarawa or not. Admiral Nimitz's face that morning expressed anything but gentleness; it was chiseled out of stone. Our casualties had been very heavy—over 3,000 in the first few hours of fighting. Admiral Nimitz knew that many more must die if the island was to be held. But he also knew that retiring, and then trying again, would be even more costly. So the order was to stay, and the Marines stayed. Later, at a press conference, Gen. Howland "Howling Mad" Smith, who was in active command, said it was the Marines' "will to die" that accounted for the

victory, and this was literally true. It ought to be remembered that this was the first step of the offensive against Japan, and that the forces under Admiral Nimitz' command, from Tarawa to Iwo, never took a backward step.

A RARE CHARACTERISTIC

This characteristic of Admiral Nimitz, of ranging from the benign and gentle to heights of resolution, of accepting terrible costs in order to win a necessary objective, is a very rare one. It was noted in Abraham Lincoln by Carl Sandburg in an address before a joint session of Congress on Lincoln's birthday, February 12, in 1959. Sandburg referred to Lincoln as a man "of both steel and velvet * * * as hard as a rock and soft as drifting fog." The analogy is applicable to Chester William Nimitz as well. As Mark Van Doren, the playwright, said of Lincoln: "He was gentle but this gentleness was combined with a terrific toughness, an iron strength."

Looking back now on how swiftly things happened after that memorable Christmas Day in 1941 which marked the Admiral's arrival, it seems amazing that so much could have been achieved so soon. Six weeks after that Christmas Day, Adm. William F. Halsey was in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands with a task force compiled out of the slender resources left to the fleet. Within less than 6 months the Battle of Midway would be fought, the great turning point of the Pacific War in which Japan lost fighting ships and aircraft it could never replace. Japan actually lost the war at Midway. Six months is not a long time from the desperate plight of late December to one of the greatest sea battles of all time, in which men who had never been in action fought with superb gallantry to break the back of Japanese seapower.

To go back to the beginning, Admiral Nimitz was seated in his home in Washington early in the afternoon of December 7, 1941, listening to Toscanini conduct the National Broadcasting Co. orchestra. In his own words, "There was a pause in the program and a flash; Pearl Harbor had been attacked by the Japanese—and this report was repeated several times."

TO DUTY STATIONS

"In a very few minutes the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Adm. Jack Shafroth, who lived nearby (Admiral Nimitz was then the officer in charge of the Bureau which is now known as the Bureau of Personnel) called me and said he would join me to go down to our duty stations at the Navy Department." They found the old Navy Department on Constitution Avenue buzzing with excitement. Hundreds of telegrams and telephone calls were pouring in from anxious parents and relatives of personnel in the Navy and Marine Corps at Pearl Harbor. This situation continued for many days and Admiral Nimitz and his assistants spent most of their time trying to establish current lists of casualties and notifying next of kin. Also during this period, a number of Congressmen came in to enlist in the Navy.

Again, in Admiral Nimitz' own words: "On the 16th of December, I was called to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, who asked me how soon I could travel. To this I responded that it depended on where I was going and how long I would be away. Then he told me he had just returned from a conference with President Roosevelt where it had been decided that I was to go out to Pearl Harbor to take command of what was left of the Pacific Fleet."

The President, it developed, had decided that a relief for Adm. Husband E. Kimmel as commander in chief, Pacific, was imperative. The reason was that the Roberts Commission, headed by Assistant Justice Owen J. Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court, had already proceeded to Pearl Harbor and begun an investi-

gation of the entire situation. Mr. Roosevelt decided that it would be inconceivable to have Admiral Kimmel in command at the same time that he was under investigation and hence had relieved him.

In response to Admiral Nimitz' question as to where he was going and how long he would stay, Colonel Knox had a ready answer. He told the admiral that he would go and stay as long as necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

It was characteristic of Admiral Nimitz that his first concern on reaching Pearl Harbor was the officers under whose command the United States had suffered the most tragic defeat in its history. He inherited three staffs, those of Admiral Kimmel, Vice Adm. William S. Pye, and Rear Adm. Milo S. Draemel. Says Admiral Nimitz today, "These were all fine men but they had just undergone a terrible shock and it was my first duty to restore morale and to salvage these fine officers for further use and this I proceeded to do."

Having been told of his mission, Admiral Nimitz proceeded as thoughtfully and without undue haste as though he were undertaking an ordinary mission instead of one that would require Herculean powers of patience, faith, and resolution. Before leaving Colonel Knox's office he told the Secretary that he should have a relief in the office of the Bureau of Navigation who could take over without a long period of indoctrination. He suggested Rear Adm. Randall Jacobs, who had been Admiral Nimitz' Assistant Chief of Bureau until a short time before the attack. At first Colonel Knox demurred, partly because Admiral Jacobs had just taken command of the Atlantic Fleet Base Force. But he finally agreed and when Admiral Nimitz left Colonel Knox's office he ran into Admiral Jacobs in the corridor. He took him by the arm, led him to his own desk, and informed him that he was thenceforth Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

Thereafter occurred 2 days of confused and hurried packing, as Admiral Nimitz describes it, and then the railway trip from Washington to San Diego which put him in San Diego on December 22.

"I needed that railroad journey," says Admiral Nimitz, "to catch up on my sleep and collect my thoughts. Stormy weather delayed my departure from San Diego until December 24, when I took off and landed at Pearl Harbor in the early forenoon of December 25."

"I found the lochs covered with oil one-half inch thick from the sunken ships. Many boats were hurrying back and forth between the wrecks and the peninsula. I was met by Rear Adm. P. N. L. Bellinger, the Pacific Fleet aviation officer, who informed me that the boats were picking up drowned sailors and marines from ships and taking their bodies to a central point on the peninsula."

"I was met at the landing by Admiral Pye who escorted me to the quarters that I occupied during the time I was in Pearl Harbor before I shifted headquarters to Guam (in 1944). When I asked who lived in the quarters with me, Pye said, 'Nobody.' I then invited him to come in and, over his protest, made him eat a second breakfast while I had mine. Thus was my cheerful reception at Pearl Harbor on Christmas Day, 1941."

Nobody recognized better than Admiral Nimitz the tremendous task he was undertaking or the colossal responsibility pressed upon him. I had remarked in my letter to him that our military situation in the Pacific was "chaotic" after the attack on Pearl Harbor. That, said Admiral Nimitz in his reply, was definitely an understatement. He added:

"From the time the Japanese dropped those bombs on December 7 until at least 2 months later, there was hardly a day passed

that the situation did not get more chaotic and confused and appear more hopeless. The decision at the highest level of government to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, while holding off Japan, was a wise one and was well understood by all of us who had to carry on the war in the Pacific.

"The several errors made by the Japanese on December 7, 1941, helped very materially to shorten the war. Their failure to come back a second day to destroy our repair facilities at the Navy yard and to burn our 4½ million barrels of fuel oil in surface tanks was a most serious error. These tanks could have been destroyed by machinegunning them with 50-caliber incendiary machinegun bullets.

"Likewise, the Japanese made an even more serious error on December 7 by leaving our submarine base on Quarry Point free from attack. As a consequence, no submarines or supporting equipment were damaged and submarines could proceed immediately to stations in the far western Pacific and start their long campaign of destruction of the Japanese merchant marine which was a primary factor in the defeat of Japan. The submarines sank in excess of 75 percent of Japanese merchant marine shipping.

"At the time of the attack on December 7, there was under construction at Red Hill, back of Pearl Harbor, an underground bombproof storage for all petroleum products. At that time in the Atlantic, allied tankers were the principal targets of the German submarines and you need only check the figures for 1941 and 1942 of the Atlantic losses to see what might have happened had the Japanese destroyed the 4½ million barrels of oil we had on the surface at Pearl Harbor.

"For me, meantime, after my arrival on Christmas morning of 1941, I sweated blood until the underground bombproof storage was complete and our oil supply safely piped therein. Had our oil supply been destroyed, and considering the tremendous shortage of fuel and petroleum production, generally, in Europe, it would have taken years to reestablish that supply and would have delayed our Pacific war accordingly. Had our Pearl Harbor installations for repairs been destroyed, our fleet would have been forced back to the west coast of the United States for support, another item which would have prolonged the war.

"So in spite of the reverses we suffered on December 7, 1941, there were some spots on which we could congratulate ourselves on our luck."

There was further cause for rejoicing in the fact that the Japanese had made the attack on our fleet while it was inside Pearl Harbor. Had the fleet been at sea, Admiral Kimmel would certainly have tried to force a battle to bring into play the powerful armament that our battleships carried. However, Admiral Nimitz points out, these ships would have been limited to a maximum speed of about 18 knots while the Japanese task force had a fleet speed of 22 knots.

This difference in speed would have imposed on Admiral Kimmel a tremendous disadvantage. He could not have forced a fleet engagement until the Japanese commander was ready for it.

Furthermore, said Admiral Nimitz:

"The Japanese Task Force that came to Pearl Harbor that day had six aircraft carriers whereas Admiral Kimmel had none—the Lexington being far to the westward on another mission. Imagine, if you can, what would have happened to our slower battleships in such an action with the aircraft of six carriers working on them and with our fleet having no air cover at all. Remember that on December 7, the Japanese destroyed all of the aviation strength of the Army Navy, and Marine Corps on Oahu. Instead of losing some 3,700 to 3,800 men as we did at Pearl Harbor, we would have lost by drown-

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3413

Here was the patriarch of Wyoming—a gentle, smiling, green-eyed Irishman who had seen the whole transition from playing games with Sioux Indian kids outside the stockade of Camp Carlin where he was born August 7, 1877, to Carlin's Atlas missiles burrowed in silos on the perimeter of Cheyenne.

Here was Mr. Wyoming—the beloved T. Joe whose acquaintances ranged from Chief Sitting Bull to J.F.K. and L.B.J., popes and potentates, and princes.

Here was a frontiersman who lived with Indians before they were subdued, who helped freight the plains, who ranched, who was a sheriff, who tamed the old cattle wars, who helped found Cheyenne and to make it great, who gave the world a wild and wooly kind of entertainment called the rodeo, who gave literature a new set of romantic and symbolic western terms, whose sunset years were spent in dedication to the orphanage he helped found in 1927 at Torrington, Wyo.

And T. Joe became part of Colorado, too. He had more friends in Denver and Colorado than he had in Wyoming just because there are more people here. It is significant that when T. Joe was made a chief of the Crow Indian tribe, they named him well—Chief Travels Well Known.

God blessed him with strength of body and spirit to allow him a life of almost nine decades—years filled with sadness, tribulation, and much joy. We know that Chief Travels Well Known will be well received in the Happy Hunting Ground, for his lifetime on earth was dedicated to making it a better and more exciting place to live.

[From the Denver (Colo.) Rocky Mountain News, Feb. 15, 1965]

A. T. JOE CAHILL MUSEUM?

(By Pasquale Marranzino)

I wonder what disposition T. Joe Cahill made in his will for the small museum of Western Americana he had in the basement of his Cheyenne home.

When Mr. Wyoming died Friday he left little behind, I'm certain, in a monetary way. He left a great legend and his museum and many happy memories I was happy to share.

The museum, however, was his pride and joy because it represented to T. Joe the real West that he saw dying in his watery greenish eyes in the final years.

The Wyoming he was born in nearly 88 years ago was a raw, wide open territory shared by Indians and the invading whites—among whom was his father, Thomas Joseph Cahill, "Roarin' Tip" from Tipperary who was quartermaster and horse wrangler for the U.S. Cavalry at Fort Carlin outside Cheyenne, where T. Joe was born.

As a boy Joe helped wrangle horses and then helped his father in the freighting business. Why Joe ran a team that dredged the foundations for the Wyoming State Capitol.

He was insurance salesman, fireman, sheriff, chief of Cheyenne police, and prime mover in the founding of the Cheyenne frontier days, the daddy of them all.

He had a sense of history that was happening around him and he squirreled away many mementoes—paintings, photographs, letters, the flotsam and jetsam of those pioneer Wyoming days.

The photographs are remarkable because they are a running history of Wyoming with T. Joe in most of them standing with famous Indian chiefs, the first rodeo hands, scouts, cavalry greats, great lawmen, great outlaws, celebrities, dignitaries.

In his basement is a strand of the rope with which he carried out the execution of Tom Horn, the hired gun who bloodied up Wyoming ranges in the days of the cattle wars. And there is the limb from which the famous Cattle Kate, the woman rustler, was hanged in 1893.

There are cavalry horns, rowels, spurs, peace pipes, headresses he got in tribal ceremonies, wampum, fire horns, badges from the most famous firemen and policemen of his times.

The cowboy art and photographs are priceless—pictures of the early pokes of the 2-Bar Warren Ranch at Chugwater, the Y Cross at Horse Creek, Charlie Irwin's Y-6. The pictures of the first rodeos with the early greats—Thad Sowder, Harry Brennan, Sam Scobey, Clayton Danks, Bill Pickett, Will Rogers, and Buffalo Bill Cody.

I hear talk Cheyenne wants to do something with T. Joe's home, the basement of which is filled with these priceless historical treasures. Why not take it over and create a memorial called the T. Joe Cahill Museum of Western Americana?

THE JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND CLARK

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, last night viewers on NBC were privileged to witness one of the finest documentaries yet produced by the skill and expertise of American television.

From 10 to 11 o'clock, those watching Channel 4 became a part of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, which began at St. Louis, Mo., in 1804, and ended 2 years later on the Pacific shore of Oregon.

This program and the excellent review it received from Washington Post Critic Lawrence Laurent are of particular interest to me, not only as a member of the Lewis and Clark Trail Commission, but also because a portion of the documentary was filmed in Wyoming.

Producer Ted Yates, formerly of Sheridan, Wyo., is an old and valued friend. He did indeed take on—in the words of Mr. Laurent—"a most difficult assignment when he decided to film 'The Journals of Lewis and Clark.'"

Mr. Yates, his writers, and the cameramen produced a most remarkable story of an unforgettable journey. They also produced a chronicle of the destruction of the tribes and wildlife that once inhabited the Northwest Passage country. The filming was made even more remarkable by Producer Yates' ability to find, for the filming, tracts of wilderness unspoiled by excesses of man and industry.

I commend the National Broadcasting Co., Ted Yates, and all who acted and took part in the filming of "The Journals of Lewis and Clark," and I request that the Laurent column be published in the RECORD, with my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HISTORIC EXPEDITION REVIEWED TONIGHT

(By Lawrence Laurent)

Preview: Producer Ted Yates took on a most difficult assignment when he decided to film "The Journals of Lewis and Clark." The filming demanded physical endurance, enormous logistics problems and it faced the unalterable fact that little is left in the United States that was seen by the adventurers during the years 1804-06.

On that remarkable expedition, Meriwether Lewis and George Rogers Clark lost only one man, a sergeant who died of a ruptured appendix. During the filming, one man was killed. He was a pilot who worked rounding up antelope.

Neither Yates nor NBC executives will discuss the cost of this 1-hour program. It was as expensive as any television documentary ever made. But whatever the cost, the results are worth the money.

What Yates, along with Writer Calvin Tomkins, Cameramen Dexter Alley and Richard Norling, and Film Editor Georges Klotz have succeeded in doing is to make every viewer a participant in that transcontinental journey.

There is a lot of blood in the show. Buffalo were killed, antelope were shot and one silver tipped grizzly bear died. One might, with validity, object to the gore, until he remembers that this program is supposed to create the sights, sounds and the attitude of a more violent time.

The narrator is Lorne Green, the man with the rich voice who is known as Ben Cartwright on "Bonanza." His work on "The Journals of Lewis and Clark" reminds us, once more, that Greene was Canada's top announcer before he took up acting and residence on the Ponderosa.

Yates, who grew up in Sheridan, Wyo., used the program to make observations on topics about which he feels quite strongly. One is our treatment of the American Indians. Another is the terrible, tragic waste of the Nation's natural beauty and scenic splendor.

The script notes that the friendly Otos Indians are now extinct; that a million buffalo "were killed just for their tongues"; that for 80 years the Teton Sioux Indians "fought their losing battle with the white man," and that once Lewis and Clark had explored the West, "the days of the plains Indian, as well as the beaver, were numbered."

There is particular eloquence in the story of the Nez Perce Indians. This tribe was friendly for "70 years, until a long succession of betrayals and broken promises forced the Nez Perce to revolt. The U.S. Army then destroyed them."

Along with pictures and Clark's description of the "remarkably clear Columbia River," narrator Greene comments: "that remarkably clear river is polluted today and no longer crowded with salmon."

This is another of the programs that must be seen in color for full enjoyment. It is the kind of program that has permanent value and as producer Yates said: "You won't be able to do such a show a few years from now. Civilization, in the name of progress, will have ruined all of the scenery."

OREGON LEGSLATURE CALLS FOR CONTINUATION OF VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION DOMICILIARY AT CAMP WHITE

Mrs. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, the Oregon Legislature, now in session, recently adopted House Joint Memorial 1, which states in clear and concise terms the need for continuing the Veterans' Administration domiciliary at White City, Medford, Ore. The resolution speaks for itself; and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HOUSE JOINT MEMORIAL 1

To the Honorable Senate and the Honorable House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress Assembled:

We, your memorialists, the 53d Legislative Assembly of the State of Oregon, in legislative session assembled, most respectfully represent as follows:

Whereas planned closure of White City Domiciliary, Medford, Oreg., has been announced; and

Whereas the domiciliary provides a much-needed facility for veterans with disabilities which incapacitate them from earning a living but which are not so severe as to require hospitalization; and

Whereas the domiciliary has a waiting list and operates at less cost than a hospital can; and

Whereas the domiciliary houses 1,015 members and employs 202 persons; and

Whereas members of the domiciliary, its employees and their families have become part of the Medford community; and

Whereas the proposed closing has been protested by the Oregon Departments of the Disabled American Veterans, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, and the Veterans of World War I of the United States of America, by the United Labor Lobby of Oregon, consisting of the Oregon AFL-CIO and independent unions in Oregon, and by the Oregon State Grange; now, therefore,

Be it resolved by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Oregon:

(1) The Congress of the United States is memorialized to prevent the closing of White City Domiciliary.

(2) A copy of this memorial shall be transmitted to the President of the United States, to the Administrator of the Veterans' Administration, and to each member of the Oregon congressional delegation.

ELDERCARE

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, during the past few weeks the American Medical Association has spent a great deal of time and money in promoting what it has chosen to call "eldercare." "Eldercare," presumably, is the AMA's attempt to answer the King-Anderson bill.

The current issue of Consumer Reports contains an excellent analysis and evaluation of "eldercare" in relation to the King-Anderson bill. I believe Member of the Senate will find the article instructive and enlightening. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled "Medicine Versus the AMA's Latest Substitute," be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Consumer Reports for March 1965]

MEDICARE VERSUS THE AMA'S LATEST SUBSTITUTE

After two decades of effort, 1965 appears to be the year for medicare—a federally administered national hospital insurance plan, financed through social security contributions for persons over 65. This time the administration's medicare bill seems assured of passage. As usual, though, the American Medical Association has proposed a last-gasp substitute. A comparison of the two proposals is instructive.

The medicare bill may of course be altered in the legislative process, but its four basic provisions are not likely to be changed significantly. They can be outlined briefly. For those over 65, medicare would:

Pay the full costs of up to 60 days of hospitalization (in ward or semiprivate accommodations), minus a first-day deductible, for each benefit period (which begins on the first day of hospitalization and ends whenever the patient has accumulated 90 days out of the hospital within a period of 180 days).

Provide for an additional 60 days of post-hospital care for each illness in a convalescent or rehabilitation center operating under

an agreement with a hospital (not an ordinary, custodial-care nursing home).

Pay for up to 240 home nursing visits a year under medical supervision, in programs organized by nonprofit voluntary or public agencies.

Provide payment for hospital outpatient diagnostic services and tests, minus a deductible that would exclude routine low-cost laboratory or other diagnostic procedures.

These provisions would be financed by an increase in the social security withholding tax. Ultimately, a citizen would contribute (to a special, separate health care trust fund within the social security system) 0.45 percent of his earnings up to \$5,600, and his employer would contribute an equal amount. Special provision would be made for those now over 65 who are not covered by social security through the Government's general fund.

The medicare program gives the citizen free choice of physician and hospital. It does not pay the costs of doctor bills, out-of-hospital drugs, prolonged or catastrophic illness requiring long, continuous hospitalization, or extended custodial care in nursing homes.

CU's medical consultants believe that this is, by and large, a sound basic package. The 60-day provision would encompass all but about 5 percent of the usual hospital stays of older persons, and the extended-care proposal would both relieve the pressure on general hospital beds and spur the construction of badly needed convalescent and rehabilitation facilities in many communities. Services of this kind are essential in many illnesses following their acute stage and prior to the time a patient can return to his home or transfer (if necessary) to a custodial institution.

The provision for organized home nursing services has obvious value: such services often preclude the need for hospitalization and permit earlier discharge from hospital or convalescent center. Outpatient diagnostic services also are capable of averting many costly hospitalizations by encouraging the early detection and treatment of disease—at a time when it may be cured or controlled by relatively simple short-term procedures.

Since the heaviest health cost of the elderly is hospitalization, the medicare coverage could make it financially possible for the first time for many citizens to purchase voluntary insurance (of the Blue Shield type) to cover physicians' bills and other supplementary costs.

The AMA substitute for medicare at first glance seems invitingly comprehensive. (It is, in fact, a resurrection of proposals made during the Eisenhower administration that the AMA bitterly opposed at the time, and again just a few months ago at its house of delegates meeting. The AMA now refers to its "new" proposal as a "redefinition" of policy.) The AMA substitute simply proposes the use of State and Federal funds to buy Blue Cross-Blue Shield or commercial health insurance for indigent persons over 65—it does not say how the funds would be raised, in the absence of a social security tax.

The proposal does say, however, that a means test would be required to determine the eligible poor, with the States using State and Federal money to pay all, some, or none of the insurance premium cost, depending on the citizen's qualification under the means test. Means tests are—moral considerations aside—enormously expensive and difficult to administer. Furthermore, the program would be administered by the States, raising the possibility that there would be 50 different kinds of governmental machinery, eligibility standards, and payment procedures. (Under some State rules setting eligibility for help under the current Kerr-Mills law, ownership of property or even ability of one's children to pay can make an old person ineligible.)

The subsidized insurance would pay for physicians' and surgeons' bills and drug costs as well as hospital bills, and an AMA statement asserts that this would be "comprehensive health care" and not "limited to hospital and nursing home care representing only a fraction of the cost of sickness." As CU has pointed out, however, this "fraction" covers the heaviest, the most financially crippling share of the burden. Furthermore, since the AMA has not spelled out specifically what the private insurance would cover (and in existing voluntary insurance policies, cash benefits, days of coverage, and other provisions vary widely from plan to plan and from area to area), it is difficult to tell how "comprehensive" the protection of the AMA's proposal would be.

The current medicare proposal, obviously, will not solve every aspect of the Nation's health problems, even for those over 65. It does not and cannot guarantee good medical care to its beneficiaries, and it pays relatively little attention to the quality of the services it pays for (though the bill does contain a provision for periodic review, by the medical staffs of participating hospitals, of the necessity for hospitalization, length of stay, and other such features). However, it is a significant beginning.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE VIETNAM CRISIS

Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, during the past few days there has emerged here on this floor an expression of views on the great crisis in Vietnam that seems to have flowered into what some choose to call the great debate. To the extent that it can in truth remain a great debate, it can serve well the best interest of our country's concern about the peace of the world.

In the course of the floor debate, I addressed myself some few days ago to the two central questions at issue: First, why not negotiate now; and, second, if there are to be no negotiations now, what policy can we best pursue that affords the greatest opportunity to stabilize the balance of power in the world at the same time that we best preserve the chances for an acceptable settlement in the Far East?

In regard to the first question, that of negotiations now, it seems to me that it is unthinkable to undertake them at this moment. They could only be interpreted in Hanoi as a sign of weakness, however else we might intend them. To invite in North Vietnam the conclusion that we lead from fear or weakness could only risk an explosive impasse unintended by either side. If indeed it is true that North Vietnam believes that we intend to pull out and go home, and if it is likewise true that the President of the United States and those of us who support his policy genuinely intend to have us stay, there are thus the makings for the type of international explosion that could lead irresponsibly to a war that no

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3415

one wants. It would be war by accident or by misunderstanding.

In order, therefore, to clear the air and to remove the uncertainties, at least on our side, it is important that we address to the North Vietnamese and, through them, to Peiping a clear and unequivocal declaration of the American intention to remain in southeast Asia. It is for the purpose of placing this intent beyond any misunderstanding that I have suggested a firm six-step approach which, in my judgment, would achieve that end. That approach includes the following measures:

First. We should make crystal clear to both Hanoi and to Peiping, and incidentally to the world at large, that we have no territorial ambitions anywhere in Asia—or around the globe, for that matter; and that we have no designs on their government or their internal politics. They must wrestle with their own internal futures, so far as we are concerned.

Second. We should announce the drawing of a firm line along the 17th parallel and projected westward along a route to conform with the independent status of the other countries bordering on China, making it clear that we intend to tolerate no breeches of that line; and that, starting along the 17th parallel, the Vietcong infiltrations from the north must cease at once.

Third. If within a specified number of days the Vietnamese do not cut off their probing activities across the line, we should announce our intention to bomb all military bases, airfields, marshaling areas, and encampments in North Vietnam.

Fourth. If this still does not persuade them of our intention to stand in southeast Asia, then we should announce that we will proceed to the bombing of logistic targets—bridges and transportation lines.

Fifth. Should the above measures still not persuade the Vietcong of our full intentions, we should also announce that we shall next proceed to the bombing of industrial centers and other obvious supply targets in support of their military effort.

Sixth. Simultaneously, we should make clear that we are ready to talk, that we are prepared to negotiate a reasonable settlement in Indochina. We should make clear, however, that the 17th parallel and the land below it are not negotiable.

The advantage of this approach would be first, to strengthen our bargaining position at such a time as negotiations would seem to become practicable; and second, to remove all uncertainties in the minds of the men in Hanoi or Peiping as to our intentions. It would leave up to them the clear-cut decision as to whether then they are willing to talk terms or whether they are willing to plunge the region into large-scale warfare.

In the latter eventuality, that would be their decision, not ours. In any case, we would not be stumbling into war or retreating into it piecemeal, as might conceivably be the case under our present policy of tit for tat. Under these

circumstances, we are forced to assume the worst, but hope for the best. Should the worst occur, it is better that we face it now in a position of relative strength and greater capability, rather than later, when time and indifference might take the same frightful course in regard to national capabilities that they did in other parts of the world when the will to resist aggression wavered.

Because this proposal has engendered a good deal of discussion since I first advanced it on the floor of the Senate, on February 17, 1965, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD editorial comment on the proposal from two Wyoming newspapers, as well as a transcript of a radio interview by the Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. In the latter, entitled "Washington Viewpoint," I was interviewed by Ann M. Corrick, Assistant Chief of WBC Washington news bureau, and Pete Clapper, WBC correspondent.

There being no objection, the editorials and the interview were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Wyoming State Tribune, Feb. 18, 1965]

AMEN—CALL THE REDS' HAND

One of the pleasures of living is the unexpected: One never knows what might happen next.

Today, we have been rocked to our Goldwater-Miller buttons by a statement by Senator McGEE, with whom we have quarreled on many occasions, on the Vietnam situation.

Differing with a group of Senate liberals, Mr. McGEE says this country ought to call the hand of Red China and the Communists "even if it means risking full-scale war."

Says the Senator from Wyoming: "If Red China is prepared to go to war to expand its sphere of influence and territory in southeast Asia, we might as well find that out right now, before it's too late."

This is the hottest war-hawk statement we have seen since the Republicans in 1962 were crying for aggressive action against the Russian meddling in Cuba; but it is one that a lot of citizens will support.

McGEE says that to negotiate now "is as unthinkable as it was to negotiate when the Communists threatened to take West Berlin and Germany; when they attempted to take Korea; when they attempted to make an armed camp of Cuba."

"Our commitment in Vietnam is no less than our commitments were and are in those other areas of the globe," McGEE says.

He also suggested that the United States deliver an ultimatum to the Hanoi regime "that would be every bit as serious and deliberate as the late President Kennedy's ultimatum to Russia during the Cuban crisis."

Furthermore, the United States should serve notice it will no longer tolerate infiltration or military raids in Vietnam below the 17th parallel; and that this should be coupled with a reaffirmation that this country has no desire to intrude into North Vietnam and no territorial ambitions in Asia.

This was in direct contrast and opposition to a statement issued by a group of other Democratic Senators including Senators GEORGE McGOVERN, of South Dakota, STEPHEN YOUNG, of Ohio, and FRANK CHURCH, of Idaho, that this country ought to seek a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

It is in direct opposition to the stance of Oregon's WAYNE MORSE who long has questioned the fact that we are in Vietnam at all. Mr. MORSE wants the United States out of there.

In fact, it even is a stronger statement than one issued by the Republican leadership yesterday, which was praised and accepted by two other Democratic Senators, LONG, of Louisiana and LAUSCHE, of Ohio. The Republican leaders, DIRKSEN, of Illinois and FORD, of Michigan, said they support President Johnson's action in ordering strikes against the Communist supply bases in North Vietnam.

But Mr. McGEE would go even further. He urges action which would, in effect, tell the Red Chinese, "Put up or shut up."

Mr. McGEE's statements are the most aggressive we have heard uttered on the Vietnam situation; if a certain person whose initials are BMG had made such statements a few months ago, the outcries against him would have been even greater than they were.

But we support the McGEE thesis nonetheless. It is time to call the hand of the Communists in Asia; in fact, it is long past due.

This goes beyond what President Johnson has said thus far, which is that we seek no extension of the war there.

Mr. McGEE suggests a deadline with the Ho Chi Minh regime being warned that to cross it will mean dire consequences. He doesn't say what the consequences should be but we should imagine the threat is one of all-out retaliation.

Whatever this latter might be, the proposal is to call the hands of the Red Chinese as well as of all the Communists; and we hope the Johnson administration will hear and act.

We can no longer procrastinate, parley, and persevere. Time is on the side of our enemies.

[From the Laramie Daily Boomerang, Feb. 19, 1965]

TIME TO CALL THE HAND

Vietnam is the key to southeast Asia. That is the primary reason why the Communists are seeking to infiltrate the area and take over control of the South Vietnam Government. That is the reason the United States is just as stubbornly trying to maintain its freedom.

There are three reasons why Vietnam occupies a position of importance in Asia. It raises a surplus of rice in a part of the world where hunger is an always present feature. A Communist victory in South Vietnam would flank a vital part of the Asian land mass setting up other nations for conquest, and third, if the Communists would win, nations threatened by them could have no future confidence in the United States.

The Vietcong has stepped up its efforts in South Vietnam, reportedly on orders from Hanoi in North Vietnam. For this reason the United States and the Vietnamese Government have carried out retaliatory raids into North Vietnam.

We're at war in Vietnam whether it's an official or recognized war. The price in American lives hasn't been as high as it has been previously in other areas, but one life is a high price to pay. That price is mounting daily with the Vietcong carrying out raids against American installations. Yet, how can we say the price is too high if the effort results in freedom?

We're not winning the war in Vietnam, but then neither are the Communists.

The Vietcong is ahead at present because of propaganda and partly because the willpower of the American people isn't strong enough. We fight in Vietnam against the protests of many of our leaders. Many urge negotiation, others suggest withdrawal.

We protest the seemingly lone defense of the United States against the spread of communism, but somewhere it has to be stopped. Many say we should let Vietnam go, that it is of no importance, but barring its im-

portance for the above-named reasons, it's still another nation in the communistic plan to take over more and more territory, and with each country gained the Reds grow in strength.

We believe that our country is the best in the world. We feel that we are the leader in the free world, but if we are, then we have to take the lead in defending that freedom.

Senator GALE McGEE said Wednesday that the United States "should call the hand of Red China and the Communists in South Vietnam even if it means full scale war."

We've lived for several years under the premise of peaceful coexistence with the Communists, yet, all of that time the Communists have had world designs, working to infiltrate various countries as they did in Cuba, taking over against the wishes of the majority. These countries have fallen from the ranks of the free. Others are endangered. As long as we don't make a stand the pattern will continue.

We must stop the Communists somewhere if there is to be any justification for the term "peaceful coexistence." If we don't do it in Vietnam we lose the confidence of the rest of the free world, and it's unlikely we'll have the guts to stop them some place in some future time. If we do stop them here and hold the line, then it could mean an end to future communistic encroachment.

Senator McGEE called the shot, and we think that we, as a free nation, must go along with that call if we hope to preserve our freedom for our children.

WASHINGTON VIEWPOINT

Miss CORRICK. Good evening. This is Ann Corrick with Pete Clapper in the Senate Radio-Television Gallery on Capitol Hill. Our guest on Washington Viewpoint this evening is Democratic Senator GALE McGEE, of Wyoming, a former university history professor, who was reelected last November to his second term in the Senate. Senator McGEE is a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Commerce, and the Post Office and Civil Service Committees.

Senator, a full-scale great debate appears to be developing in the Senate over Vietnam and the Communist influence in southeast Asia. For your part, you have said we should call the hand of Red China and the Communists even if it means risking full-scale war. Red China already has exploded one nuclear device and the State Department says it has reason to believe she will touch off another one any day. Doesn't that mean that a full-scale war means nuclear war? And isn't that too high a price to pay to save a country that doesn't appear to have the determination to save itself?

Senator McGEE. Well, you ask a very deep question and a very long question, in terms at least of the reply. First, the stakes are high in Vietnam. I view Vietnam as the last in a link of crisis areas that have to be stabilized before the world is fully balanced—its stability restored in the wake of the last World War. You can draw a line now from Finland all the way across Eastern Europe and across northern Greece and Turkey and Pakistan and India to the China Sea, and that line is not crossed recklessly by either side, until you get the southeast Asia. The world will not be back in balance until that line is drawn firmly. If we don't draw it firmly, southeast Asia goes to the Chinese or Communists. That is enough and its resources to unbalance the world. So what I'm saying is that the same price we risked at Berlin, that we risked in Greece, which was all-out war, if they wanted to go that far, that we risked in Korea, has to be risked in Vietnam. I believe that this is a probing action that's going on there, the same as it was in the other areas of the globe. They're testing us out, but we have to assume the worst, and hope for the best. And that

was the reason for my reference, that if they chose this to be the occasion for war, that would be their choice—better we learn it now rather than discover it piecemeal much later under less favorable circumstances.

Miss CORRICK. Do you really believe that at this stage in the game and considering the alliance with Hanoi and Peiping and Moscow, that the Communists will back down simply if we issue an ultimatum.

Senator McGEE. Oh, I don't know. Only they can answer that. First, I don't think that Hanoi is too comfortable with the prospect of China moving in. I think Hanoi worries as much about Peiping as do the rest of the countries in southeast Asia. Secondly, I don't believe that the Russians relish China dominating this large and fruitful area of the world to the exclusion of the Russians. Therefore, there are some inhibiting factors present. The other is that they alone can decide whether a showdown in Vietnam is worth risking their current emerging economy. China doesn't have nuclear capabilities, won't have for some time to come. She has exploded nuclear devices. Her cities are vulnerable. Her industry has not yet really gotten off the ground. If this is what she's ready to risk now in an all out war, that's for her to decide. I would doubt that she would, but if she does, it's better we know that now when we have every measurable advantage of striking capability than to discover it as we discovered it with Mr. Hitler in Czechoslovakia and then in Poland, where we surrendered to an aggressor one step at a time. I think that it's imperative to force a showdown.

Miss CORRICK. If we should force a showdown, which side would Russia go on?

Senator McGEE. My guess is that Russia would probably applaud any kind of an open conflict between the Chinese and the Americans. It gives Russia a free hand.

Miss CORRICK. You mean she'd stay out?

Senator McGEE. I think that she would stay out, as she did in the Far East in World War II until it could be determined what the shape of it was going to be. It's to her advantage. There are three giants in the world—two real giants—Russia and the United States. China is only a budding giant, a long way from arriving yet. And I think that the Soviets would not get directly involved, would not find it desirable to do so, or fruitful to do so. Every advantage would accrue to them not to do so. There's no friendship of any substantive sort between Peiping and Moscow. Historically there's never been. There's not about to be now. And I think from the Soviet point of view, there would be no reason for involvement there. They're not deeply involved in southeast Asia even at this time. This has been largely a Chinese affair.

Miss CORRICK. They're not supplying aid to the Vietcong?

Senator McGEE. No. They haven't been involved there in any way as a matter of fact. This has been pretty much preempted by China. They're making noises now, but that's, I think, for propaganda purposes in the Communist world, rather than for any realistic purpose in our own world.

Miss CORRICK. Pete Clapper.

Mr. CLAPPER. Senator McGEE, there has been a good deal of concern expressed on the Senate floor, but not many positive proposals for what to do about South Vietnam. And you have a plan of action. What is it?

Senator McGEE. Well, the first plan of action, in my judgment, is that we dare not negotiate right now. I think we've got to be sure that we don't do the wrong thing. I think it would be a mistake to seek negotiations right now. And that's important. And that's been the real nub of the debates in the Senate this past week. There's been a drive on by some of the very excellent Senators to demand negotiations at this time. The reason I say this is not the time is

that we have reason to know that Hanoi and Peiping both are convinced we're going to get out of there; if not this week, next year. And that time is on their side. Therefore, they're not interested in negotiating in realistic terms.

The noises that are being made on the floor of the Senate, the protestations that are being made in some portions of the press, all are taken 10,000 miles away as indications that America is beginning to waiver in its position in southeast Asia, and therefore, if we were to approach now on negotiation, after these airstrikes that they have just made on our airfields and our billets and other installations in South Vietnam, it could only, and would only be interpreted by them as leading from weakness. Now you and I know that we're going to stay. The American President has made it clear that we're going to stay. But what we know is irrelevant. What the Communists think is what really counts because that's what motivates them. And they're confident, even as illustrated in the conversations that Edgar Snow had not very long ago with Mr. Mao, that we're going to be out of there in a measurable period of time. That's why we dare not negotiate now. So I propose that we serve an ultimatum on North Vietnam which says that the infiltration of northern troops across the 17th parallel must stop at once, and give them a chance to stop—x number of days. If they continue to cross the line, then we tell them—we will have warned them—we bomb every bona fide military installation—that means, every encampment, every barracks, every airfield, that sort of thing, in North Vietnam. If they still think that's a joke, that it's only bluff, then after the passage of a specified number of preannounced days, we then would bomb all of the logistical facilities—the bridges, the highways, the railroads. And if this still hasn't communicated in a language that they alone seem to understand when the chips are down, then we should announce that we will bomb the industrial centers. That would be the planned, announced, and scheduled acceleration of the war. The purpose would be, not to spread the war, but to write in strong, unadulterated terms, our intentions to stay there. I think this would have a great advantage in clearing the air and getting through to both Hanoi and Peiping. We should accompany this ultimatum with a very clear statement again that we don't want their country, we don't want their government, we have no territorial ambitions in Asia, but we do intend to keep them north of the 17th parallel, and nothing below the 17th is negotiable. I think those are the terms in which we ought to speak, and that does raise the question whether Hanoi would accept it or not. Maybe they won't. I think this will hurt Hanoi enough that they would have to, but it leads us inescapably, then would China decide that she had to go into the war. And I think it's time we know the answer to that question.

Mr. CLAPPER. Senator McGEE, two practical questions: Do you think that our side could tell if the infiltration is coming to an end at x number of days? Is this possible in that jungle?

Senator McGEE. Yes. I think without betraying any classified information, we know who comes across, where they cross, where they came from in crossing, where they go after they've gotten across. Our intelligence there is not without some real strength.

Mr. CLAPPER. OK. The next question is, Do you think that bombing would be enough? This is a backward country, this North Vietnam. Does bombing really knock anything worthwhile out?

Senator McGEE. Bombing doesn't knock armies out.

Mr. CLAPPER. That is right.

Senator McGEE. But bombing knocks out a warwaging capability. Because the troops that are coming into South Vietnam now are

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3417

highly trained, skilled troops. These are not the inside guerrillas that we've been talking about for several years over there. These are highly skilled, highly trained, imported guerrilla fighters. And by destroying their bases, you're going to at once cut down their source of supply. They'll still be over in there. You will not have thrown them out of the south. But out first task, it seems to me is to do two things—cut off that supply and communicate the message. It would be very difficult for Hanoi to continue any protracted campaign except on the isolated guerrilla basis. And this is the real issue at stake here. Winning the guerrilla combat is quite another problem. That's another question. But we want to make sure that Hanoi understands that by carrying this along in a delaying way is not going to cause the Americans to pull out or to get tired and go home.

Mr. CLAPPER. Senator McGEE, you touched on something a little while ago that fascinates me. Do you feel that the Senators who are now urging negotiations might, in fact, be giving the wrong signal to the Communists and thus might be doing a disservice to our country?

Senator McGEE. Well, I think that these Senators making these speeches are doing a great service to our own people. I think this question should have been out in the open and being debated in these hard terms long ago. That has been one of our blind spots. I do think that the Communists will misread and misinterpret these remarks. And to that extent, it is unfortunate. It is even dangerous. But nonetheless, I am not one of those that thinks that you ought to shut up debate on a great question such as this. I think that is one of the risks that we have to take now for not having made it clear earlier that we are there really to stay.

Mr. CLAPPER. Senator, one last question on this general area. Have you discussed your proposals with the White House yet?

Senator McGEE. I have sent the proposals to the White House.

Miss CORRICK. Senator McGEE, if we should reach the point where negotiation would be possible and honorable, whom would be negotiate with?

Senator McGEE. There is no one to negotiate with if Hanoi and Peking won't negotiate. Again, negotiations are at least bilateral and preferably multilateral. This could include third powers, at least in initiating the negotiations. We would negotiate such negotiations depending upon the agenda that would be agreed upon. It might be limited between Hanoi and the Vietnamese, with us as participants in the discussions. But it would almost certainly have to include spokesmen, unofficially at least, from Peking. Anyone that pretends that we can isolate this whole question as though Peking didn't exist is just playing a little game of fairy tales, and you've got to be realistic about it. Peking is there and it's not about to go away, and it's there in a very sinister way.

Miss CORRICK. If we get Red China to the conference table, wouldn't that be de facto recognition of Red China, which we have denied up to this point?

Senator McGEE. This would be de facto recognition of a crisis that we're willing to talk about.

Miss CORRICK. Wouldn't that lead to Red China's admission into the U.N.?

Senator McGEE. It wouldn't lead to that. But it would be talking with the Chinese. We've already talked to the Red Chinese. We've talked to Red Chinese in Czechoslovakia. We've talked to the Red Chinese in Geneva—that is, with their spokesmen. And as President Kennedy once said, we must never be afraid to talk with anybody. And I mean anybody. We must always be willing to negotiate freely, was his actual phrase, but we should never be willing to negotiate

freedom. And I think that's why we have to draw this firm line.

Miss CORRICK. Doesn't South Vietnam itself present a problem in reaching any sort of a solution to this problem? It keeps changing its government. If we should have negotiations, the South Vietnam Government might change overnight. Who would want to negotiate with—

Senator McGEE. The basis of a negotiation, in my judgment, would first be that there will be no further depredations across the 17th parallel. They would center around the terms under which we would police such a firm line. That would then stabilize the situation, much as it did the 38th parallel in Korea. That's not the most desirable settlement in the world, but it's a pretty fair substitute to all of the bloodletting that was going on up there. We've learned to live with two Koreas, two Berlins, two Germanys, two Chinas. I think we could learn to live with two Vietnams. And I think that the conditions in South Vietnam and around Saigon are secondary in this case. The primary consideration is to prevent the breakthrough from the north. The basic consideration is to rebalance this section of the world. Having done that, what happens to the future of economic development, and the political maturing of South Vietnam, are secondary issues, which we have an interest in only as people who wish well for all nations, but it should not become a point of dictation by us. We can't make little democrats out of those people. We can't make little Americans out of them. And whatever they can put together in the way of their own independent government is their business. And I think our only interest is in that one word "Independent." We could care less what type. They're not going to get democracy in that part of the world for a hundred years or 50 years. It takes a long time. We've been working at it nearly 200, and we still haven't quite arrived in the true democratic concept. I draw the parallel very often with Greece. In Greece we plunged in in 1946 and 1947 because of the Communist threat to the north, and we had to back the wrong guys in Greece for a while in order to win the first round; namely, to keep the Communists out so that there would be time for Greece to become more democratic and more economically viable. And I think the parallel is not without its point in Vietnam.

Mr. CLAPPER. Senator McGEE, does it concern you at all that the motive of some Pentagon war hawks in possibly bombing North Vietnam might be an escalation of the war aimed ultimately at destroying the Red Chinese nuclear plants?

Senator McGEE. Yes. That concerns me a great deal. I don't happen to believe that this at any time ought to be one of our motivations, one of our targets, of bringing it to a head for that reason. I would bring it to a head only as the last recourse by being realistic. I think that there are enough inhibiting circumstances present in Hanoi to lead us to believe that a firm and controlled escalation will bring about a realistic willingness to talk. Only if that fails must we then be prepared for the worst. But I think that puts it clear down the list, whereas the suggestion that you just made, Pete, would indicate that there are those manipulating it in that direction as the primary objective. And I would reject that.

Mr. CLAPPER. What's your own feeling about destroying those Red Chinese nuclear plants? Should we?

Senator McGEE. Well, only if the Chinese were to make the decision that this was worth an all-out commitment of 2½ million trained Chinese military. If they are willing to commit that to this real estate in southeast Asia, then I think the answer is yes.

Miss CORRICK. Aren't you worried, Senator,

that people might start calling you a war-monger?

Senator McGEE. Oh, they already have started. I suppose I'm one of the strangest ones to be talking this language, being dubbed on most questions a liberal and all that, but I likewise would like to be realistic. And the risk that we have there in Vietnam right now is exactly the risk we took in Berlin, exactly the same risk. That was, to call the Russian hand. It's the risk we took in Cuba. We didn't know the Russians would back down. We hoped they might. But we pledged all-out nuclear war if necessary, backing up our firm line beyond which we would not retreat.

We did it in Greece—this same commitment was made. And I say this is the one language that these fellows can understand in the critical areas, and this is a critical area.

Miss CORRICK. But you know, now today we've got these terrible weapons of destruction—the hydrogen bomb, the nuclear bombs. We didn't have those in 1947.

Senator McGEE. We had them in 1962 when the showdown in Cuba came, and the showdown in Cuba was: Do you want the big war? That was the ultimatum. It's language that you've got to be prepared to use and back up, not bluff, over the critical points around the world. And I classify those critical points as the equivalent of Berlin or Germany, as the southeastern part of Europe—the eastern Mediterranean—and as southeastern Asia. The wealth, the resources, as well as the people—not to mention the people—constitute an empire that can affect the rebalancing of the world. Japan was willing to wage World War II to get it. Britain waged a war to get it. France waged a war to get it. The Dutch did. The Portuguese did. In all history this has been one of the great balancing contingents in this thing we call the balance of power. I think that the Chinese and the Russians fit into a category that Lord Palmerston once described best of all when he said: "They will continually probe outward along their peripheries seeking weakness; finding weakness they'll break through and grab it, but finding resistance, they pull away." And I think this is a probing action in southeast Asia. And I think that's the reason a line has to be drawn. If it's the issue for a war, then I say that we've got to know that now rather than discover it several years after Munich.

Mr. CLAPPER. Senator McGEE, you're a Democrat. Do you think that President Johnson has said enough—has told the American people enough about this war in Vietnam?

Senator McGEE. I think all of us have failed to tell the people enough about the war in Vietnam. We've talked too much about economic reforms, and land reforms and the dreams of working toward democratic governments, the well-being of these people, of our unselfish motivations, to permit time to talk about the harsh realities of power politics. And before you can really raise the level of the world, you have to restore, in the wake of any war, the world balance of power. It's doing that that is really the extension of the war itself, and who wins that phase is going to have a pretty strong hand in the shape of the world to come. And so what we've been waging is a fight ever since 1941, clear down to the present, for a chance to have a voice in the shape of the world to come. And people sometimes get impatient and think that what we're doing is trying to arrive at peace. We haven't won the chance to shape the peace yet, as I see it. We're still fighting for that chance.

Mr. CLAPPER. Senator, shouldn't the President call a spade a spade the way you just have? Don't you think he should?

Senator McGEE. I think he has done that in the last several weeks. I think he's laid the cards on the table for us, but this has

to be done again and again and again, in order to get the idea fully understood around the country. You just don't say something once. It's been a long time coming. But I think it ought to be phrased in these terms bluntly. And I think while the people may not like it, I think our people would rather know it as the truth or the direction things are going, and they rise to the occasion.

Miss CORRICK. Do you think the President is firmly convinced in his own mind of a policy—tactics and objectives in southeast Asia?

Senator McGEE. I think he is, yes. I think that he understands this question better than any of us as a matter of fact. And when it really comes down to the final fateful moment, he and he alone has all the facts at his fingertips and only he can make the decision. And I'm confident that he has these, that he knows these, and that's the reason I think we should take this strong stand and support the position that he is beginning to make very clear.

Miss CORRICK. Thank you, Senator McGEE. I'm sorry we have to bring our discussion to a close, but our time is up. Our guest on "Washington Viewpoint" this evening has been Democratic Senator GALE McGEE, of Wyoming. This is Ann Corrick with Pete Clapper in the Senate radio-television gallery on Capitol Hill.

POEMS ON WYOMING'S 75TH ANNIVERSARY

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, as I have pointed out previously, the year 1965 is a landmark year for the State of Wyoming. Wyoming—the Equality State—this year marks its 75th anniversary of statehood, and will do so formally at ceremonies in Cheyenne on July 10.

Evidence that the people of the United States are not only aware of Wyoming's diamond jubilee, but also will aid Wyomingites everywhere in marking the anniversary is certainly welcome. Such evidence has come to me from Andrea DeMaio, of the Holy Family Civics Club, in the Bronx, New York City. She enclosed some poetry composed by members of the club in honor of Wyoming's diamond jubilee. In behalf of all Wyoming citizens, I express my thanks to the club and to its moderator, Sister Joan of Arc, for their interest in a sister State.

I ask unanimous consent that the poems be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the poems were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EAST GREETES WEST (By Carole Lochard)

Wyoming, our sister State of diamond jubilee
boast
Greetings from New York, and to you our
birthday toast.
We hope your mighty forests continue to
thrive and grow
And grasslands furnish health and hoe.
May your rivers and valleys flow, run, and
blend,
Your canyons and your mountains your
mightiness contend,
May you always, dear sister, enjoy birthdays
evermore,
Happy 75th birthday from the Bronx in New
York State.

WYOMING CELEBRATES (By Beth Campbell)

Wyoming is the home
Of majestic Yellowstone.
It is the land in which not too long ago
Were found Indians and buffalo.

Wyoming has great geysers
That rise so very high.
They seem to reach the sky.
I think it is in order to brag and boast.

For the geyser known
From coast to coast
Old Faithful is the one,
To bring endless pleasure and lots of fun.

OUR 44TH STATE (By Lucille Storen)

In this year of its diamond jubilee,
The State of Wyoming looks back,
A glorious page in our country's history
It presents; not much does it lack.

The Wyoming rodeo, known far and wide;
Its Indians, Cheyenne and Crow;
The legendary cowboys, saddles and rawhide;
This State, to all seekers, will show.

A State in 1890, yes, Wyoming is there,
Forty-fourth is its star in our flag,
We know it wouldn't be fair to say
It ever dishonored that flag.

Wyoming, Wyoming, pride of our land,
To you we will always be
A loyal State, a great State, beautiful and
grand.
Spectacular, amazing, Oh! We all agree.

TREASURE STATE (By John Krantz)

Wyoming! Wyoming!
Your treasure is great.
Some are hot springs, geysers,
Yellowstone National too.

Wyoming, Wyoming,
It is your diamond jubilee.
The Green River rendezvous,
Could only be for you.

Wyoming! Wyoming!
People trot your land of late
So we the pupils of New York State
Give you a hand, and congratulate.

A SISTER STATE (By Wanda Kowalski)

In eighteen hundred ninety
This land became a State
And nature blessed it greatly
With forest, cattle, and bait

You recognize this place too
Where resources abound
Wyoming, peopled with races two
Has a wonderful heritage all around.

With equality a password
And freedom so common a thing
This State truly must be rated well
So its praises must New Yorkers sing.

COME TO THE JUBILEE (By Eileen Tils)

Wyoming land of beauty and grace
Whose heritage is great.
Became our 44th State
July 10, 1890, is the date.

Now this year Wyomingites celebrate
Their diamond jubilee.
All their festivities you can see
If you go to Wyoming State.

People will come from everywhere
To see the beauty of their fair.
Indian girls of 70 tribes
Miss Indian American to try.

Adventure will head the show.
With a great big race, you know,
If you want adventure and fun,
To Wyoming you must come.

WYOMING NOW (By Rita Moore)

Where the Indians used to roam
Is where some had to make their home
They couldn't resist canyons and parks,
The State where geysers still can spark.

All visitors stop and stare
At Old Faithful still there.
New York, go to Wyoming, take a dare
You might find yourself staying there.

INCREASE OF FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate and made the pending business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the bill by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R. 45) to amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, is there an amendment pending?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending amendment is the amendment of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE].

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Am I correct in my understanding that my amendment, No. 42, is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, the pending amendment, if adopted, would prevent the Inter-American Development Bank from floating in the United States any bond issues which by the natural impact of such flotation would take American dollars out of our country and put them into foreign countries.

The question may well be asked as to why I have proposed that if and when more money is subscribed to the Inter-American Development Bank, we should prohibit the bank from selling bonds in the United States, if and when it determines to procure more money for its operations. That question is quite pertinent, and, of course, it must be answered.

Yesterday I made the statement that last week there was before the Senate a bill dealing with gold. We discussed the perilous position in which we find ourselves because of the constant movement of gold out of the country.

In the face of those arguments, but having hanging over us another threat, which was of greater consequence, we decided to remove the 25-percent gold coverage on deposits which the member banks of the Federal Reserve System have in their Federal Reserve banks.

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3431

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have no objection. I would rather consider some further restrictions on tourism, because it would be much better for a year or two for Americans to take a look at their own country. But that is not the issue before us. I do not believe that this is the vehicle to solve our problem. We have a bill involving \$750 million for a period of 3 years, and I would hope that we can dispose of that. All the other good ideas for improvements we can leave for some other vehicle.

Mr. HARTKE. I see a basic inconsistency with what the Senator has pointed out. We cannot take the balance-of-payments problem and be on one side of the situation one moment and on the other side the next moment. We should adopt a policy which should apply universally throughout the Government.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not believe that the President, even though he is concerned about the balance of payments—as we all are—believes this to be so important that our foreign policy—every activity that we have—will be subject to that one consideration. I do not believe it is quite that critical. It may become such. If the program that the President suggests does not work as efficiently as he would like it to work, I am sure he would be prepared to come in with stronger controls until we do work out a balance.

I am sure that if it continues, tourism can be restricted in more direct ways. I notice in this morning's newspapers that Secretary Udall and others have been trying to persuade Americans to travel in the United States for a year or two, to look at our own country. This is a healthy way of approaching the problem. It will not work if people insist on going to Monte Carlo to be fleeced instead of going to Las Vegas to be fleeced. If they continue to go to Monte Carlo we may have to put some restrictions on their travel abroad. However, I believe they may be content to be fleeced in Las Vegas, rather than in Monte Carlo, for a year or two, at least, and then, if we are in a better position, they can go over there again.

At any rate, we have a specific problem before us, and that is whether we wish to participate in carrying out an agreement which has been entered with all the members of the Bank over a period of many months. We can either take it or not. Of course, Congress is at liberty to reject it if it wishes to reject it. At any rate, I do not believe we should issue congressional directives that are not to the point. We have a way of reaching the issue properly if we wish to do it through putting on a tax which would make it unattractive to float such bonds in this country.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I shall be very brief. We are not telling the International Development Bank what to do. It wants \$750 million of our money, at the rate of \$250 million a year. We are, in effect, saying, if my amendment is adopted, "We will allow you to have that money, but you must remember that we have a balance-of-payments problem, and therefore if in the future

you should decide to sell bonds, you must agree not to sell them in the United States."

The manager of the bill has argued that our Government through the Secretary might be able to handle it without my amendment.

To that statement I give the answer that from 1962 to 1964, at a time when our balance-of-payments situation was growing worse, \$225 million worth of bonds were sold in the United States. Those dollars paid by our private investors for bonds of the Inter-American Development Bank are not tied into the purchase of U.S. goods. They can be used to buy goods wherever the recipient country desires to buy them.

It is argued that we should enact a law which would increase the interest equalization tax rate. That has not worked. I would not be at all surprised to have a new request made of us.

To the Senator from Indiana I should like to say that our balance-of-payments problem, as described by the Senator from Arkansas, does grow from a number of causes. One is the presence of American troops in foreign countries, where they spend our dollars. The second, to a substantial degree, is the large number of American tourists who are spending dollars in foreign countries, and the small number of foreign tourists who are coming to the United States to spend their dollars here. The third is the investments which American business is making directly in building factories around the world. The fourth—and not in a minor degree, but in a substantial degree—is the American dollars that are buying foreign bonds.

There may be other causes, but these are the primary ones. All of them contribute to create the grave problem that is facing us.

All I wish to do is to start effectively. Secretary Udall has asked the people of the United States to travel in America. President Kennedy asked the people to do the same thing in 1963. The Commerce Department set up a program to encourage travel in America. These efforts did not work. There was not much response to it. My belief is that it did not work because the people were not conscious of the grave problems confronting us.

The Senator from Arkansas speaks of solving the problem in some wishful way. He says, "Let us speak with sweet words; let us appeal, and it will be solved."

My proposal is to write it into the law and say to the Bank "We will make this money available to you in the amount that is suggested, but all we want is that you, the Bank, will not further aggravate our balance-of-payments problem by selling new issues of bonds in the United States."

The Senator from Arkansas admits that our interest rates are low. In England, as I pointed out earlier, the interest rate is 7 percent for loans. When these 20 countries assemble and decide to sell bonds, the normal impulse will be to sell them in the market that charges the lowest rate of interest. Where is that? It is in the United States. Therefore I re-

spectfully suggest that we should not try to wish ourselves out of this task and problem that confronts us and that we had better start taking affirmative action. Adopting my amendment is one way of doing it.

Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? The report is not sufficiently seconded.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceed to call the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY of New York in the chair). The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 42, offered by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. LAUSCHE]. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY], the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. NELSON], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. NEUBERGER], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], and the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. WILLIAMS] are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] is absent because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], and the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS] are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. RANDOLPH], and the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] would each vote "nay."

Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CARLSON] and the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER] are absent on official business to attend meetings of the British-American Interparliamentary Group.

The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Hruska] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROUTY] is absent by leave of the Senate because of illness in his family.

The Senator from Delaware [Mr. BOGGS] is detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROUX] would vote "yea."

On this vote, the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Hruska] is paired with the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Boggs]. If present and voting, the Senator from Nebraska would vote "yea" and the Senator from Delaware would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 35, nays 46, as follows:

[No. 25 Leg.]

YEAS—35

Allott	Fong	Pearson
Bennett	Gore	Robertson
Bible	Gruening	Simpson
Burdick	Hartke	Stennis
Byrd, Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Symington
Cotton	Jordan, Idaho	Talmadge
Curtis	Lausche	Thurmond
Dominick	McClellan	Tower
Eastland	Miller	Williams, Del.
Ellender	Morse	Young, N. Dak.
Ervin	Mundt	Young, Ohio
Fannin	Murphy	

NAYS—46

Aiken	Hill	Mondale
Anderson	Holland	Monroney
Bartlett	Inouye	Montoya
Bass	Jackson	Morton
Brewster	Javits	Moss
Byrd, W. Va.	Kennedy, Mass.	Muskie
Cannon	Kennedy, N.Y.	Pell
Case	Kuchel	Proxmire
Church	Long, Mo.	Ribicoff
Clark	Long, La.	Saltanstill
Dodd	Magnuson	Scott
Douglas	Mansfield	Smith
Fulbright	McGee	Sparkman
Harris	McGovern	Yarborough
Hart	McIntyre	
Hayden	McNamara	

NOT VOTING—19

Bayh	Johnston	Randolph
Boggs	McCarthy	Russell
Carlson	Metcalfe	Smathers
Cooper	Nelson	Tydings
Dirksen	Neuberger	Williams, N.J.
Hickenlooper	Pastore	
Hruska	Prouty	

So Mr. LAUSCHE's amendment was rejected.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I should like to inquire if it is possible to obtain an agreement to vote on the amendments and on the final passage of the bill.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I believe I can answer the Senator from Arkansas. The answer is "No."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator not agree to any kind of agreement?

Mr. MORSE. None at all.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. At any time?

Mr. MORSE. At any time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator from Oregon indicate, for the information of the Senator in charge of the bill, whether he objects to a vote today or tomorrow?

Mr. MORSE. Let the debate run its course. I doubt whether there can be a vote today or tomorrow.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator doubts it?

Mr. MORSE. I doubt it.

ALIANZA POR PROGRESO NEEDS SUPPORT TO FURTHER DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, neighbors, be they nations or individuals, inevitably find that mutual advantage lies along the path of good relations. We are neighbors with all the nations on earth, because we inhabit the same planet. But, both historically and

geographically, we bear a special relationship to our neighbors to the south.

Today, the Latin American nations of this hemisphere face a great challenge. Social, political, and economic change must, of necessity, be brought about. The question impatiently awaiting answer is this: Will the change be evolutionary or revolutionary?

The Alliance for Progress has been advanced as our primary offering to meet the challenge, by evolutionary steps. We in Congress have the duty to do everything we can to enable the Alliance to succeed in its work.

The people of Texas feel a particularly close friendship for our Latin American neighbors. Texas was once a part of Mexico; we still share a long border with our good friends to the south. The culture of Texas reflects the influence of our unique Mexican past, and is one of our irreplaceable treasures. Fifteen percent of all Texans, more than 1½ million people, have Spanish surnames.

Mr. President, I state categorically my support of the aims of the Alliance for Progress. Thus far, the program has not lived up to the expectations of many; but perhaps some of those expectations were unrealistic. It would be difficult to imagine a more difficult goal than that to which the Alliance is dedicated: Widespread, rapid, evolutionary—rather than revolutionary—social change.

The Alianza para el Progreso has taken a giant leap forward. In terms of where it has to go, it has taken only a short, faltering step.

These words were written in 1963 by the then Senator HUBERT H. HUMPHREY. They still serve to describe the Alliance's accomplishments. Hundreds of thousands of housing units have been built. But the need is for over 10 million. Classrooms have been built, and the number of persons in Latin America who can read and write is at an alltime high; but 54 percent of the population is still illiterate.

Experience has taught us that the conditions of extreme poverty and inequality of opportunity which exist throughout so much of Latin America are breeding grounds for the Communist line which preaches economic advancement, but which results in shackles of totalitarian control. Thus far, Castro has not succeeded in getting any other nation to follow his example. But if the values of Western civilization are to shape the future of Latin America, then it is imperative that, at this crucial stage in the development of this hemisphere, we show what can be accomplished by a free people in a democratic society. More houses and more schools must be built. Agricultural and industrial production must be stepped up. Land reform is needed. The barriers to social and economic justice must be blasted away. At the same time, attention must be paid to the unrest and the insecurity which arise during times of rapid social change. We must show the people of Latin America that the future belongs to those with the vision to see that man's fulfillment comes not only from material accomplishment, but also from a realization of the nature

of the human spirit; that man is more than an animal, more than a mouth to be fed, more than a number in a statistician's notebook.

The pending bill, which authorizes a \$750 million increase in the U.S. contribution to the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank, and which permits the merger of the FSO with the Social Progress Trust Fund, can bring us one step farther down the long road to a stable, democratic Latin America.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I yield to the senior Senator from Oregon with the understanding that I may have the floor after he speaks.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, What is the pending business?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to amendment.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I offer the amendment which I send to the desk and ask to have stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

At the end of the bill strike out the quotation marks and add the following new paragraph:

"(c) The contribution of the United States under this section shall be made upon condition that at least 50 per centum of the aggregate amount of loans made from such contribution shall be repayable in United States dollars."

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield for a question?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. How long does the Senator intend to speak?

Mr. GRUENING. Approximately 12 minutes.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I often find myself in my present predicament. I am trying to operate an education demonstration. I see that the senior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], a great teacher, is present in the Chamber. He ought to be here with me. The demonstration is employing the use of audiovisual techniques from Chicago, and a group of sixth grade youngsters.

I am sorry that the Presiding Officer cannot be with me. He has heard me discuss this question in the committee.

I shall leave the floor to attend as much as I can of the demonstration. I would not be surprised if the Senator from Alaska were asked some questions.

May I have a gentleman's understanding with the Senator from Alaska that when he finishes his speech, he will ask for a quorum call and protect me with respect to any unanimous-consent agreement relating to limiting debate on this bill?

Mr. GRUENING. I will.

THE MESS IN VIETNAM—IV

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, day by day, events in South Vietnam are making the United States look evermore

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3433

ridiculous in the eyes of the rest of the world.

If almost every edition of the newspapers did not carry reports of more American fighting men being killed and wounded in a bloody, senseless war in the swamps of South Vietnam, the political and military situation there would be humorous—indeed farcical—if it were not so tragic.

What is our excuse for being in South Vietnam fighting an undeclared war?

Because, answers our Government, we were asked for assistance in resisting Communist aggression by the free, democratic Government of South Vietnam.

What government? Yesterday's? Today's? Tomorrow's?

Why were we given the signal honor of having our fighting men killed in the swamps of South Vietnam?

Our men are dying in defense of a people who do not care, who only want to be left alone, and who have so little appreciation of our efforts that, when placed on guard duty, they permit our men to be slaughtered in their barracks.

One of our officers reported that the barbed wire entanglements around our barracks were designed not to keep the Vietcong out, but to keep the South Vietnamese in and thus keep them from deserting.

Our men are dying in defense of a government that is no real government at all, that is composed of civilians and/or military having little regard for anything other than their own personal gain and of power-grasping, petty military men similarly interested only in their own gain and advancement. The last year's record on this score is conclusive and unanswerable. And there is no prospect of anything different.

Why are we fighting alone in Vietnam? Where are our allies—our cosigners of the Southeast Asia Treaty? Where are the fighting men from Australia, from France, from New Zealand, from Pakistan, from the Philippines, from Thailand, and from the United Kingdom?

Are treaty obligations honored only by us and not by the other signatories?

Or do we interpret our treaty obligations differently?

Our interpretation has certainly changed since September 15, 1954, when Secretary of State Dulles, explaining our obligations under the Southeast Asia Treaty, stated:

Thus, the treaty will not require us to make material changes in our military plans. These plans already call for our maintaining at all times powerful naval and air forces in the western Pacific capable of striking at any aggressor by means and at places of our choosing. The deterrent power we thus create can protect many as effectively as it protects one.

I reiterate. Secretary Dulles emphasized that we were not prepared to commit foot soldiers to fight in the swamps of Vietnam. We would have, however, according to Secretary Dulles "powerful naval and air forces in the western Pacific capable of striking at any aggressor by means and at places of our choosing."

Our present involvement in the land fighting in South Vietnam must be judged in the light of an analysis of the

type of conflict there. We are aiding one side in a civil war. We are already providing more military support to our side in the civil war—the South Vietnamese—than North Vietnam is supplying to its side—the Vietcong.

But unless we are willing to drop the futile disguise that our military men are in South Vietnam as advisers and take over all of the actual fighting, then the civil war will be successful only to the extent that the South Vietnamese are willing to fight—and this they are not willing to do. They are more concerned with being left alone.

And now on the horizon appear the "hawks," urging that the United States take over the actual fighting in South Vietnam; even if it means taking on in ground battle the fighting forces of North Vietnam, Red China, and Russia; even if it means risking the last world war—a thermonuclear war destroying civilization.

What is involved in escalating the war as demanded by the "hawks" is clearly set forth by Hanson Baldwin, the noted military expert, in Sunday's New York Times.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the article entitled, "We Must Choose," by Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, published in Sunday's New York Times of February 21, 1965, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, Mr. Baldwin openly admits that escalation of the war could result in our having up to a million men fighting in South Vietnam in a Korea-type military operation. This does not include the number of military troops we would have to send to Korea if Red China—as is most likely—decided to reopen that front.

Such an escalation of the war would stop our steps towards economy in Government, our war against poverty, and our attempts to establish the Great Society.

In defense of the United States, this we should be prepared to do. This I am prepared to support.

But I cannot support those who urge an escalation of an undeclared war in a remote area of the world at a time, in a place and under circumstances chosen by the Communists.

The New York Times stated last Friday, February 19, 1965, in its editorial entitled "The War Hawks," criticizing their proposal, the "road out of the present hazardous situation is to invite world destruction. The American people made it overwhelmingly clear in the last election that they do not want to plunge recklessly down that road."

The New York Times, Sunday, again in an editorial, urged negotiation of the crisis in Vietnam. It said in part:

The course of sanity is to explore the initiatives opened up by Secretary General Thant and General de Gaulle for negotiations to seek a neutralization of Vietnam and all southeast Asia. For a year the objection has been that our military position is too weak to allow negotiations. Every week it has grown weaker, and the latest upheavals in the Vietnamese military and political structure indicate that total collapse may be

imminent. To send hundreds of thousands of Americans into an endless jungle war or to bomb North Vietnamese ports and industrial centers on a saturation basis would be a surer road to global holocaust than to a "victory" arms can never win for either side.

As Mr. James Reston stated in his column in the New York Times on the same day:

But most of the people in Washington, including President Johnson, are neither hawks nor doves but something in between, who want to find an honorable way out of the confusion.

The opportunity for an honorable way out of the mess in Vietnam has been afforded the United States by the pleas for negotiation made by the Pope, by the Secretary General of the United Nations, by India, and by France, and by numerous private citizens, including some of our colleagues.

Those who urged the escalation of the undeclared war in South Vietnam should ponder well the words of the then-Senator from Massachusetts John F. Kennedy who, on April 8, 1954, beginning on page 4671 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, said:

To pour money, material, and men into the jungles of Indochina without at least a prospect of victory would be dangerously futile and self-destructive * * *. I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere, and at the same time nowhere, an enemy of the people which has the sympathy and covert support of the people * * *. For the United States to intervene unilaterally and to send troops into the most difficult terrain of the world, with the Chinese able to pour in unlimited manpower, would mean that we would face a situation which would be far more difficult than even that we encountered in Korea.

I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at the conclusion of my remarks the editorials from the New York Times for Friday, February 19, 1965, and Sunday, February 21, 1965, and the column by Mr. James Reston in the same paper on February 21, 1965.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 2.)

Mr. GRUENING. I hope the President will not attach too much significance to the urging he has received that he adopt the position of the "hawks" from such outstanding Republican leaders as the former Vice President, Richard Nixon, the former GOP presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater, and the able and distinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN]. As has been pointed out, if we become involved in a Korea-type, bogged-down foot war in South Vietnam, all three of these distinguished gentlemen will, when the casualty lists from an escalated war start coming in, be among the first to dub the war "Johnson's war" and to revive the cry that the Democratic Party is the "war party."

I hope, also, that the President will heed well the voices raised by his former colleagues on this side of the aisle who, having at heart only his best interests and the best interests of our country, have been urging him to heed the pleas of the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Pope, as well as those of our friends and allies in India and

3434

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

February 24

France, that the Vietnamese problem be brought to the negotiating table.

EXHIBIT 1

[From New York Times Magazine, Feb. 21, 1965]

WE MUST CHOOSE—(1) "BUG OUT", (2) NEGOTIATE, (3) FIGHT—A MILITARY COMMENTATOR ARGUES FOR A GREATER USE OF OUR POWER IN VIETNAM: "WE MUST FIGHT A WAR TO PREVENT AN IRREPARABLE DEFEAT"

(By Hanson W. Baldwin)

What should we do—"bug out" or fight? Should we be "hawks" or "doves"? Or is there a third choice—negotiations now?

Recent events in Vietnam indicate that "the war that is not a war" has reached a crossroads. Washington's policy of the past 4 years, based on the polite fiction that we were not fighting a war but merely helping the Vietnamese to defeat the Vietcong insurgents within their own territory, has reached a point of no return.

Compromise and consensus—perhaps applicable to some of the Nation's great domestic problems—cannot be guideposts to foreign policy. There must be a clear-cut and courageous decision. And though in Vietnam we face the hard problem of risking much to gain little, the risk must be taken: We must fight a war to prevent an irreparable defeat. We must use what it takes to win.

Our policy should not be "unconditional surrender" or unlimited victory. Our goal of victory should be the defeat of Communist attempts to conquer South Vietnam and extend their control deep into southeast Asia.

The reasons we must fight for Vietnam have little to do with making Saigon safe for democracy or freedom. There has been far too much cant on this point, far too much effort devoted to trying to establish a politically legitimate South Vietnamese Government after our own image. Nor does it do much good to argue the past, debating whether or not we should have become involved in Vietnam in the first place. The facts are that Communist expansionism in Asia has been consistent, related, and progressive, that the end of the Korean war, without a simultaneous settlement in Vietnam, gave Peiping and North Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh the opportunity in southeast Asia they have so well exploited.

Belatedly, but nevertheless clearly, the United States became aware of the threat. Our commitments to Saigon began in the Eisenhower administration and were enormously amplified after the Kennedy administration took power 4 years ago. Today, we are committed—fully committed—by the words of Presidents and Cabinet members, by the actions of the Government, by the deep involvement of U.S. military forces.

U.S. global prestige and power is intimately bound up with the outcome of the Vietnamese struggle. In Vietnam, we are attempting to formulate an answer to the Communist strategy of creeping aggression, of subversion and insurgency, of what Khrushchev called "wars of national liberation." If the might and will of the United States cannot evolve a victorious answer to such tactics, we are undone; the map of the world will gradually become red. And if we will not fight in Vietnam, where—after the series of Communist conquests in the past 20 years—will we fight? Where will we draw the line?

The psychological and political consequences of a U.S. defeat in Vietnam, a U.S. withdrawal or a negotiated peace likely to lead to a Communist takeover, would be disastrous in much of Asia. It would undermine Thailand (already openly threatened by Peiping), Laos (even now half conquered by communism), Malaya, the Philippines (with its growing anti-Americanism), Burma, India, Japan, and even Taiwan, Okinawa, and Australia.

For a long time after the politically stalemated end of the Korean war, Peiping was successfully depicting the United States to the peoples of Asia as a "paper tiger." The defeat of the French—backed heavily by American aid—in Indochina enhanced this image of a windy-weak-willed, feeble Uncle Sam. That image has since been dispelled by U.S. actions in and around the Taiwan Straits, during the Cuban missile crisis and, recently, by President Johnson's retaliatory air attacks upon North Vietnamese objectives. But the portrait of flabby indecision could be easily revived if the United States loses in Vietnam.

Strategically, South Vietnam is too important to be allowed to go by default. North Vietnam badly needs the rice of the South. More important, the area is the traditional rice bowl of the continent. Geographically, Vietnam is a long appendix pointing toward the rich archipelago of Indonesia and abutting strategic sea passages. Whoever dominates it will eventually control most of the Indonesian archipelago.

The strategic importance of the area is similar to the so-called rimlands, or maritime nations, of Western Europe which represent a powerful bastion against the "heartland" of Soviet Russia. In Asia, the non-Communist strategic position vis-a-vis Red China is based upon mainland positions—Pakistan, India, southeast Asia and the island bastions of the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, and Japan. If the rimlands of Asia fall to communism, the island positions will be doomed sooner or later. Ultimately the Communists will challenge us upon what is now our unchallenged domain—the oceans.

In a word, we must remain in southeast Asia for our own security needs. South Vietnam is in itself not vital in the sense that the United States cannot live without it. But if lost we would be forced to commence the next chapter of the world conflict in retreat, and at a disadvantage.

Despite the admitted importance of South Vietnam to the U.S. global position, the current breed of neoisolationists and the "doves" who believe we must cut our losses and get out advance many arguments against deeper involvement and in favor of withdrawal.

Most of the arguments represent the voices of defeat and despair, caution, and fear.

WHY NOT NEGOTIATE NOW?

Any negotiations opened now would lead from weakness, not strength. If we want to negotiate—and not to surrender—we shall have to raise our ante considerably. And "meaningful" negotiations are "meaningful" to the Communists only if they are faced with superior power and a position of strength.

We must "arm to parley." Personally, I seriously doubt whether talks can guarantee peace in Vietnam and southeast Asia, as some quarters have suggested, by neutralizing the area politically and militarily; in short, by eliminating the struggle for influence between Communists and non-Communists. Nevertheless, we need not fear negotiations if we speak from strength, by really putting up a fight for Vietnam.

Continuing U.S. air and sea attacks on North Vietnam would serve notice on Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow that the United States will no longer tolerate "sanctuary warfare." They might—hopefully—force Hanoi to the conference table. Indeed, such a policy would appear to be the minimum necessary to open any kind of negotiations. Yet even such a program will not "win" the war in the south.

"If the French couldn't win, how can the United States achieve victory?"

The implication of this argument is twofold: (1) we have donned the colonial mantle of the French, and (2) our power is no

greater than that of Paris. Both suggestions are absurd.

As some of our diplomats have found to their discomfort, South Vietnam is distinctly an independent country—not, as in France's day, part of a colonial empire. In fact, the fear of Chinese Communist colonialism is probably greater in all of Vietnam, and in North Vietnam in particular, than the fear of U.S. imperialism. As for a comparison between the political, economic, and military power of the United States and France, there is none. Particularly in the air and at sea we can mobilize power completely unavailable to France, backed up by the ultimate force which France did not possess—a nuclear arsenal.

"You can't win a war against guerrillas."

Not true. We have dressed up the fighting in Vietnam with a fancy name—"counterinsurgency," but some of its basic military elements resemble the kind of war Americans have fought successfully many times in the past in Nicaragua, Haiti, and behind the main fighting fronts during the Korean war. Other anti-Communist guerrilla wars were won in Greece, the Philippines, and Malaya. The Portuguese seem to have done a pretty good job of stamping out the rebellion in Angola. Guerrillas can be defeated, but it takes careful organization, special training, and security forces that should be from 10 to 30 times larger than the guerrillas. It takes infinite determination and patience.

"Continued fighting or expanded U.S. involvement will mean higher U.S. casualties and greater risks of broadening the war."

Of course, you cannot win a war without spilling blood. We must pay the price of power. Risks are unavoidable in any foreign policy worthy of its name. The question is not whether there will be risks, but the degree of risk. For against the perils of action must be weighed the perils of inaction. Political and military history clearly reveal that compromise, hesitancy, or appeasement merely lead to ultimate disaster. In Vietnam, the longer we wait, the greater the price we shall have to pay for even partial victory (as we are now discovering), and the more restricted our choice of options.

"We have no moral right to be in Vietnam, or to attack North Vietnam."

Neither do the Vietcong. Nor does North Vietnam have the right to support the civil war in the South. Our involvement was a response to Communist aggression. Since the beginning, Hanoi has organized, supplied, and directed the Vietcong insurgency. We were invited by the South Vietnamese Government to come to its aid. A high moral purpose is an essential element of our foreign policy but we can be left with no purpose—moral or otherwise—if we are conquered by the doctrine that the ends justify the means. If we are inhibited from action by Hamlet-like indecision over legalistic concepts of international law, we shall lose the world.

"What's the use of further military involvement, when the political instability of South Vietnam pulls the rug from under our feet?"

Here is one of the more cogent objections to greater involvement. But in the long history of Vietnam there have always been feuding sects and factions. Moreover, the French left behind them a people still unequipped for self-government. Yet somehow or other the war has gone on, and somewhat better in some respects recently. Greater U.S. involvement—above all, a tangible determination to win—may well do more for Saigon's political stability than any amount of diplomatic pressures.

"Isn't the real danger that escalation might involve us in a larger war? Wouldn't the Chinese come in?"

This is the \$64 million question. It is quite clear that if the United States becomes

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3435

more involved we must be prepared for greater effort by the enemy. Escalation in some form would be not only possible, but likely. But we have advantages. We are fighting, as we did in Korea, on a peninsula where our superior sea and airpower can be most effective. North Vietnam's few powerplants and industries are vulnerable to destruction. The Gulf of Tonkin is easily blockaded. And China itself, with an obsolete air force and minimal naval power, could not defend itself effectively against a determined air and sea attack.

Nevertheless, an expanded effort by the United States in Vietnam may well be answered by an increased flow of supplies and men from North Vietnam, perhaps by an all-out attack by the North Vietnamese Army, and perhaps ultimately by aid from China into South Vietnam. Though the flow could be hampered and reduced by air attacks it could not be completely halted. It is quite possible that the United States might become involved in a new kind of Korean war. But this would not be hopeless by any means. In fact, some well-informed authorities believe the United States could win a Korean-type of war in South Vietnam-Laos against the best that the Chinese Communists could throw against us.

"What about the specter of nuclear weapons? Wouldn't Russia join in, even if China didn't have enough A-bombs to do us any harm?"

There is no certain answer to these questions, but a full-scale nuclear war is highly unlikely. The United States has scared itself to death by its own nuclear propaganda. The fear of a nuclear exchange—never probable, or even likely—has been the greatest single restraint upon a positive and firm U.S. diplomacy since World War II.

Presidents and public alike have been inhibited by the nightmare of the mushroom cloud. Yet the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis should be remembered. Is it in any way probable that the Kremlin would risk for Vietnam what it would not risk for Cuba? Moscow knows our nuclear power. Would Russia invite its own destruction as a nation by invoking the use of nuclear weapons in any cause except the defense of its own soil? The questions answer themselves.

We must also remember the risks of delay. If there is a danger of nuclear retaliation today by Peiping, how much greater will it be tomorrow when China will have accumulated a stockpile of weapons? Time is restricting our options.

Clearly, then, the stakes in Vietnam are large enough to warrant the risks of greater U.S. involvement. Whether or not we raise our ante, the enemy will. The Communists are implacably determined to triumph, and the only factor that can prevent their victory is superior power in all its forms. More of the same on our part will no longer serve any purpose, save slow defeat.

What should we do? First and foremost, we must recognize as a government and as a people that we are fighting a war in Vietnam not merely advising how to fight one. Such a recognition would awaken a greater sense of national and military determination, inspire a Presidential and congressional enunciation of purpose, and create a more streamlined military operation in Vietnam.

Second, the United States itself must provide maximum possible security in Vietnam to major U.S. installations, such as airfields, supply depots, and headquarters. Secretary McNamara's statement that it was impossible to guard against such attacks as those recently made by the Vietcong against U.S. airfields and barracks is no answer. Of course, 100-percent security is impossible in any war; defense against terrorism and sabotage is especially difficult. But there is no doubt whatsoever that we can provide better security to key installations than the South

Vietnamese, who have been responsible for the job in the past.

We need U.S. tactical units in South Vietnam to defend our installations. We need Infantry battalions, Military Police companies, Army Engineers and Navy Seabees to build aircraft revetments, dugouts and protected barracks. Yet all this is purely defensive; it should reduce U.S. casualties but it will not "win" the war.

Another essential measure is simplification and streamlining of both the high military command and the "country team" units, composed of representatives from various Government agencies, that support our aid effort in Vietnam. We must get more Americans and more Vietnamese out of the bistros of Saigon and into the bush. The coordination between the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the U.S. Information Agency and the Agency for International Development is far better than it once was. But it is still far from perfect, in Saigon or in Washington. The war has shown, for instance, that South Vietnamese-United States teams have been able in many instances to carry out the military portion of the clear-and-hold prescription for victory. But AID—not the military—is responsible for police and internal security forces in Vietnam, and these cadres rarely have been able to hold an area once it has been cleared of the Vietcong. Perhaps military troops should be charged with the "hold," as well as the "clear," part of the operations. Certainly internal policing needs a major overhaul.

A basic change in the prescription for victory demands a United States-South Vietnamese unified command such as now exists in South Korea.

Continuous and heavy air and sea attacks against staging areas, supply routes, training fields, camps and recuperation centers of the Vietcong in North and South Vietnam and Laos will be necessary for any appreciable diminution in the flow of men and supplies to the Communists. The one-shot retaliatory raids have only temporary and minimum military importance; viewed as political and psychological warnings, they are likely to provoke the Vietcong and North Vietnam to a redoubled war effort.

The history of airpower dictates the need for unremitting, massive attacks. Bombing targets in North Vietnam probably would have to be broadened to include powerplants, bridges, industries, road junctions, docks and oil storage facilities. A naval blockade and naval gunfire may well supplement the air bombardment. To carry out effectively any such program as this, U.S. air and naval forces in the Western Pacific would require material strengthening.

Meanwhile, it would take years of effort inside South Vietnam itself to reduce the Vietcong to manageable proportions. Much larger, and better led, South Vietnamese forces would be necessary. They would have to be supplemented by U.S. ground troops—perhaps in small numbers at first, but more later, particularly if North Vietnamese regular forces and Chinese soldiers joined the Vietcong.

How many U.S. soldiers would be needed is uncertain—probably a minimum of 3 to 6 divisions (utilized chiefly in battalion or brigade-size units), possibly as many as 10 or 12 divisions. Including Air Force, Navy, and supporting units perhaps 200,000 to 1 million Americans would be fighting in Vietnam.

Obviously, this would mean a Korea-type conflict, a major war, no matter what euphemisms would be used. Nor could we wage it in the present "business-as-usual" economy. We would require partial mobilization, vastly beefed-up military production. Many weaknesses in our military structure would need strengthening. Even so, we

could not anticipate quick success. The war would be long, nasty, and wearing.

No one could relish such a prospect as this; the stark statistics of war explain the President's reluctance to embark upon a path that has no turning.

Vietnam is a nasty place to fight. But there are no neat and tidy battlefields in the struggle for freedom; there is no "good" place to die. And it is far better to fight in Vietnam—on China's doorstep—than fight some years hence in Hawaii, on our own frontiers.

EXHIBIT 2

[From the New York Times, Feb. 19, 1965]

THE WAR HAWKS

A comparatively small group of Americans, at this moment predominantly political in character and predominantly Republican in politics, is doing its best to multiply the perils and frustrations of the war in south-east Asia.

This group ignores the realities of the present situation. It ignores the obvious war weariness of the people of South Vietnam. It ignores the steady stream of desertions from the Vietnamese Army. It ignores the difficulty of protecting isolated American bases against the surprise attacks of guerrillas.

It ignores the possibility of an invasion of South Vietnam by the very considerable North Vietnamese Army. It ignores the problem of how an aerial counterattack could cope successfully with a massive ground attack of this character. It ignores the possibility of Chinese intervention. It ignores the logistics and belittles the cost in lives lost, blood spilled and treasure wasted, of fighting a war on a jungle front 7,000 miles from the coast of California.

The whole aim of this group is to expand the Vietnamese war, even if it means drawing in China and perhaps the Soviet Union as well. By its lights, Presidents Johnson's declaration that the United States seeks no wider war is as much a prescription for failure as any attempt at a negotiated peace. It is one thing to say, as Secretary McNamara did in his testimony yesterday, that this country has "no other alternative than continuing to support South Vietnam against the Red guerrilla onslaught." It is quite another to argue that the road out of the present hazardous situation is to invite world destruction. The American people made it overwhelmingly clear in the last election that they do not want to plunge recklessly down that road.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 21, 1965]

THE DEBATE ON VIETNAM

A great debate on the Vietnamese conflict is now raging all over the United States. It goes from the White House, Congress, and the Pentagon to every home, office, factory, and farm. It is unresolved because the Government has not yet decided on its policy or, if it has, President Johnson is not telling the American people. The debate's subject, in its simplest form, is whether to fight a big war in Vietnam or to seek a way out through a combination of continuing defense and diplomatic negotiation.

The case for a vastly stepped-up American military commitment—as set forth in today's Magazine by military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin—is that the "Communist strategy of creeping aggression" must be stopped in Vietnam before it swallows all of Asia and the world. Under this theory, the United States should undertake saturation bombing of North Vietnam and send as many as a million American soldiers, sailors, and fliers into a "war to win."

Such an approach discards any pretense that our objective in Vietnam is to protect

February 24

3436

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

the Vietnamese people; it turns the conflict into a naked ideological struggle that ignores all the deep cleavages recent years have brought in both the Communist and free worlds. Not one of our major allies in the West could be expected to endorse, much less actively assist, an American involvement so massive it would amount to a military occupation of leaderless South Vietnam. America's efforts to demonstrate the superiority of its social system by abolishing poverty and building a Great Society would vanish under the necessity for pouring our youth and treasure into a limitless solo adventure.

On the Communist side the effect of a large-scale American assault on North Vietnam would be to resolidify the fragmented Moscow-Peking-Hanoi axis. Communist China would have to send her land armies to the rescue, as in North Korea, or be labeled a "paper tiger." Soviet Russia, now manifestly unhappy about anything that would enhance Chinese prestige or dominion, would find it almost impossible to stand aloof. The end result would be an escalation of such dimensions that no one could be sure it would not wind up in the kind of calamitous atomic exchange Secretary McNamara described so graphically in his testimony last week.

There are many, of course, who content that the United States will eventually have to fight a nuclear war with China anyway, and that it is better to have the showdown now when our superiority in weapons and delivery devices is so great. These are the same people who a decade ago were advancing precisely the same argument on why the United States should not wait to drop the bomb on Moscow. The notion that all Communists are alike and that all must be destroyed is the road to world annihilation.

The struggle between East and West is enormously complex, and nowhere more so than in Vietnam, a country that has been occupied or neutral for 2,000 years and that now shows no will to fight in its own defense. The Vietnamese, both North and South, have an inherited fear and dislike of the Chinese. The Russians undoubtedly have at least as much desire as the United States to keep them from being swallowed into Peking's empire.

The course of sanity is to explore the initiatives opened up by Secretary General Thant and General de Gaulle for negotiations to seek a neutralization of Vietnam and all southeast Asia. For a year the objection has been that our military position is too weak to allow negotiations. Every week it has grown weaker, and the latest upheavals in the Vietnamese military and political structure indicate that total collapse may be imminent. To send hundreds of thousands of Americans into an endless jungle war or to bomb North Vietnamese ports and industrial centers on a saturation basis would be a surer road to global holocaust than to a "victory" arms can never win for either side.

[From the New York Times, Feb. 21, 1965]

WASHINGTON: THE AGONIES OF VIETNAM
(By James Reston)

WASHINGTON, February 20.—President Johnson is not the only one who is having trouble with the war in Vietnam. It raises so many new problems that the lawyers, the journalists, and even the architects here are as baffled by it as the politicians, diplomats, and soldiers.

Consider the lawyers at the State Department. With their gift of proving the legality of either good or evil, they are expected to demonstrate that the Communists in Vietnam are breaking their international agreements, which is easy, but proving that the United States has been faithful to the same agreements is not so simple.

The main legal argument of the United States in Vietnam is that it has intervened in that country at the request of the legally established Government, but there have been 8 Governments in Vietnam in the last 16 months, most of them established by force.

This is awkward, even for competent lawyers. They can easily demonstrate that the Communists have broken the 1954 Geneva agreements against subversion and aggression in South Vietnam, but the United States sent more military advisers into Vietnam and refused to agree to elections in Vietnam—in violation of the same Geneva agreements—and this complicates the argument.

The American journalists are in even more trouble here and in Saigon than the lawyers. They are supposed to report what is going on in Vietnam, but how could they? They cannot see what is happening beyond the 17th Parallel in Communist North Vietnam, where the U.S. Navy and Air Force are bombing, and they cannot even keep up with the changes in the South Vietnamese Government in Saigon.

All the techniques of diplomatic correspondents of the past are now out of date. A reporter used to know in a foreign capital who was in charge. Sometimes he even knew who was ahead. But in Saigon, Prime Ministers change like bus drivers at the end of the run, and unless they are numbered, like football players, it is almost impossible to know who is on the field.

PUZZLE FOR THE PRESS

Even the most resourceful and responsible American news agencies and newspapers have only one or two reporters on the scene, but there are now over 40 different wars going on in Vietnam under different circumstances and in different provinces and, in Saigon itself, the conflicts between political, military, and religious factions are so varied and complex that they would tax the energy and ingenuity of the entire Washington press corps, now numbered in the thousands.

Almost all the normal assumptions of the democratic society of the United States are challenged when they come into conflict with the assumptions of the peoples of Asia. We believe in individual responsibility; the Buddhist countries regard this principle as a formula for chaos. We put the children of the family first; they put them last. We assume that the people of Vietnam want to be helped to have our kind of personal, family and political life, but the experience to date, after almost 20 years of war, is that the people of Vietnam want peace under almost any terms.

THE ARCHITECTURAL PROBLEM

Oddly enough, even the architects of the State Department, who build the U.S. Embassies abroad, illustrate the problem. They are thinking of the majesty of their country, of its power, its culture, and its vision of the future.

So they build symbols of America's aspirations: Open glass palaces, prominently placed in the center of foreign capitals where everybody can appreciate the glory of American freedom.

The Russians are more cynical. They build compounds, with high walls, to discourage the political demonstrators. They are introducing the new imperialism, and the new colonialism, but they expect trouble in the process, and they prepare for it, both politically and architecturally.

The American architects, however, like the American lawyers, journalists, diplomats and soldiers, prepare for the world as they want it to be, rather than for the world as it is. They assume that the world will be sensible, that it will accept our standards and our ideals and aspirations, though the whole history of American intervention in Vietnam defies our assumptions.

What we need in the modern world are

policies, men and institutions that are practical to the facts as they are. We are trying to make the world conform to our ideals, our concept of the way Congress and the President would like it to be, but the world of Asia has a different idea of man and his relations to the world and eternity.

So we are in trouble. We have in Washington our "hawks," who want to take any risks to impose our will on the politics and religions of Asia, and our "doves," who want to take no risks about anything. But most of the people in Washington, including President Johnson, are neither hawks nor doves but something in between, who want to find an honorable way out of the confusion.

Fortunately, Washington, Peking, and Moscow are all holding back for the moment. All are trapped by the dangers of using the power at their command. They talk big but act with some restraint, and this is the main hope of a settlement in the end.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I am glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. McGEE. If I may speak for a moment, I should like to address myself to some of the points raised by the Senator from Alaska. I believe the central point of this case stems from the open question as to the importance of southeast Asia in the power balance of the world. It is my judgment that the area of Indochina, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, is such a rich enough empire in its total context, with tin, rubber, oil, rice, and a number of other important resources, that it makes a difference to the powers of the world what happens to that segment of resource potential. It particularly makes a difference to a country that has too many people and too few resources. It was worth a war on the part of Japan. The reason she made war in the Pacific was to make this area a part of the Japanese Empire. So also was it worth a war by the British, by the French, by the Dutch, and the Portuguese in earlier, colonial times.

Especially in the atomic age, in the mid-20th century, the same importance attaches to that region; and if it is surrendered to one nation that looms as one of the great political powers, we are aiding and abetting the imbalance that will result.

On this basis in particular do I believe it is important that there be a sincere effort to withhold from Red China acquisition of a great territorial empire. That is where I begin to disagree with the distinguished Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. I appreciate the statement of my colleague from Wyoming. His references to the eagerness of the former colonial powers, England, Japan, France, and others, to seize this territory, points up the very difference between the situation then and the situation now. Because of that difference I believe we should leave this question to be settled by the people directly concerned, the people of South Vietnam and southeast Asia. We should not, as a government, succeed to the position of any former colonial power, although, in effect, we have, and take over the burden once borne by France, after she had suffered

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3437

175,000 casualties, at a cost of billions of dollars, to which we contributed. Let the Asians settle the problem, in which case it will be settled far better than if the governments of the West attempt to settle it. The white man cannot, in my view, settle the problems of Asia.

As Walter Lippmann pointed out in a recent column, we did not interfere in a case of manifest aggression when Tibet was invaded by the Chinese. We do not interfere in the more tragic case of Hungary where the people were ruthlessly mowed down by Russian tanks. We did not do so for various reasons. The reasons for our interfering then were more cogent than they are now, because we might have had a chance in those areas of succeeding by recognizing promptly the free government of Hungary. We would have been helping a people who were willing to fight, the Hungarians. Moreover, they had been led to believe by Secretary Dulles that we would roll back the Russian invaders.

The tragic thing about this situation, which has been amply demonstrated by events of the last few years, is that the South Vietnamese have no will to fight. The constant overturn of one South Vietnam Government after the other, the government which we invoke as being a friendly government of a brave people which has asked us to help them, does not hold water. It has become a myth.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. GRUENING. The Senator from Wyoming will remember that in the case of the Korean war, which has been occasionally invoked as a parallel issue, there were important differences. First, we were there under a United Nations mandate, fighting side by side with the troops of eleven other nations of the West.

Where are our allies today?

The situation might be different if we were supported by the troops of all our Southeast Asia Treaty Organization allies, by the British, by the French, by the Australians, by the New Zealanders, by the Filipinos, by the Pakistanis, by the Thai. But, where are they?

They are conspicuous by their absence. None of their boys have lost their lives on the firing line. Why should the United States alone be called upon to sacrifice the lives of its young men for people who do not wish to fight?

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Alaska yield at that point?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield.

Mr. McGEE. I address myself to the pertinent question raised by the Senator from Alaska: Why is it any of our business? Even our allies will not stand with us, and the Vietnamese do not wish to fight. Needless to say, we all would wish that we had allies beside us and that the Vietnamese were in better order south of the 17th parallel than they are, and that they had the will to go on, and that sort of thing; but I believe this is relatively irrelevant. The real point is once again the old political power struggle that takes place in the wake of any great war. This has been going on since the end of World War II. There were

only two nations left standing at the end of World War II capable of reconstructing the balance of power politics around the globe. One of them was in Moscow and the other was in Washington. We did not seek this leadership. History thrust it upon us. We could either have forfeited to the Russians at that time or have seized that responsibility ourselves. We have been trying to carry out that responsibility ever since. Without trying to run over the history of World War II again, which I know the Senator from Alaska knows even better than I, suffice it to suggest that as a result of American policy, we succeeded in drawing a firm line to represent our rebalancing of the world, a line that extends from Finland all the way down eastern Europe across to the eastern Mediterranean and north to Greece and Turkey, Iraq, Iran, India, Burma, and China, to the last link in southeast Asia.

It is a line drawn firmly enough so that at least neither side dares to cross it with impunity. That is the reason it makes a difference to us. Irrespective of the Vietnamese Government in the south, irrespective of what the British do, or the French do, or anyone else does, it has become our lot to try to rebalance the world in order that out of that imbalanced world we might once again obtain the opportunity—win the opportunity, if we will—to direct the course of the history of our time in more useful directions than otherwise might be the case.

That is what is at stake right now.

Better that we should have a united government in Vietnam. However, we do not have it. Do we, then, forfeit by chance or by inadvertence, or because of the quarrelsomeness among the generals in South Vietnam, the obligation to finish the rebalancing job around the world to the kinds of undeveloped or unsophisticated or indecisive political forces that come into play in South Vietnam?

I say that we would forfeit our right to be the representative leaders of the world if we were to do it that way. I would rather have people with us, but let me say to my friend the distinguished Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING], that we do this not to be patted on the head, not to be loved by other nations, but that we do it because we have to do it, to save our very existence. Balance alone, is our only substitute for major war under our present system on the globe, we have found no measurable substitutes for the power politics and the balancing of the political spheres of the world. Because the world is still older, it is no longer possible to confine this kind of contest to the mainland of Europe, or western Europe, as used to be the case in the 18th century and the 19th century, because the forces of power and their great capabilities are now worldwide. We have to rebalance an entire globe, rather than one continent. That is what is at stake, as I see it, in Vietnam.

That is the reason it makes a difference to us what happens there, no matter what the Vietnamese do, or what the French do, or what anyone else does.

We have the capacity for doing it, if we still have the determination to see it through.

We have paid a considerable price until now to get as far as we have. It would seem to me to be a travesty upon the sacrifices made up to this time, to get cold feet now and pull out at the moment that we have an opportunity to realize ultimate stability in an area that does make a difference to us.

Therefore, I submit to the Senator from Alaska, that what happens in Vietnam and the rest of the peninsula, and all of southeast Asia, does indeed play an important role in the rebalancing of the globe, and that we can have a hand in making that readjustment of this rebalancing possible. That is where I take issue with the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. GRUENING. I thank the Senator from Wyoming for his lucid exposition of his views, which I do not share in any particular. I do not believe that American security is imperiled by what happens in South Vietnam. I have said repeatedly, and say again, that I consider all of South Vietnam not worth the life of a single American boy.

Moreover, I do not believe that we can win this battle by military means. If the implications of what the Senator has said are followed through, it means that regardless of whether the South Vietnamese fight—which they clearly have shown no disposition to do—that we must move in with our American troops, and take over the whole war. As Hanson Baldwin indicated in the Sunday Times article which I just placed in the Record we shall need a million men there. When the casualty lists which have been steadily growing start coming in in even greater numbers, we shall hear from the American people. My mail already shows, in a ratio of over 100 to 1, that our Vietnamese policy is not approved by the American people who prefer an effort to stop the killing and attempt a policy of negotiation which I have advocated—this is a most representative mail.

This mail comes from all parts of the country. It includes Episcopal bishops, Catholic priests, presidents of universities, retired Army generals, heads of foundations, business executives, doctors, lawyers, clergymen, laborers, housewives—people from every State in the Union.

That proportion of more than 100 to 1 is so overwhelming that I believe I can say advisedly that the effort to achieve peace by negotiation, by arbitration, by conference, is what the American people wish. We are, incidentally, pledged to do that by our adherence to the U.S. Charter. The Senator from Wyoming will find that sentiment is growing. Some of the letters which I receive come from his State of Wyoming.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. GRUENING. I am glad to yield.

Mr. McGEE. I also have received a good bit of mail on this question. With all due respect to the Senator from Alaska, let me suggest further that the

issue in the world today is so critical that this country—upon whose shoulders the mantle of leadership has fallen—cannot afford to project its foreign policy with a 5-cent postage stamp. We cannot afford to weigh the mail. We must try to do what we believe is right in the national interest, and then we must try to provide the leadership that can lead to the attainment of that objective. I receive the same kind of mail that the Senator from Alaska does. In fact, I may get some which is even more vituperative, because some of us have been labeled as "war hawks," which is as much a mistake as labeling some other Senators as "pacifists." We are all interested in achieving the same objective.

However, I am receiving mail, some of which I am not proud of, saying, "Amen, you are doing a great job" I am speaking of the John Birch Society. I am speaking now of some of the extremist groups that we have developed in this country. "Welcome to the club. You have now joined our ranks." That is hard to take, because as the Senator from Alaska knows, I was one Senator who helped expose the extremists of the right. I carry no brief for them in any respect. In my judgment, any coincidence of interest on this question of policy is sheer coincidence.

Let me say to the Senator from Alaska that here is where the Senator should now start being a Senator, rather than being aware of mail, that this group should start providing leadership, should provide a voice that can direct the course of policy and give it a push. Our direction, I believe, is tied in with the national interest, rather than with groups, according to the whims of public opinion at any given moment. I believe that our position is much bigger than reflecting public opinion. We should contribute to the molding of public opinion. We are not going to do it if we read letters first and then act. Sometimes we must act according to the mandates of history. I believe that the mandate of history is unmistakably clear at this particular moment.

Mr. GRUENING. The Senator from Wyoming makes reference to the interesting question concerning negotiation. Why not negotiation now? When we sit down to negotiate, we sit down to try to make some reasonable, rational adjustment in an area where there are honest differences of opinion.

We have no indication that anyone wishes to sit down on the other side. We have no indication that we would be able to lead from any kind of position of strength that would enable us to exert any influence on the shape of a settlement. At this very moment, as the Senator proposes that kind of negotiation, we are confronted with the effrontery of those to the north of the 17th parallel, who have attacked our army billets and our airfields from which our airplanes are deployed, and who are deliberately set upon a policy of harassment in that part of the world. For us to say now, in the midst of these circumstances, "No matter what you have done, let us sit down now and talk about it," would be interpreted in Hanoi and in Peiping to

mean that we have had enough and that we are willing to call it off and go home. It would be interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as our leaving from weakness.

That, in itself, would foment exactly the wrong reaction in North Vietnam. The President is committed to see it through in Vietnam. Our policy is to see it through in Vietnam.

One of the most serious mistakes that we could make right now would be to lend credence to the view on the other side that we are only bluffing, that we are engaged in some kind of game. That is the stuff of which unintended and accidental wars are made.

It is imperative that we get through to them, loud and clear, that this is no joke, that this is no academic exercise on our part. Once we can make sure that the men in Hanoi know that we mean business, only then, it seems to me, dare we talk in realistic terms of negotiating.

All of us believe in negotiation. However, we believe that we ought to negotiate in times and circumstances when we have a little more control than we have had up until now.

That is why it is imperative that we hold back at this time on the proposal to negotiate.

The Senator has quoted from what the late President Kennedy has said. I repeat a bit more wisdom of the late President, when he said, "While we will negotiate freely, we shall never negotiate freedom."

The time is here when we must draw a line, across which we will brook no further infiltration or supplying of the forces that are now waging combat in South Vietnam. I believe that drawing that line, and making it clear that we intend to hold that line, gives us the best chance to stabilize conditions in the countries surrounding Vietnam and in all of southeast Asia.

It is this pursuit, it seems to me, that will best clear the air.

It is not without point that Edgar Snow reports to us from his conversations in both Hanoi and Peiping that the gentlemen in charge there believe that in perhaps 2 years we shall be off the mainland, that we will go home. They must be disabused of that notion, because of the dangerously explosive assumption it represents, namely, that they can bluff us out.

It is only in those circumstances, the pursuit of this policy of bluff, that the world can explode into a war that no one intended or wanted.

That is the basis for the proposal I submitted the other day, in order to contribute, I hoped, to the substantive debate, which I believe is essential in connection with this subject. The Senator from Alaska has contributed a great deal by his courage in carrying forward his views.

I have suggested that we serve an ultimatum on North Vietnam that if it continues to supply its troops across the 17th parallel, and if it continues to send in materials of war, we shall step up and escalate our bombardment of North Vietnam, for one reason, and for one reason only, that reason being to make it

clear that we are there to stay, to disabuse them of the false notion that somehow or other if they make themselves enough of a nuisance, we shall pack up our bags and go home. Once we clear the air on that point, we shall be in a position to sit down and talk realistically about some kind of settlement of the issues that have generated unrest in this area.

Mr. GRUENING. It is my recollection that the quotation from President Kennedy was somewhat different from that cited by the distinguished Senator from Wyoming. My recollection of what President Kennedy said was: "We shall never negotiate from fear, but we shall never fear to negotiate."

It may be that in another quotation the President used the word "freedom," and not the word "fear," which I used.

I believe that the quotation the Senator from Wyoming has reference to was the one that the President used when he said, "We shall never negotiate from fear, but we shall never fear to negotiate."

Mr. McGEE. The quotation which I had occasion to use is one that I have checked, and one I have used many times. It is, "We shall never fear to negotiate freely, but we shall never negotiate freedom." That is the substance of what we are talking about.

Mr. GRUENING. The point is that President Kennedy said, "We shall never fear to negotiate." This is the time when it appears that the Senator from Wyoming fears to negotiate.

Mr. PELL. Perhaps there were two quotations, made at different times. I recollect both.

Mr. McGEE. I used the one that I thought best described the situation. The Senator from Alaska has used another quotation that he, likewise, believes has application in other circumstances. I believe the one I used fits these circumstances. It is not a matter of failing to negotiate, but one of negotiating meaningfully. A proposal from our side at this time to negotiate would add fuel to the fires now burning in North Vietnam, which would lead to their expectation that we are leading from weakness, and, therefore, they would say, "Why should we talk?"

Mr. GRUENING. The Senator from Wyoming has referred to a commitment which we have made. He feels that in order to carry out the commitment we must do what we are doing now and a great deal more.

The only commitment that I know of from the administration was the one made by the President in his state of the Union message, and perhaps repeated subsequently, namely, that we are there to help the people of South Vietnam, and that it is they who must win their freedom. We are merely there to help them. I do not remember any commitment with respect to North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, or the rest of southeast Asia. The Senator is escalating that commitment into an all-out war in southeast Asia, to do whatever may be necessary. I do not share that view.

I have the great fear, which those of us who oppose the policy of the admin-

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3439

istration share, beginning almost a year ago, on March 10, that we may become involved in a major war. That is contrary to all our professions of peace and our repeated statements that we seek only peace.

I do not see how it is possible to achieve victory—and I put the word "victory" in quotation marks—by military means.

Let us suppose that we send in a million men, as Hanson Baldwin feels it will be necessary to do to "win." We probably could conquer North Vietnam and South Vietnam militarily and hold it for a while. Then what would happen?

We would in all probability have to fight a war with China; possibly with Russia, too. Our policy is pushing Russia back into China's arms. Our policy appears to be closing the split between them.

But even if that does not happen—war with China—does anyone believe we could hold Vietnam indefinitely? That is a prospect which few Americans will approve when we consider the forces that exist in Asia—forces for self-government that will assert themselves.

It is my conviction that we cannot win this war by military means—perhaps it can be won by other means in time. Therefore, I am one who feels that a great tragedy is confronting the American people, the loss of hundreds and in the future, if we persist, of thousands and tens of thousands of young American lives, in a war which ultimately will be settled in the form in which the North Korean conflict was settled—a stalemate. I believe that that is what we should avoid.

I feel that U.S. security is not involved in the operations down there. I believe that the United States has no business to be all over the world unilaterally wherever there is a fracas and a Communist threat and send our young men to die for people who will not fight for themselves. That is the point at which the Senator from Wyoming and I differ.

Mr. McGEE. I point out to the Senator from Alaska that our difference is not based upon the willingness or unwillingness to risk the lives of American boys. Unless and until we are willing to wage peace as vigorously as we are always willing to wage war—that means the commitment to the calculated risks of seeking a chance to reach peace—we shall not achieve it. That is exactly what is now at stake. It was the risk that was taken in Berlin; it was the risk that was taken in Greece; it was the risk that was taken in Korea; it was the risk that was taken in Cuba. The same calculated risk must be taken now. We cannot with certainty predict what the other side will do. If we could, we could make much wiser calculations than those of which mortals are capable.

But we must know what our standards and stakes are. In my judgment, the stakes in southeast Asia are the equivalent of the stakes that we have already measured up to in other areas where the risk was all-out war, and where the risk was literally hundreds of thousands of American lives, if need be. It is the will-

ingness to take the risk under carefully calculated conditions that is the measure of our opportunity to win—not peace—but the opportunity to shape the peace. The price that we have already paid for it is a rather frightening one.

Mr. GRUENING. To use the words of the Senator from Wyoming that "we should wage peace," I point out that that is precisely what we have not done. It seems to me that early in the Johnson administration, when the President was not as committed as he is now, when our casualties were relatively minor and we had not made extravagant promises, when we had not sent Mr. McNamara over there to lead the campaign for General Khanh, and when we had not increased the number of so-called advisers—which have not been advisers—from 16,000 to 18,000 to 23,000, that was the time when, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to which we are signatory, we could have tried negotiation, conference, arbitration, to see how far we could have gotten. At that time it might have been a great deal easier to do it than it is now. I think now we are deeply committed. The problem of disentangling ourselves is surely more difficult. I think precisely we should have waged peace in the beginning as we have waged war.

Mr. McGEE. The waging of peace involves a willingness to risk war. In the rebalancing of the power vacuums of the world that has always been the case. To obtain peace, we risked war in Berlin. We risked it in Greece. We even had to support the wrong side in the Greek civil war in order to win the opportunity for the so-called right side to get a chance to establish a better economic level and a more democratic form of government.

History is not always as kind as it ought to be on questions of alternatives that have faced us. I submit in all sincerity that the people of Malaysia—whatever it is they want—the people in South Vietnam—whatever they may ultimately desire—or the people anywhere else in southeast Asia will have a better opportunity to realize the dignity of national independence if we are capable of rebalancing the world to the point of stopping the territorial influence and expansion of forces that have been bent on taking whatever portions of the world they can get, either free or at a very cheap price.

The analogy is excellent. It applied to the Soviet Union in the earlier stages of its cold war. It applies to China now. It is to their advantage to reach out and press on the periphery for settlement. Wherever there is a soft spot and they can break through, they attempt to do so in their own national interest, for they can attain the objective cheaply. Wherever we have stood firm, events up to now have proved they are willing to pull back.

That is the line we must now make clear in southeast Asia. If they choose not to pull back, their decision becomes an overt act of war, and it is their calculation. It is better for us to know that that is their decision now than to discover it piecemeal after some wishful Munich of 1965. It is important that

we force that crystallization of the main interest and main intent of the colossus to the north that is Peiping, while we are in a position to do something about it, than to fritter our efforts away through false expectations or wishful thinking and drift into the most inexcusable kind of war—an accidental one. This is no time to indulge in wishful thinking about peace. What is required is realistic thinking about the hard political factors in rebalancing the world.

Mr. GRUENING. One uncertain aspect of the situation upon which the Senator relies to make his case is that our response in North Vietnam was definitely in response to aggressive action by the North Vietnamese. That has by no means been proved. I believe the performance of the United States has been far more aggressive in South Vietnam than there is any evidence that the people of North Vietnam have been. It has been alleged that this last attack in which eight Americans were blown up was a North Vietnamese action. I have yet to see any demonstration that that is so. The contrary appears to be the case. It was a Vietcong operation. I have no doubt that there has been infiltration from the North. But the evidence we have is that the incident was another action by the Vietcong. It was made possible by the supineness and passiveness of our South Vietnamese alleged allies. The record will show, I believe, that to date the United States has been far more of an aggressor in its actions than have the North Vietnamese, but that fact remains to be more fully determined.

Mr. McGEE. Verification of that fact is no longer a question of classified material but is public property. The Vietnamese infiltration across the line in substantial numbers is becoming the backbone of the problem. I am not addressing myself to the interior guerrillas, the endemic ones which may have been there for a long time. I am speaking now of what has happened in the stepped-up version of the conflict in the last few months. We not only know what has taken place; we know where it is taking place, how many there are, and where the marching orders are coming from. This has been established, it seems to me, in all due respect to the Senator, beyond the shadow of a doubt. We are not insisting that they pull out the guerrillas. The North Vietnamese cannot command all the guerrillas of the south. But we can address ourselves to the kind of infiltration that is taking place now. A thousand men have crossed the 17th parallel. From the standpoint of those on the other side, that is the strength of a division. As the distinguished Senator from Alaska knows, in guerrilla warfare the proportion ranges from 8 to 1, 10 to 1, and sometimes 20 to 1. By putting 1,000 well-trained men over the line, they are capable of holding down a full division in terms of the kind of warfare that is being conducted.

The price is not cheap, and the task is not easy. There is great risk. But it is the kind of risk that we can best take now, as our course offers a more reason-

able chance to stabilize conditions in that part of the world.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. GRUENING. I yield.

Mr. PELL. I have one question to ask the Senator from Wyoming in connection with the number of people coming south from North Vietnam. I think the number of guerrillas born in North Vietnam and coming from North Vietnam, as opposed to South Vietnamese who have come home to engage in a revolution, is less than the number of American soldiers in South Vietnam. Is that correct?

Mr. McGEE. I understand that to be true.

Mr. PELL. I am glad the Senator pointed out that it would take 10 soldiers, or 10 military men, to balance one guerrilla, which is the ratio accepted as necessary.

Mr. McGEE. The disproportion there is still very considerable. Our troops together with all the troops from South Vietnam—and the proportions we are told are about 4 to 1—are still playing a very limited game which we have no opportunity to command or to control, because of the shortage of manpower. For that reason, we must deal more realistically with the guerrilla problem behind the scene. We shall lose ground rather than gain it if we permit a substantial infiltration of the North Vietnamese-trained troops across the line.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, one other question has occurred to me. Does the Senator believe there is really a close analogy between the situation in Vietnam and the situations which occurred in Greece, Berlin, Korea, and Cuba? Each of those countries had a firm government and specific tactical situations of which we could take hold. In this instance we are dealing with what might be called a political vacuum. We may be faced eventually with the problem of a government that might ask us to depart. Would we then have to organize a counter coup to throw that group out, so that we could organize a new government that might ask us to stay? I do not believe there is an analogy. In Greece there was a firm government that displayed great bravery in the war. In Berlin we have a strong ally in the West Germans and West Berliners. In Cuba we had a specific tactical situation. In Korea we had, earlier, a tactical situation that we could control, with the sea on all three sides and a narrow isthmus; akin to the British in Malaysia.

In Vietnam we have an area that has a boundary far longer on the land than it is on the sea, and a government that is much more unstable. I dislike to see us going back to those analogies, because I believe we get into trouble by doing so.

Mr. McGEE. I would not deny that the political and geographic analogies are somewhat different; but the situations have been different in every one of the circumstances with which we had to deal. The situation in Korea was different from that in Berlin. The situation in Berlin was different from that in Korea. But fundamentally there is one factor that is the same in all instances. Once

again we find aggressor-bent nations probing for weaknesses, so that they can know the areas of their control. They must be stopped; otherwise we are only deluding ourselves into the belief that we are improving our chances to achieve a more stable peace. That is fundamental. We must remember that the crisis in Vietnam is not similar to those in Korea, Berlin, and Greece.

Cuba is in a class by itself. It had qualities that were largely our own. There was the capability of nuclear attack, which required the courage to repel that was shown by President Kennedy. We emerged successfully, under the circumstances.

But in southeast Asia, what is likely to happen if we pull out? Probably the North Vietnamese do not want the Chinese in that country; but the North Vietnamese are in no position to stop the Chinese from coming in if the Chinese choose to do so. Those people will have to make their peace with China if we go home; and if there is any doubt about the American position, they want to know it now. It is the same substantive uncertainty that prevailed in Western Europe after the last war. The Europeans have read the history books. They read how we went home at the end of World War I and left them with the great uncertainties and unrest. They want to know this time whether we shall see them through or make peace with the Russians and try to get along with them in some compromising way. We rose to that great height and met that test. As a consequence, the recovery of Western Europe has emerged as one of the great achievements in the existence of the cold war. We showed our willingness to take the risks that were involved.

In the context of Asia and the Asian peoples, allowing for the lack of sophistication and the lack of stability in their governments, and for a lack of experience in democracy, the power factors remain the same, whatever the form of government or lack of government. Therefore, we must be prepared to take the risks by stabilizing the line in southeast Asia. I believe it is as important to do so there as it is in Berlin.

Mr. GRUENING. There is still one further point of difference between the Senator from Wyoming and the Senator from Alaska.

I very much question the amount of aggression which we are resisting, which the Senator considers a cardinal principle. I have no doubt there was some infiltration, but I should say advisedly that far more aggression has been committed by the United States of America in South Vietnam than has been committed by any of the North Vietnamese.

When the Senator says that this is now proved beyond the shadow of a doubt, he also raises some doubt as to the reliability of our news. We have been told from the very beginning that the 16,000, 18,000, or 23,000 men we had in South Vietnam were advisers. We learned painfully that they were not advisers; but that they were in combat. The American people have not been given the full truth about this situation.

That is one of the factors that make it all the more difficult to judge the situation. We are supposed to assume that everything we do is perfectly sacrosanct, while everything the other side does is wrong.

Mr. McGEE. I agree with the Senator from Alaska that we have been less than candid about our activities, and that is unfortunate. However, our fundamental purpose, our national interest, is to bring about a more stable condition throughout the world. Whether we achieve it will depend on what we do and how we do it in southeast Asia. Whether our men are there as advisers or in another capacity, let us understand why they are there. They are there to try to draw a line of strength; to try to hold back expansion of the war from the north. One may label it in any way he chooses; the result is still the same.

I believe it would be a mistake to become involved in the kind of democracy that exists in Vietnam. They will probably not have democracy there in the Senator's time or mine. We in this country have been working at it for 200 years and have a little way to go. Their kind of government is their business; but we can create an opportunity for them behind the line to assert national independence. That is the only kind of line we can draw—a line that will give them a chance for independence. That is a secondary priority. The first priority is that we draw the balance of the world so as to withhold from potentially great powers all the resources that are so urgently needed in that part of the world.

The Senator raises the question of the kind of support we are receiving. I have already mentioned, earlier in my remarks, that I am hearing from all the wrong people. Some of our good friends on the other side of the aisle are rallying behind the President. If we are not careful, we shall end by having the war called "Mr. Johnson's war," as we ended by calling the war in Korea "Mr. Truman's war."

Mr. GRUENING. That could happen.

Mr. McGEE. And it is still beside the point. The point is, What must we do in order to try to win a chance to stabilize Asia?

No matter who calls whom what name, whether the Senator from Alaska be called a pacifist and I be called a war hawk—people are already calling us names—we cannot pay attention in this instance, as the first priority, to the calling of names. We must try to approach the policy in the national interest, in a way that will enable us to keep with all the business that engulfs us in times like these.

It behooves us to recognize that the President alone must make the decision. In the final analysis, he alone must assess all the give and take involved in this debate. That is a part of our system. The President is operating under a mandate from Congress, one that we all voted for in August.

Mr. GRUENING. Not all.

Mr. McGEE. As I recall, 2 distinguished Senators out of 534 Members of Congress, opposed the resolution. But

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3441

let us say that the vote was overwhelming.

Mr. GRUENING. I should say to keep the record straight there are two Senators who are still proud that we voted against the resolution, including myself. The events of the succeeding months would seem to have demonstrated conclusively that we were not wrong. Several Senators have told me privately since that they wished they had voted as the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse] and I voted.

This discussion has been useful. There should be a debate of this kind. I hope it will be extended and that it will enable President Johnson to achieve the right decision.

Mr. McGEE. I thank the Senator from Alaska for his courtesy and indulgence.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY of New York in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 1496. An act to authorize the disposal, without regard to the prescribed 6-month waiting period, of zinc from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile; and

H.R. 1658. An act to authorize the disposal, without regard to the prescribed 6-month waiting period, of lead from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED

The following bills were each read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

H.R. 1496. An act to authorize the disposal, without regard to the prescribed 6-month waiting period, of zinc from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile; and

H.R. 1658. An act to authorize the disposal, without regard to the prescribed 6-month waiting period, of lead from the national stockpile and the supplemental stockpile.

OUTRAGES COMMITTED AGAINST U.S. PROPERTY ABROAD

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, a few days ago this body adopted an amendment to an appropriation measure nullifying an amendment previously passed by the House of Representatives. I refer to the House action in seeking to ban shipments to Egypt under Public Law 480, and our subsequent action in leaving this discretion in the hands of the President.

Powerful arguments were used to persuade Congress to leave such decisions

with the President as our sole architect of foreign policy. I was one of those recorded in opposition to the Senate amendment, preferring the more severe House language, even though I recognize the role of the President as the architect of our foreign policy. I want it understood that I have complete trust in the wisdom of President Lyndon Johnson and know that he will exercise such authority in the best interests of our great country. My opposition is based on a basic belief in congressional responsibility. In no way would I want it to be said that I was trying to keep the hand of the President from being upheld in the matter of foreign policy.

Since then events have marched swiftly and we have retaliated against the North Vietnamese. Other events have marched swiftly and our property has been placed under attack in many parts of the world.

Soon this body and the other body will have another opportunity to decide whether to appropriate funds for the disposition of grain to Egypt and other nations. Because of the events that followed Senate softening of the House stand on the surplus foods sale to Egypt, including new attacks on our property abroad, I believe it is well for us to look at all these things and to place them in proper perspective.

The action of the House of Representatives was taken, in part at least, in response to attacks on our libraries in Egypt. Once it was nullified, the Egyptian press and governmental officials seized upon this action by the Senate as evidence of our softening our position vis-a-vis their country. They did not present our action as a matter of upholding the hand of the President.

Cairo has insisted variously that first, our shipments under Public Law 480 are not aid, and second, they are aid.

Ali Sabri, Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic, stated on February 10 in the National Assembly:

I hereby announce clearly that the United Arab Republic does not obtain aid either from West Germany or any other country.

Cairo Domestic Service on January 28 stated:

The only way the wheat ban will affect us is that the money for this wheat will go somewhere else than the United States.

On the same day, the Egyptian Gazette stated:

There is no need for the United States to exercise the pressure. The United Arab Republic will simply do without U.S. aid in the form of food or anything else.

A short time later the United Arab Republic blackmailed West Germany, an ally of ours, into stopping shipments of arms to Israel, defensive arms to withstand possible attacks by the United Arab Republic which is armed with Russian and Czechoslovakian weapons.

When West Germany backed down from its agreements to sell arms to Israel and the U.S. Senate compromised the House action on Public Law 480 shipments, Al Kifah, the Lebanese Journal reported:

The Arab bloc can dictate its wishes not only to Germany and Japan, but also to the United States, Britain, and France.

Other statements and publications from the Arab world bear this out. Our action and that of Germany have been viewed as victories for Nasser and his policies of bluster and blackmail.

Meanwhile, other countries have taken their cue from the United Arab Republic where the most recent outrages against our property started. They have felt they could, with impunity, attack our property and our Foreign Service personnel and get away with it.

The time has come for us to demonstrate that we mean business, that we stand up for our friends and against our enemies.

We should provide our embassies with tear gas and other weapons for breaking up mobs in countries that do not seem to understand the courtesies of civilized people.

We should show that blackmail and threats will not bend our determination.

The Senate will face another test when the question of the extension of Public Law 480 comes up. We will be able to state in clear language whether we shall take a firm position against blackmail and whether we shall support our friends and enemies or just our friends.

If one wants some very interesting reading from a very fine magazine, the Reporter for this month, he can find some very interesting reading about Public Law 480 funds and our wheat shipment to another Communist country, but more friendly to the United States; namely, Poland, about which I shall have more to say later.

TOWARD A PROGRAM OF JUSTICE FOR THE AMERICAN FAMILY FARMER

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, a frequently recurring theme of American historians is that as America made the transition from a primarily rural agricultural economy to a predominantly urban, industrially based society, an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion toward the cities began to grow in rural areas. I raise this point in order to note that, whatever the validity of this thesis, the reverse of it is occurring today. There is growing in some quarters a feeling that we can just write off the family farm and forget about it. Many sociologists, economists, Government bureaucrats, and others who would formulate public policy have never lived on a farm, never worked in the fields, never been in rural America, except to zip through on a superhighway. Because our society is predominantly urban, and because so many of our opinionmakers come from urban backgrounds, the importance to our whole society of agriculture, of nature, and of life outside the city is being lost sight of.

This phenomenon may be explainable and understandable. But it is also wrong.

We cannot cut ourselves off from nature. Man's most intimate link with nature is agriculture, where man and nature work together in a harmonious relationship. It is no mere nostalgic longing for the past that raises my ire; it is a concern for our future. I can think of no more disastrous course for us to follow

than to destroy the family farm and replace it with huge, monolithic, faceless "agricultural factories."

In a new study, Leon Keyserling, former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, argues eloquently and persuasively against the view that 2½ million farmers should leave the land and should find improved incomes and employment elsewhere. Mr. Keyserling finds that this viewpoint neglects abysmally both the experience of the past and the contours of the future. He writes:

From the economic, social, and moral viewpoint, the most economical thing for the Nation to do with its farmers is to encourage them to continue to produce foods and fibers, grant them a fair share of our national income for doing so, and develop outlets for utilization of these foods and fibers in meeting human needs at home and overseas.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the study, entitled, "Agriculture and the Public Interest—Toward a New Farm Program Based Upon Abundance," dated February 21, 1965, and issued by the Conference on Economic Progress, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

According to its author, Leon H. Keyserling, "the objectives set forth in this study are closely in accord with those set forth in President Johnson's farm message to the Congress on February 4. But these objectives will be frustrated, if farm legislation embodies the completely erroneous analysis now accepted in many important quarters, and articulated very recently by Kermit Gordon, the Director of the Budget. While the President's ideas and ideals are inspiring and affirmative, the Budget Director's specifics are discouraging and negative, and some way must be found to 'cut the Gordon not.' The study proposes, in implementation of the 'parity of opportunity for rural America' which the President's message advocated, that legislation be enacted in the form of an Agricultural Employment Act, as a counterpart to the Employment Act of 1946, and designed to make maximum employment, production, and purchasing power in agriculture an important weapon in promoting maximum employment, production, and purchasing power throughout the whole U.S. economy."

1. Contrary to the Budget Director's view that about 1 million farmers could produce the foods and fibers we need, and that about 2½ million farmers should find their way into other occupations, the study finds this: To bring a truly American standard of food and fiber consumption to all of our own people, especially the beneficiaries of the war against poverty, to meet the needs of U.S. industries at sustained full employment, and to make a proper contribution to the war against starvation in those countries of the world where more than half of the people go hungry, we need practically to stabilize farm employment between now and 1975, even allowing for the onrushing farm productivity and technology.

2. Contrary to the view that 2½ million farmers should leave the land and find improved incomes and employment elsewhere, the study finds that this viewpoint neglects abysmally both the experience of the past and the contours of the future. In 1964, probably one-third of the excessive unemployment throughout the United States—and maybe half—was attributable to the number of workers forced out of agriculture

from 1953 forward. Between a fourth and a fifth of our total national production deficiency of about \$590 billion (uniform 1963 dollars), during the 12-year period 1953-64, inclusive, was directly traceable to the deficiencies in farm income from all sources. Those forced off the farm have merely compounded the costs of unemployment, poverty, and dislocation in nonfarm areas. Trends in technology and automation in various sectors of the nonfarm economy makes it crystal clear that reduction of unemployment to even tolerable levels will be a herculean task, even without continuing to aggravate this problem by the ejection of people from agriculture. From the economic, social, and moral viewpoint, the most economical thing for the Nation to do with its farmers is to encourage them to continue to produce foods and fibers, grant them a fair share of our national income for doing so, and develop outlets for utilization of these foods and fibers in meeting human needs at home and overseas.

3. Contrary to the Budget Director's statement that about a million farmers (about 27 percent of the total number) have "cash receipts of over \$10,000 and earn average rates of return on their capital investments and labor almost equal to the corresponding averages in the nonfarm economy," the study finds this: After deducting costs of operations, and looking at income as usually measured, in 1963 only 8 percent of farm families (not 27 percent) were at \$10,000 or more, contrasted with 20.7 percent of nonfarm families. Meanwhile, 43.4 percent of farm families were under \$3,000 contrasted with only 17 percent of nonfarm families; 28 percent of the former were under \$2,000, contrasted with only 9.5 percent of the latter; and 11.1 percent of the former were under \$1,000, contrasted with only 3.3 percent of the latter. And the \$3,000 figure is only a benchmark for poverty, not an acceptable level of income. Only 16.4 percent of farm families in 1963 had incomes of \$6,000-\$10,000, contrasted with 33.8 percent of nonfarm families. Putting aside the 4 percent of all farms which are really large or giant in nature, and which receive far more help from the Government than they need, almost all of the rest of the farm population needs a drastically reoriented farm-income policy, which would also benefit the whole economy.

4. Contrary to the notion that the agricultural category in the Federal budget should be a prime target for further cuts in order to make room for other needed programs, the study finds this: Because so much of the nationwide poverty and paucity of public services concentrates in agriculture, because most farm-program outlays do not consume national wealth but merely redistribute national income along lines which help the whole economy to function better than it otherwise would, and because of the failure thus far to reduce the disparities in farm income which are so damaging to the whole economy, farm outlays have already been cut excessively. When proper allowance is made for recoupments by the Government, estimated fiscal 1965 budget outlays in the agricultural category come to only 10.4 percent of total budget outlays for all domestic programs, even though 15 percent of all the poor people in the United States live on farms, and even though about 18 percent of the total U.S. personal income deficiency in calendar 1964 was represented by the deficiency in farm income from all sources. Measured in ratio to gross national product, without allowance for recoupments, agricultural outlays in the budget fell from 1 percent in fiscal 1963 to 0.7 percent in fiscal 1965 (a decline of 30 percent in the ratio), while nonagricultural outlays fell from 15.3 percent to 14.5 percent (a decline of only about 5.2 percent in the ratio).

Using an equilibrium model which takes into account the interrelated needs of the

farm and nonfarm sectors of the U.S. economy, and also our international objectives, the study sets forth these balanced goals for 1975, compared with 1964: (1) Almost all types of farm production need to be expanded greatly—for example, red meat output should be up 35 percent, dairy products up 46 percent, wheat up 31 percent, and cotton up 52 percent—even assuming that only the free world, but not Communist Asia, is included within the scope of our export efforts by 1975; (2) On the same assumptions, total farm acreage should be up 10 percent, and farm employment held within 10 percent of the 1964 level; (3) Most of the poor and substandard commercial farms should be helped to become self-sustaining family-type farms, instead of chasing the futility that their occupants can find adequate incentives and rewards outside agriculture; and policies should be designed to shift more of total farm sales and incomes toward family-type farms, and away from giant and corporate farms; (4) The so-called farm surpluses have been been fantastically exaggerated. For the period 1953-64 as a whole, annual farm output averaged only 1.8 percent in excess of utilization, while true unemployment (including the full-time equivalent of part-time unemployment and concealed unemployment) averaged 8.1 percent, and the nationwide production gap averaged 8.8 percent. For most items, even now, the so-called surpluses are far below an adequate food reserve; (5) By 1975, compared with 1964, gross national product should be up about \$489 billion, and farm personal income from all sources up almost \$24 billion. Even so, per capita farm income would be only about 92 percent of per capita nonfarm income, compared with less than 58 percent now. The number of farm families living in poverty should be reduced from more than 1.3 million to about 70 thousand; (6) The programs in the Federal budget attuned to these ends would average annually less than 1 percent of the total size of the Federal budget, or about the average of the past few years, assuming that the total budget were properly expanded to meet the growing needs of a growing nation, and the ratio of farm outlays to total outlays would continue to decline.

The study's main policy recommendations are: (1) enactment of an Agriculture Employment Act, setting in motion a President's economic report for agriculture, a Council of Agriculture Advisers to the President, and a congressional Joint Committee on the Economic Report for Agriculture—this parallelism with the Employment Act of 1946 serving to promote the parity for agriculture which President Johnson seeks; (2) this act would stress a three-sided attack upon poverty: poverty in our farm population, deficient food and fiber consumption of the U.S. poor in general, and poverty overseas within the range of our productive resources after meeting our needs at home; (3) goals for domestic consumption would be to bring a truly American standard of diet to every American family, by special distribution programs even prior to when the general war against poverty would accomplish this result; (4) goals for exports would include vigorous efforts to improve our competitive position in commercial markets, but would accent utilization of our farm products to help bring the free peoples of the world up to a minimum adequate diet by 1975, after allowance for increases in their own production and imports by them from other countries; (5) goals for farm production would be based upon inducements to maintain a fair balance between annual production and annual outlays; (6) Government aid to farmers would be shifted gradually from price supports to income payments. This would induce needed changes in patterns of production, and shift income assistance from those farmers who need help least to those who need help most. It would also help domestic

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

3443

consumers, facilitate commercial exports, and reduce Government costs relative to benefits, by gradual relinquishment of the effort to support farm prices across the board; (7) the so-called farm surpluses would be held for the most part as an adequate food reserve, and would not be used self-defeatingly to compete with farm income by dumping these surpluses upon the open market; this would be accompanied by Government withdrawal from all forms of farm marketings and storage which compete with farmers and their organizations; (8) more credit would be made available to farmers on more reasonable terms; (9) every effort would be made to steer farm production toward the family-type farm; (10) equalization efforts would be made by the Government to remedy the deficiencies of public services in farm and other rural areas, especially in education, housing, and health services; (11) the Government would undertake a vast and sustained effort to educate the whole American public about the farm problem, so that prevalent misconceptions would not block programs mutually beneficial to the farm and the nonfarm population; (12) to assure agriculture an increasing voice in national farm policies, representatives of farm organizations would have major representation on the Council of Agriculture Advisers, and coordination of programs would be encouraged by the Secretary of Agriculture serving as Chairman of this Council.

INCREASE OF FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 45) to amend the Inter-American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is an agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE]. [Putting the question.]

The amendment was rejected.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill is open to amendments.

There being no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the third reading of the bill.

The bill (H.R. 45) was ordered to a third reading, and was read the third time.

VIETNAM

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I feel that I should express my disagreement with the position taken by the Senator from Alaska today with regard to the position which we hold in Vietnam. We had the opportunity to vote on that matter, and we did vote with respect to the President's strong action on the Bay of Tonkin, to afford no sanctuary to those who attacked our forces, and to resist aggression.

When we did so, we said, quite forcefully and effectively, we approved of the President's striking back at aggression, and when he did strike back at aggression we felt when further aggression occurred he should act strongly and forcefully and effectively with regard to this Nation's position.

The House of Representatives, by a vote of 414 to 0, approved of the strong position taken by the President. The

Senate voted by a vote of 88 to 2 to approve of the strong position taken by the President.

When we did that we indicated that we strongly recommended that when the Communists strike at us, we would strike back still harder. If they wanted to strike back still harder, then we would strike back even harder than that. If they wanted to escalate, we proposed to escalate.

When they destroyed a four-story barrack building housing our troops, we struck back at their barracks.

By a vote of 502 to 2 we voted to approve such action. The Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] voted against it. So did the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. Those two Senators have said more on this subject than those 502 Members of Congress who voted to uphold the President, but until we have voted for another resolution, this Senator considers that 88 Members of this body have approved of the President's action. I feel that the 414 Members of the House feel as strongly as we do. So far as I know, nobody who voted for it has changed his mind. We believe in maintaining a strong position in the face of Communist aggression and we are united behind our Commander in Chief.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The chair will recognize the majority leader after he makes certain appointments.

APPOINTMENTS BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

The VICE PRESIDENT. Pursuant to Public Law 372 of the 84th Congress, I appoint the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. MCCARTHY] as a member of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial Commission.

Pursuant to Public 759 of the 87th Congress, I appoint the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. BASS] as a member of the Battle of New Orleans Sesquicentennial Celebration Commission, in lieu of former Senator Walters, of Tennessee.

Pursuant to Public Law 1028 of the 84th Congress, I appoint the following Senators as members of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Military Academy: Senators BARTLETT, PASTORE, and BOGGS.

Pursuant to Public Law 1028 of the 84th Congress, I appoint the following Senators to the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Naval Academy: Senators ROBERTSON, MCGEE, and PEARSON.

Pursuant to Public Law 207 of the 81st Congress, I appoint the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] as a member of the Board of Visitors to the U.S. Coast Guard Academy.

INCREASE OF FUND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 45) to amend the Inter-

American Development Bank Act to authorize the United States to participate in an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, my parliamentary inquiry has to do with this question: Has there been a third reading on the pending bill?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The third reading has been had.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous consent that the third reading be reconsidered.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I object.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion was agreed to.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I second the motion.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I should like to be heard on the motion. We have been given notice that the Senator from Oregon proposed to debate this matter for 3 days. On occasion I have done that sort of thing myself, and I have sought other Senators' help in waging a one-man filibuster. But when a Senator seeks to engage in a big or little filibuster, he should be here. He should not be outside the Senate Chamber, or back home, or in his office, and have word left to hold up proceedings until he can get back.

I would like to have the Senate do its work. I propose to give any Senator a pair if he cannot be here in this Chamber, so his vote will be effective even when he is absent.

In this case, I made no commitment that the Senate would not vote, and I know of no one else who made of any such commitments. If a Senator does not want a vote to be had, he ought to be at his desk ready to keep talking. I heard the Chair take all deliberate time to put the motion for a third reading. No Senator was present to oppose it.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I wonder if the Senator will be interested in the statement I now make. The Senator from Oregon had agreed to permit the Senator from Indiana [Mr. HARTKE] to take the floor and make the statement he made. When I left, I asked the Senator from Indiana to request a quorum call, because I was called from the floor by the Under Secretary of State, who wanted to talk with me. I was in the reception room conferring with him.

The Senator from Louisiana has an especial duty on the floor as majority whip. I did not vote for him, and his conduct in this matter explains one reason why I did not vote for him.

As majority whip the Senator should protect a Member of the Senate when he has parliamentary rights. I want the Senator to know that so long as he and I serve in the Senate I will never look to him to protect my rights. The Senator knew full well that I intended to speak on the amendment, and he knew there would be a vote on the amendment. I

did not intend to speak long. I made perfectly clear that it was not a filibuster. I was going to proceed amendment by amendment in the regular course of debate.

The amendment had not been so much as presented or discussed by its supporters or opponents. Even normal parliamentary procedure required that the interested Senators be notified that the Senate was returning to the pending business.

That is perfectly all right. I expected this from the Senator from Louisiana; and we know where we stand.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Since the Senator has made that statement, let me say that I have the highest admiration for him, and always will have, even when we disagree. I am sure he will agree that if he wants his rights to be protected he ought to have an understanding with the leadership to protect his rights. He could tell someone who occupies the desk where I am standing or someone on this side of the aisle who works for the leadership to do it for him. But if a Senator has an agreement with some individual Senator that that Senator is going to protect his rights, that is another matter. I have on occasion protected the rights of the Senator from Oregon, and so has the Senator protected mine. But when a Senator fails to do so, he should not expect his opponent of the moment to protect him. That is why we southern Senators keep someone present on the floor when we are engaged in long debate. A Senator should have someone here to protect his rights when he is not ready to permit the Senate to vote.

On this occasion I am not going to insist. I am going to consent to the unanimous-consent request, if the majority leader wishes to make one. But when a Senator has served notice that he is going to keep the Senate tied up for 3 days he should plan to be here.

Mr. MORSE. I was present. I was in the precincts of the Senate.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to rescind the order by which the third reading was had.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I do not know how we can speed things up. I am not going to speak, but we have been sitting in the Chamber all day. The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Long] has made a good point. If we are to have unlimited debate for an indefinite time, I do not know why Senators who wish to pursue unlimited debate should not remain on the floor and pursue unlimited debate. We have spent all afternoon in debate, most of which has had nothing to do with the bill. It was carried on by an ally of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse] on a wholly irrelevant subject. It had nothing whatever to do with the bill, but was on a subject which can, I predict, occupy an indefinite number of hours.

The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Long] is justified in making his point, that if we are to have extended debate, Senators who wish to conduct it should conduct it and be in the Chamber and

carry on the debate, at least some part of it relevant to the bill which the Senate is considering.

The Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse] will admit that the debate so far this afternoon has had nothing to do with the bill which is actually before the Senate, or anything to do with his amendment. I understand, of course, his call from the floor. He can make his own arrangements. He knows how to do that as well as any other Senator. I respect arrangements made like that, but I do hope that his colleagues who oppose the bill will pursue debate on all amendments offered by the Senator, and at least make some headway. We make no headway at all when the subject goes off on Vietnam or some other subject.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas knows, as well as does the majority leader, that I have no intention of filibustering the bill. I do not know why the Senator is using the word "filibuster." There are amendments that will have to be adopted in the regular course of debate. The Senator asked me how long would be required. I stated that I thought 2 or 3 days would be necessary for debate. I still believe that 3 days will be necessary for debate if we go back to the bill and stick to it until 4 p.m. every day as we are supposed to do under the Senate rules. Let the Senator make up his mind as to how to run the Senate. If all the technical rights are desired, go ahead. I know how to use mine subsequently.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have stated that I do not intend to debate but that I wished to make a statement on the subject. As is well known, I respect the Senator's right to his position on this on any other bill in this field. It is an unpopular bill. I have never "run" on the subject. I do not consider that it inspires great enthusiasm by my constituents. It is just one of the duties which I feel I must carry out. We should confine ourselves reasonably, at least, to debate on the subject matter so that we can make some headway. This, as a precursor of the main foreign aid bill, would mean that we will be held here again all year. I do not expect to object at this time, but I do believe that all of us cannot protect the Senator's rights. As the Senator from Louisiana stated, he will have to make arrangements to make sure that his rights are protected. I shall not object.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the motion to reconsider is agreed to.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. The motion to reconsider the third reading has been approved. The vote on the amendment will have to be reconsidered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote disagreeing to the amendment which was pending at the time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the amendment will be reconsidered, and is now pending.

The Chair recognizes the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, before I discuss the amendment, let me briefly discuss the parliamentary situation so far as I am concerned.

A considerable amount of discussion was held with me today as to when the Senate would reach a vote. I stated that I was not going to give unanimous consent to limit the time to vote, on this or on any other bill in the foreseeable future. If some emergency develops—and I believe it is definitely in the interest of my country that unanimous consent be given to speed up consideration of proposed legislation—I shall, of course, cooperate.

Mr. President, full floor debate is becoming more and more essential in the Senate. In recent years, there has been a growing tendency for the Senate to delegate more and more of its powers and functions to the executive branch of the Government. There has also been a tendency in recent years, more and more on the part of the Senate, to abdicate the responsibilities which it owes to the people of this country for full debate on the issues that come before it. After all, we should not overlook the fact that the Senate is also an educational institution, and the people of the country are entitled to the information that comes from serious Senate debate.

The tendency to make this only a meeting place for Senators to convene, or to vote, without presenting to the American people their position on issues which are involved in proposed legislation, constitutes a bad trend, in my judgment. That is why I am not going to be prone this year to give unanimous consent to fix a time to vote, or to limit debate on bills and amendments thereto.

We are going to reduce this body to the equivalent of the French Senate or the Italian Senate, whose membership is an honor but all the real decisions are made by others, if we continue much further down this path.

There is nothing new in that position, on my part. Time and again I have, in my many years' service in the Senate, refused to give unanimous-consent agreement on bills that I thought would be desirable to have discussed, and for the American people to have the benefit of the information that would be brought out in such debate.

So far as the parliamentary situation this afternoon is concerned, my statement is as follows:

I made clear to the majority leader today that I had no intention of filibustering the bill, but that I did intend to offer some amendments—and other Senators will offer amendments—but I wished the amendments to be subject to full debate. I also made it clear that I do not have any plans to speak at any great length in connection with the amendments I shall offer.

The majority leader knew that. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fulbright], sat with me on the floor of the Senate, not so many minutes ago, before I was called from the floor by the Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann, who asked me if the Senate was about to

1965

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A811

On January 22, a crowd of university students estimated at from 500 to 1,000 demonstrated in front of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, and called for an end to all agreements between the United States and the Philippines, including the military bases treaty. It was an orderly demonstration.

On January 26, 5,000 Filipinos marched on the Embassy, again demanding the end of agreements. The Philippine Congress was in joint session at the time to hear President Macapagal and the demonstrators went there to press their demands. Spokesmen said the demands would be given a full hearing.

Yango was critical of the reports in the American press (in Hawaii as elsewhere) that stressed the pilferage angle, but did not stress, when it was the case, the workings of American servicemen involved.

"There is a case of an American serviceman who headed a gang that took out boxes of ammunition from a U.S. base and provided it for Filipino demonstrators, but very little publicity has been given that case, in the United States," he complained.

But he ended the interview on a hopeful note.

"Negotiations between your Ambassador and our officials are now going on aimed at revising the status of forces agreement. This is good progress. The Cole case is moving in the right direction. The feelings of the Philippine people is being considered. Channels are being kept open and this is good. Our peoples are too close to let the matter ruin our friendship."

Both Blair and Mendez talked again this week on the matter and U.S. officials predicted in Washington that "through the course of time, a new article on jurisdiction and other matters, we feel, will emerge."

The Laramie Lifesaver: What Flight Service Stations in Wyoming Mean to Pilots

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. TENO RONCALIO

OF WYOMING

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 24, 1965

Mr. RONCALIO. Mr. Speaker, for the past several years certain Federal Aviation Agency officials persist in trying to close manned flight service stations and aviation navigation facilities in the State of Wyoming. My colleagues who are familiar with the West know that Wyoming is one of the trickiest of the States in which to fly. VFR flying particularly meets its most stringent challenge in areas like Wyoming which is made up of plains ranging from 3,000 to 7,000 feet in elevation and of mountain peaks that pierce 14,000 feet into the air. Winds aloft, turbulence, mountain flying down-drafts, and other aviation perils are as prevalent in Wyoming as in any State in the Union.

Yet certain FAA officials persist in wanting to convert Wyoming facilities at Sheridan and at Laramie into remotely manned operations.

I am happy to have this Record indicate how life is saved as a result of these manned facilities, and I am happy to include in my remarks the following editorial from the Laramie, Wyo., Daily Boomerang. I hope this will be read by

all who are interested in aviation, and particularly by those who have occasion to rely upon Government facilities when flying the airways of America.

[From the Laramie (Wyo.) Boomerang,
Feb. 11, 1965]

STATION'S NEED POINTED UP

An Indiana pilot is alive today after he made an emergency landing near Bosler. If it hadn't been for a Federal Aviation Agency station manned 24 hours a day that pilot might very well have been found dead when he was eventually located.

When the pilot left Laramie the weather was clear with clouds to the north and west. He climbed over the clouds but found the mountains filled in so that landmarks were not distinguishable. He headed north to see if it was any clearer that way. He ran into more storm and headed back to Laramie.

At Laramie he found the field closed in by clouds and finally was forced to make an emergency landing near Bosler.

All of this happened in an area where the weather is supposed to be remoted out of Denver if the FAA station is abandoned as previously indicated.

The FAA managed to keep in contact with the pilot after he went down through relay messages between commercial planes and the ground. They knew at the FAA station here where the plane's general location was, but with that much to go on ground crews couldn't find it during the night because of blizzard conditions, although the downed pilot could occasionally see lights.

Weather proved a factor in continued slowing down of search operations the next morning. The downed plane was without radio communication now for its fuel supply had been exhausted. Finally a break in the weather allowed a plane to take off from Brees Field and in less than an hour the plane had been spotted.

Without FAA in the area no communication would have been established. Without the Agency on a 24-hour system the location of the plane would have been a matter of speculation. Without that location pretty well fixed, search pilots would have had a wide area to cover and only a brief period in which they could fly to spot the plane. Without FAA present, no one would have been aware for possibly days that the plane hadn't made it to its destination. Then, the search area would have been a vast one.

The pilot wasn't dressed for cold weather. He wouldn't have been able to leave his plane and walk out with any hope of success.

The single incident brings attention to the need for maintenance of the FAA station at Laramie. There's little doubt that if such a station hadn't been in operation in the area that the pilot of the light plane would have been found dead of exposure at a later date.

The FAA station plays an important part in aviation in the mountain area where weather is constantly changing. To close one down would mean disaster in many cases. It would set aviation safety back a number of years. The situation here has been found necessary in the saving of a pilot's life, but even under normal conditions it's sorely needed.

Ohioan's Bravery in Vietnam

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. ROBERT E. SWEENEY

OF OHIO

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 24, 1965

Mr. SWEENEY. Mr. Speaker, I wish to draw the attention of the House to an

article that appeared in the Washington Post, Sunday, February 21, 1965, with reference to the particular bravery in the field, of U.S. Brig. Gen. Richard Rowland, the second ranking U.S. airman in Vietnam.

I draw the attention of the House to the fact that Brigadier General Rowland is a distinguished Ohioan, whose home is located in Lodi, Medina County, Ohio.

General Rowland's bravery certainly reflects great credit upon his country, the U.S. Air Force, and his home community. Ohio is indeed proud of this serviceman who, under conditions that are indeed desperate at this hour, acted so heroically so as to avert a planned bombing of an air operations center at Saigon, which air operations center is so vital to the continued and effective conduct of the war in Vietnam.

As Congressman at Large for the State of Ohio, I am indeed proud to represent a people capable of authoring heroes in a time of emergency of the caliber of General Rowland. This soldier merits our respect, admiration, and our appreciation.

The article follows:

U.S. AIDE DEFIED THREAT OF VIETNAMESE BOMBING

SAIGON, February 20.—A U.S. Air Force brigadier general in a dramatic move probably headed off a planned aerial bombing of the air operations center at Saigon's huge Tan Son Nhut Airbase late Friday by making himself an obvious target.

Brig. Gen. Richard Rowland, the second-ranking U.S. airman here, decided to establish himself inside the vulnerable center when he felt he had failed in several telephone attempts to persuade the enraged Vietnamese Air Force commander, Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky, not to send Skyraiders to divebomb the base.

Ky was insisting on bombing the center in the midst of the huge military complex because the rebel coup leader, former Brig. Gen. Lam Van Phat, smuggled back into this country from exile, had seized the center as his headquarters.

STAYS IN CENTER

When Rowland decided Ky was still preparing to divebomb, he told the Vietnamese general that in that case he—Rowland—was going to enter the center. He did, and stayed there until the bombing threat faded with nightfall.

Rowland was talking to Ky by military telephone at Bien Hao Airbase about 12 miles northeast of Saigon, where most of Ky's divebombing force is established.

Rowland is a 46-year-old Ohioan who is chief of the U.S. Air Force advisory group here.

At dusk it appeared that General Rowland's mission might be a failure. About 7 p.m. word came that a strafing run was imminent and thousands of U.S. servicemen on the field were ordered to take cover.

The warning was hardly necessary. American servicemen for hours had been staying close to sandbagged bunkers and gunposts.

Suddenly a pair of Skyraiders that had been droning at a respectable altitude above the field suddenly roared down at the air operations center.

An American Air Force major yelled at Francols Sully, of Newsweek, and me to take cover.

The Skyraiders bored in and we flattened behind sandbags, but fortunately the Skyraiders also flattened out their simulated bomb runs and zoomed up again. All this time the air alert was sounding.

A812

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

February 24

By 8 p.m. the danger seemed past. The Skylanders continued to patrol at higher levels and servicemen began coming out of the sandbagged bunkers.

"Well, at least we trained them properly," remarked a U.S. Air Force adviser as he looked up toward the planes that by now had dutifully turned on their downward-flashing recognition lights.

JOHN MAFFRE.

Outside Medical Experts Support VA Hospital Closings

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. GEORGE E. BROWN, JR.

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, February 24, 1965

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speaker, I am sure that most of my colleagues are aware of the Special Medical Advisory Group which has been established by law to advise the Veterans' Administration on the treatment of the sick and disabled veterans. It is composed of outside medical experts.

In view of the current controversy raised by the proposed closing of several VA installations, the hearings being currently held in the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, and my own desire to obtain a clear picture of both sides of this discussion, I was most interested in the recommendations of the Special Medical Advisory Group.

I feel that all of my colleagues should read the letter and statement, which follow, from Dr. Thomas M. Brem, who is Chairman of the Advisory Group and is a professor of medicine at the University of Southern California School of Medicine. Dr. Brem, speaking for the Special Medical Advisory Group, wrote as follows:

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA,
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE,
Los Angeles, Calif., January 21, 1965.

Mr. WILLIAM J. DRIVER,
Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, Veterans'
Administration Central Office, Wash-
ington, D.C.

DEAR MR. DRIVER: You are aware I am sure that the Special Medical Advisory Group at its last meeting in January learned of the resignation of Mr. John Gleason. The group was naturally concerned with the appointment of his successor, and particularly with the interest, appreciation, and knowledge of the medical program that he might possess. In fact I was instructed by the Special Medical Advisory Group to communicate to the President our concern in this regard. We believe that the Veterans' Administration medical program, although not the largest budgetwise, is its most sensitive activity because it deals essentially with very necessary personal services with the attendant extraordinary complexities. I can assure you that I was greatly relieved and more than pleased to hear of your appointment as Administrator. This is my last year as a member of the group, but I will have no concern about the future of the Veterans' Administration medical program. With you and Dr. McNinch leading the way, I am confident that all of our efforts toward the best possible care of the veteran will be achieved.

I am also aware of the clamor attendant upon the announcement of closing or consolidating certain Veterans' Administration

medical installations. As you no doubt know, these proposals have been discussed with the Special Medical Advisory Group by Mr. Gleason and Dr. McNinch on several occasions. In every instance the members have been in accord with the philosophy and desirability of these changes and have supported them. There can be no question that changes in the practice and effectiveness of medicine and in the distribution of potential patients demand changes in the distribution and organization of medical facilities.

I believe that I can speak for the Special Medical Advisory Group in strong support for the changes proposed. I am not sure of what I can do to support you in this, but you may be sure that I am anxious to do whatever I can.

With hearty congratulations on your appointment and very best wishes.

Sincerely,

THOMAS H. BREM, M.D.,

Professor of Medicine, Chairman, Special
Medical Advisory Group.

DR. BREM'S STATEMENT TO CONGRESS

Speaking on behalf of the special Medical Advisory Group to the Veterans' Administration, I would like to make the following observations relative to the proposed closure of several Veterans' Administration hospitals and domiciliaries.

Our sole interest in this is the provision of modern medical care of high quality to our eligible veterans. To this end, the problems of operating certain hospitals within the VA system have been discussed with us on various occasions. The great advances in medical knowledge and medical practice over the years have dictated significant changes in the provision of medical care. Medical care—diagnosis and treatment—are now far more effective than even ten years ago provided the newer knowledge and methods can be made available to patients. This, in turn, requires the application of teams of physicians, nurses, and technicians, and other professional personnel, skilled in modern methods and the presence of facilities and equipment to implement their skills. All of these are expensive and relatively scarce despite their effectiveness. It is quite apparent that they cannot be made available to all areas of the country, but rather must be provided in complete centers. The maintenance of small hospitals in remote regions makes it difficult to provide the type of comprehensive medical care to which our veterans are entitled. Sufficient highly trained and skilled professional personnel cannot be persuaded to accept positions in these areas, nor is the provision of expensive facilities and equipment feasible.

No longer is it desirable that medical care be segregated into single diseases or categories. The day of the large tuberculosis hospital, the psychiatric hospital and domiciliary is past. Experience has shown that far better and more effective care and restoration are accomplished in a complete general hospital setting where the experts in the various fields can communicate and consult with one another—where modern modalities and facilities for treatment are available.

Knowing the nature of the hospitals proposed for closure, we must conclude that they cannot provide the full range of comprehensive modern medical care. Many of them have professional personnel vacancies in essential areas. Others have seriously outmoded plants. Still others have the undesirable segregation of domiciliary and tuberculosis patients from the rest of medicine.

Needs are always relative and examination of bed waiting lists indicate that these are quite low in relation to those of hospitals in other areas. Clearly there has been a migration of veterans and the obligation of the veterans hospitals is to follow this migration to the areas where the need and demand is greatest—where the provision of complete and broad programs of medical care is feasible. We do not believe that it serves the

best interest of our veterans to provide incomplete or less effective care to those who live in out-of-the-way places when modern and comprehensive care can be provided within a reasonable distance. Convenience of care is a poor substitute for quality and completeness.

There can be little doubt as to where the needs are greatest and where the provision of effective and complete programs are feasible. Budgetary limitations require that decisions—sometimes uncomfortable and seemingly harsh—must be made as to the manner in which the funds are most effectively allocated. When these decisions require change, there are bound to be instances of inconvenience—even hardship. In the present instance, however, we are convinced that there will be many more instances of hardship relieved than created and that the overall medical program of the Veterans' Administration will be rendered much more effective in the services that it provides to our veterans.

We respectfully submit these views for your consideration.

Latin Unions Backing Boycott of Allies Shipping to Cuba

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. PAUL G. ROGERS

OF FLORIDA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, January 27, 1965

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, recently the Inter-American Regional Workers Organization adopted a resolution put forward by the Venezuelan delegation to impose a boycott of ships calling in Cuba. Once put into effect, such a move would have widespread damage to Cuba as the only practical way of supplying this Communist island is by ship. Many nations now allowing their ships to call in Cuba would prefer to retain the trade within the rest of this hemisphere than lose it through continued shipping for Castro.

Writing in the Fort Lauderdale News, Hector Morales has realized the significance of the new movement gathering in Latin American unions, and summarizes the changing conditions in them very concisely. I place the article in the RECORD at this point:

LATIN AMERICAN UNIONS TAKE SURPRISE
POSITION

(By Hector Morales)

Twenty-five years have changed most Latin American unions from the extreme left to a strong stand against communism.

Communist-controlled unions of the pre-World War II era apparently have cleaned house and now are launching a campaign to boycott Castro's Cuba.

The Inter-American Regional Workers Organization (ORIT) unanimously passed a resolution calling for all unions in North and South America to boycott all incoming or outgoing Cuban products.

The action was the highlight of the ORIT's meeting during the weekend in Mexico City. It marked a complete turnabout of unions in Latin America whose history has been thwarted by international communism.

Back in the 1930's, when communism was rampant among college circles in the United States, Latin American unions were being taken over by a more radical phase of communism.